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whether a continuing strategic standstill is both workable and verifiable. It is my understanding that this is consistent with the intent of Senate Resolution 211 as amended. I shall vote for the resolution.

I. A MUTUAL INTERIM STRATEGIC STANDSTILL

Let me describe more precisely why I support Senate Resolution 211, how it would work, what its advantages are, and why I believe it should begin as a temporary arrangement. I visualize five elements in the MISS:

First, The United States should take the initiative in making the proposal. It should be the first order of business at Vienna. If the Soviet Union is not interested, we can move on to other negotiating possibilities. If the Soviets are interested, the entire initial Vienna session can be well devoted to ironing out the details.

Second, The substantive effect of the proposal would be a mutual halt to first, MRV and MIRV flight testing, and, second, further deployments of all other strategic offensive and defensive systems. Only by prohibiting Soviet missile testing that could lead to the development independently targetable warheads could we have the confidence that Soviet MIRV's would not be deployed. Because of our open society, the Soviets need not have a similar concern about U.S. circumvention. MRV and MIRV testing and deployments would be halted, thus giving neither side an opportunity to gain advantage. Research and development, an area which is inherently unverifiable and hence uncontrollable, would continue. The ban on further deployments would encompass land and sea based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and ABM radar construction and upgrading along with associated missiles. The halt would apply only to strategic offensive and defensive nuclear systems. It would not in any way affect the current deployment of ground forces, air and sea units, or of tactical nuclear weapons. We would be as prepared to deal with any contingency—strategic, tactical, nuclear, and conventional—as we are today.

Third, The halt would be for a 6-month period with an automatic lapse unless renewed in the same or in modified form by both sides. Initially, this would be long enough to provide negotiating room and short enough to forestall either sides' having the jitters. Of course, if we detect Soviet cheating, we would have the option to call off the whole arrangement. If all works satisfactorily, both sides could extend the temporary halt.

Fourth, Both sides would agree to rely on national means of verification to detect violations. For the United States this means utilization of our ample technological capabilities. For the Soviet Union, it means also the ample supplement obtainable by reading American newspapers. Given the all-encompassing nature of the temporary agreement, both sides would have high confidence of being able to detect cheating. Any new deployment would be a violation, and would bring an end to reciprocal restraint.

Problems associated with detection and verification need to be looked at closer when it comes to making a final agree-

ment. These problems are not an excuse for rejecting the interim arrangement I propose.

Fifth, As a measure of precaution, we should maintain a high state of readiness to resume testing and deployment programs.

The limited duration of the initial suspension makes possible the breadth of its coverage. As I see it, this approach has the advantages of more limited proposals to ban MIRV testing or ABM deployment and the like, without involving their disadvantages. More limited proposals which focus on banning one or more weapon systems are open to the charge that compensatory actions in other weapon systems could upset the balance. For example, simply prohibiting MIRV testing and deployment would do nothing about ABM systems, and simply banning ABMs would leave the MIRV threat intact. Pressures to resume deployments and make new deployments are bound to arise in such situations.

A mutual interim strategic standstill takes no chances with our security. No one in the Nixon administration has argued, and I believe no one can argue, that no matter what happens, our security could be impaired over such a short period of time. The President and the Secretary of Defense have said that we are in good shape now and in the short term, and that our only cause for concern might be the possible situation in the mid-1970's. For example, even the very first stage of the supposedly "vital" Safeguard ABM system is not due to become operational until 1973 at the earliest.

The immediate benefit to the United States of a MTSS is that it would halt Soviet ABM and SS-9 buildups and multiple warhead tests. The Nixon administration points to these ongoing Soviet programs as the cardinal reasons for U.S. ABM's and MIRV's. To be specific, Secretary Laird has said that 420 SS-9's with three warheads per missile could destroy almost all of our Minuteman missile force. But if we do not act now to hold off this MIRV'ing potential, the situation could only become worse. The Soviets eventually could develop a five or a 10 headed MIRV'ed missile, and with a force of only 300 SS-9's do more damage than at present. Can this kind of development be checked by anything other than an arms control agreement? Would a 6-months freeze, which I have proposed, make the threat of the SS-9 greater?

Of course, U.S. ABM and MIRV programs would be suspended as well. But this should be no cause for concern. Those who still take great comfort in U.S. "superiority" in numbers of nuclear warheads and technology ought not to be disturbed by the mutual freeze. To the extent that this superiority is translatable into diplomatic and strategic currency, the mutual freeze leaves the United States with those advantages as well.

Another benefit from a mutual interim strategic standstill is that it keeps the door open for permanent agreement either along the same over-all freeze lines or along more limited lines. So in a sense,

Mr. President (Mr. HOLLINGS), it would be a negotiator's pause.

Without this pause, all chances of banning MIRV's and ABM's are lost. Once both sides go beyond present testing of MIRV's and deployment of ABM's, banning becomes impractical. In the case of the MIRV's, we would not be able to detect with confidence whether or not they are being deployed. The Soviet Union is not nearly far enough along—if they have started at all—on a MIRV testing program. If an agreement is not made which prevents their testing and they do develop MIRV's, they could deploy this weapons system by the simple process of putting new upper stages on their present missiles and by changing internal guidance systems. These operations present some difficulty for detection. As is now well known, our own country is well down the road with MIRV testing. MIRV deployments are readied for next January. Once these take place, the door is completely shut on the possibility of banning MIRV's. For once MIRV's are placed on missiles, the only means of verification is onsite inspection and a canopener. Neither the Russians nor ourselves are prepared for this degree of intrusive inspection.

So far as ABM's are concerned, deployment would create problems of political inertia as well as problems of verification. Once present ABM deployment schedules are met, political pressures would make it difficult, if not impossible, to tear it down. The technical verification problem concerns the potential for upgrading present radars which are associated with air defense. Some try to argue that the radar support for an ABM system cannot be banned effectively because of this. Given all the difficulties with sophisticated radars in general, this argument seems to me overdrawn. It is no easy task to make existing radars much better, and my proposal would ban the construction of new radars.

If, at the end of the freeze period, we decide that MIRV's and ABM's serve some useful purpose vis-a-vis other nuclear powers, we can make other kinds of agreements which do not ban these systems.

Finally, if the talks make unsatisfactory progress, or if we become dissatisfied with the freeze, both sides can go forward on their own.

The point is that only a mutual temporary freeze preserves all three of these options.

SALT is a very complicated and sensitive matter. The technical aspects, the intricacies of strategic thinking, the potentialities of different weapon systems, are not easy to comprehend—especially when all the pieces must be fitted together in an agreement. No one can be confident today as to what a good agreement should look like at this time, and we should not commit ourselves to any long-term arrangement without careful negotiations.

At the same time, Mr. President, it would be an enormous tragedy to see reasonable options destroyed because those in positions of responsibility do not have the will to preserve them. We do not need to know all the answers in order

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to institute a temporary freeze. All we need to know is that our national safety will not be impaired by the freeze, and this we do know.

The best way to decide about the complexities of an agreement and what is necessary to maintain confident mutual deterrence is to talk to the Soviets as we are doing, but also to give the negotiators the chance to talk meaningfully by freezing the strategic situation.

The only risk in this proposal, as I see it, is the possibility that the Soviets might reject the proposal. Such rejection could lead to a chorus of "I told you so's." But those making up this chorus would be the same people who oppose a freeze. I believe the proposal is worth this risk.

II. THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY: THREE ROADBLOCKS TO SUCCESSFUL SALT

President Nixon has repeatedly said that we are leaving the era of confrontation and entering "an era of negotiation." With respect to SALT, his mixture of negotiation and confrontation can best be described as "massive ambiguity."

This "massive ambiguity" appears on three fronts: his linking SALT with other political issues, his strategic criteria, and his negotiating tactics.

Let me deal with each of these three points briefly.

First, shortly after President Nixon assumed office, we began to learn that he thought of strategic arms talks with the Soviets as a part of our over-all relationship with the Soviet Union. This was a sensible and admirable thought—except that it was carried to an extreme. Well, before Helsinki, he stressed that SALT depended on progress toward settlements in Vietnam, the Middle East, and Europe. In other words, unless the Soviet Union made concessions in those other areas, no real movement could be expected on SALT.

While the President was deciding whether such talks could even begin without progress on these other fronts, precious time was lost. Now that the talks are underway, it is not clear whether the President is prepared to reach any kind of agreement with the Soviets in the absence of these side concessions. To the extent that this approach remains an implicit or explicit part of the President's attitude, it can forestall substantive progress for Vienna and beyond.

By lumping negotiations on the strategic nuclear balance with tenuously related issues, the President makes SALT agreement much less likely. There are real differences of interests and different issues involved in these separate areas. Should we deny or reject the common interest we have with the Soviets in curtailing the costs and risks of the strategic arms race because our interests conflict in Vietnam or elsewhere? Does the President's phrase an "era of negotiation" mean a complete across-the-board agreement with the Soviets or no agreement at all?

If the "era of negotiations" is ever to arrive in fact, we must try to negotiate what is negotiable.

Second, the President seems to be basing his SALT policies on strategic criteria which, if I guess at them rightly, are incompatible with the goal of negoti-

ating and stabilizing the balance. I stress the guesswork because the President said in his recent state of the world message, "We reached general agreement within the government on four specific criteria for sufficiency." His statement, however, did not explicitly identify those criteria.

Withholding of this information, I might add, is a serious departure from the view of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations that the objective of deterrence and the U.S. interest are best served if the Soviets know where we stand and why.

Until the President tells us what he has in mind, however, we can piece parts of the picture together from his own words. He says:

The strategic doctrine that had gained the greatest acceptance by the time my Administration took office was this: According to the theory of 'assured destruction,' deterrence was guaranteed if we were sure we could destroy a significant percentage of Soviet population and industry after the worst conceivable Soviet attack on our strategic forces.

Then President Nixon went on to say that—

The growing strategic forces on both sides pose new and disturbing problems. Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?

I submit that this statement abounds with errors of fact and logic. As a matter of fact, both Secretary McNamara and Secretary Clifford defined assured destruction "as the ability to inflict at all times and under all foreseeable conditions an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or a combination of aggressors—even after absorbing a surprise attack." This was considered the basis of deterrence. As such, it seemed and still seems a valid and sensible criterion—especially since the basis for calculating assured destruction was a very conservative one. Without even counting the lives lost due to radioactive fallout and the catastrophic disruptions on society and services, it was estimated that after absorbing a full blow on ourselves we still could kill at least 25 percent of the Soviet population and destroy upwards of 50 percent of its industrial capacity. These estimates were made in terms of the highest expected Soviet threat and a greater than expected Soviet threat—that is, under the worst possible circumstances to us.

If we already have this kind of capability, surely we have the capability both to respond to lesser attacks and to give the President more than "the single option" of holocaust. Former Defense Secretary Clifford stated that U.S. policy for years has been to "try" to provide "our forces with characteristics that will permit them to be used effectively in a limited and controlled retaliation as well as for assured destruction, thereby being prepared for any type of Soviet attack."

What kinds of capabilities and what kinds of options is the President really talking about? When the President talks

about "the variety of threats we may face" does he mean the Chinese? Both the President and the Secretary of Defense talk about the Chinese threat as if it were something our present and future capabilities cannot fully manage. Again, Secretaries McNamara and Clifford made abundantly clear that our forces are designed to maintain assured destruction against both the Soviet Union and China at the same time. This judgment still seems eminently sensible in view of Secretary Laird's Posture Statement prediction that "If flight testing began in the near future, the Chinese might have as many as 10 to 25 ICBM's in 1975." How does this stack up against our present capability of about 3,000 deliverable nuclear warheads? In calling his area ABM "essential," the President seems to be saying that we need more than 100 to one superiority to deter and cope with the Chinese. If this is not enough, then nothing can suffice—since only the same can be deterred.

While we can assume that assured destruction is one of the President's four criteria, we must also assume that his other three criteria go well beyond this. Presumably they deal with issues of defense and the fighting and winning of nuclear wars. What else could they be, until he tells us differently?

To the extent that the President would go beyond deterrence and assured destruction, we are brought again into pursuit of the will-of-the-wisp of superiority—whether it is called "relative advantage" or the new phrase "sufficiency."

These latter goals are illusions. They are based on the twin pillars of nuclear absurdity: that a nuclear war can somehow be fought in a controlled way, and that one side can emerge the victor.

Think about it, Mr. President. The one reality in the nightmare world of nuclear arms is mutual deterrence. To the extent either side tries to turn this situation to its advantage, it can lead only to the continuation of an arms race that neither side can win.

Third, the President's actions and his negotiating tactics do not seem consistent with his rhetoric about SALT. He calls MIRV and ABM deployments "essential." Even as the negotiators will meet in Vienna, deployment activities will be going forward. MIRV's will be in some missiles by June and ABM site construction is taking form.

I find it difficult to accept the administration's description of these actions as "restraint."

To justify "negotiating from strength" as a good negotiating tactic shows a lack of understanding of the negotiating process.

In the first place, it misjudges the Soviets. For years they have resisted negotiations from a position of inferiority. Would they negotiate from such a position now or would they attempt to get parity? In the second place, it overlooks the obvious fact that agreements are based on mutuality of interests, not advantage. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are strong enough not to have to make agreements that are not in their interests.

Another point of concern is the Presi-

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dent's leisurely pace, despite his stated interest in SALT. The Soviets cannot be excused on this point either. Time is running out for agreements on MIRV and ABM. From what we here in the Senate hear about the President's "building block" approach, he intends to take matters slowly and one at a time. With such a view and at such a pace, what will be left to negotiate if deployments and testing continue?

Again, I want to underline my main point about negotiations. Mutually perceived parity is the best and perhaps the only basis for agreement. Agreement at this time may be our last hope against increased dangers of nuclear holocaust and a terrible drain on our resources and our people. Unless we act now to preserve parity and the possibilities it offers, it will vanish through Soviet and U.S. actions and responses.

III. CONCLUSION: ACTING NOW AND ACTING FOR THE FUTURE

President Nixon called this resolution "irrelevant." This choice of word invites two questions. Is it "irrelevant" because it is not feasible and desirable? If so, he should explain. Is it "irrelevant" because it is what he himself really wants? If so, why does he not propose it?

With only slight differences, a mutual interim strategic standstill has been proposed by a group of experts in the American Assembly and by the President's own Arms Control General Advisory Committee. Many men in both of these groups have had and still have access to all the relevant classified information on strategic nuclear forces. They know what they are talking about and they have the facts. Now, I hope that U.S. Senate will add its voice and act favorably on Senate Resolution 211, the resolution before us.

Acting now means making the temporary freeze relevant.

Acting for the future requires that the freeze be temporary. We need the time to negotiate and the time to decide. Five issues need to be thoroughly discussed with the Soviet Union and within our own Nation:

First. What to do about land-based ICBM's which are becoming vulnerable as missile accuracy on both sides improves and which invite attack on our own territory.

Second. Whether MIRV's are necessary to maintain mutual deterrence, giving us enough deliverable nuclear warheads to hedge against unexpected threats or whether a ban is feasible.

Third. Whether ABM's work, and even if they do work, do we want them, given the costs and the strategic dangers.

Fourth. What over-all political and strategic directions should we set in order to guide U.S. choices on these weapon options and on our foreign policy.

Fifth. What are our overall national priorities?

It is only by answering these and other questions that we can be ready for a final agreement. But we must act now with a temporary freeze to insure that these questions are not answered by default. This is why I propose my 6 month interim freeze.

Thoughtful Americans will recognize that this approach, if accepted by both sides, would greatly increase our national security. In no respect would it diminish our ability to protect American interests. The interim standstill would involve no element of unilateral disarmament. Instead, it would involve reciprocal restraint. Although the suspension would apply to all types of strategic weapons systems, it would not affect conventional forces and related capabilities. The breadth of the ban, and the consequent questions about compliance and verification, would be fully offset by the relatively short duration of its initial period.

In making his decision on these matters, the President would do well to remember the war in Heaven which Milton imagined in his *Paradise Lost*. After the first day of fighting in which the rebel angels suffered the worse, Satan sought to redress the balance of forces. He said:

Weapons more violent, perhaps more valid
Armes, when next we meet, May serve to
better us, and worse our foes, Or equal what
between us made the odds, in Nature none:

To the amazement of his followers, Satan then produced a field gun. And in the next day's fighting, these guns wreaked havoc among the loyal angels. Losing and in their fury, the good angels grasped the absolute weapon. They tore up the hills of heaven and hurled them at the rebels. Not to be outdone, the rebels did the same. Heaven threatened with imminent ruin, God intervened and cast the rebels into darkness.

Angels, unlike men, cannot die. Men, unlike angels, cannot chance and should not want absolute weapons. Without direct divine intervention, men have to fall back on their own good sense.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, the Dutch humanist Erasmus once asked:

What is more foolish than to enter upon
a conflict . . . wherein each side reaps more
of loss than of gain?

Today, we live in an era in which a nuclear war would incontestably bring more of loss than of gain to each combatant. Even preparations designed to protect ourselves and to deter the conflagration we devoutly hope never comes are made at great cost. We are becoming acutely aware that there is no absolute security as long as we remain the hostages of the escalating technology of the arms race.

If we are to fulfill Faulkner's optimistic belief that "man will not merely endure: he will prevail," then we must break the cycle of weapons system after leapfrogging weapons system, carrying us ever closer to the point of no return.

We now have an opportunity, its promise still untested, to begin to bring a halt to this melancholy pattern. Next week in Vienna, the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union will begin. It would be tragic if, at the moment when constructive talks seem possible at last, we allow the chance to slip away.

There is real danger that this will happen. Scientific experts have made it quite clear that once MIRV's are deployed, verification of weapons levels will

be much more difficult, and will require on-site inspection. As long as the MIRV's are not deployed, so-called national verification procedures such as satellite photography can provide an accurate assessment of weapons levels. Given the climate of mutual fear, it will be difficult if not impossible to gain agreement for on-site inspection. Without verification, agreement on arms limitations will be correspondingly more difficult.

Time is very short. Air Force Secretary Seamans announced last month that the United States first multiple warheads would be operative on Minuteman missiles in June. While the administration later said that the announcement should not have been made, they did not deny its truth. The U.S.S.R. apparently will not be ready to deploy MIRV's until sometime after that date, but as things now stand the time is not far away when both great powers will have reached a new and more dangerous plateau.

One way to avoid losing this opportunity would be to adopt the policy urged by the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) as modified by the suggestion of the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER). This proposal, now before the Senate in Senate Resolution 211 of which I am one of 51 cosponsors, calls upon the President to propose immediate suspension of strategic offensive and defensive weapons to the Soviet Union. This would apply, if accepted by the Soviets, to ABM systems, and to land and sea based offensive weapons, including MRV and MIRV warheads. Its intent is to provide time for permanent agreements to be worked out at the SALT talks, and to give impetus to the Vienna meeting.

The large number of Senate cosponsors for Senate Resolution 211 is only one indication of the wide support such an initiative would have in this country. Recently, a similar suggestion for an "interim halt" in strategic weapons deployment was made by a panel of arms-control specialists called together by the American Assembly of Columbia University. Perhaps even more important, the prestigious General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency chaired by the Honorable John J. McCloy recently argued that such an immediate mutual halt of deployment of strategic weapons should be proposed to the Russians, and that such a halt should also apply to the testing of multiple warheads for offensive missiles. This committee, composed of, in addition to Mr. McCloy, Dean Rusk, William Scranton, Cyrus Vance, William C. Foster, and James R. Killian, represents much of our accumulated experience in arms control, gained in the service of several administrations.

Support is clearly bipartisan for this proposal. Its prime movers in the Senate have been two distinguished Republicans, while the Senate Democratic Policy Committee on Tuesday announced its agreement and informed the President that strong Democratic support would be forthcoming if he chose to make such an initiative to the Soviet Union.

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Unfortunately, the administration has chosen to label Senate Resolution 211 as "irrelevant," and has given indications that it intends to pursue a flexible, non-committal approach in the forthcoming SALT talks. I agree that flexibility is a necessity in such complicated and technical discussions, but cannot agree that the initiative suggested by Senate Resolution 211 is irrelevant. Such an interim halt accepted by both sides would provide time for the Vienna talks to bear fruit by removing the threat that deployment of MIRV's would make a permanent agreement difficult if not impossible to achieve. It would be an indication of our sincere intent, thus providing a favorable atmosphere for the talks themselves. Finally, it would delay the need to deploy expensive ABM systems until we know whether they will be needed, at no cost to our security.

In spite of these advantages to ourselves, the administration seems to persist in a more timid exploratory approach to the SALT talks. Yesterday's National Security Council meeting to consider the U.S. position in the talks apparently reached no final decision, ignoring the opportunity to make this important initiative. The New York Times this morning cites "informed officials" for the report that the administration is not prepared to make a proposal for a freeze on strategic weapons deployment, and, apparently, is unwilling to consider the thoughtful and useful recommendation of McGeorge Bundy for an American initiative for deferring its planned deployment.

In the course of Senate debate on this resolution several points have been made which I believe should receive additional emphasis.

First, it is generally agreed that we are now in a situation of "rough parity" with the Russians with respect to deliverable nuclear capability. Sentiment has been expressed in some quarters that we should only negotiate from a position of strength. If this means that we ought to be strong enough to avoid any possibility of nuclear blackmail, I am in agreement. Some have argued that we should only negotiate when we are considerably stronger than the other side, and, therefore, that agreement should not be actively pursued until we re-establish a superiority by deploying MIRV's on Minuteman and Poseidon. But, Mr. President, if we would not be willing to negotiate from a position of nuclear inferiority, why should the Soviet Union be willing to do so? We must realize that the nuclear arms race is both a cause and a result of cold war tensions and fears, that misunderstanding exists on both sides, and that our good intentions are not always as clear to others as they seem to ourselves. For these reasons, the present time is particularly auspicious for reaching agreement on arms limitations, since currently each side is clearly able to deter the other. Further, each side has a clear interest in diverting the vast funds presently earmarked for strategic weapons to other purposes. Because of the existing weapons parity, I submit that a meaningful and effective agreement will

be easier to achieve now than it might be at some time in the future when one side might have made technological advances to which the other would feel compelled to reply. As Washington said:

There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation.

Only when there is a mutual advantage in a proposal can we expect agreement. Such mutual advantages exist at the present, and we should not be timid in our efforts to convert the situation into a completed agreement.

A second point can be considered more briefly. Contrary to the fears of some, there is no way in which the policy suggested in this resolution could be converted to one of unilateral disarmament. The halt in deployment of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons would take place only if both sides agreed. If such agreement could not be obtained, then each would be free to do what it thought necessary for its own protection.

Finally, there has been considerable discussion of how such a halt in deployment, whether the interim one proposed in Senate Resolution 211 or a permanent one which might result from the Vienna talks, would be verified to insure that neither party was violating it. This is a complex technical problem, but our scientists are confident that at the present level of weapons sophistication, national verification techniques can insure that each side will know what the other is doing. As I have said earlier, the verification problem once MIRV's or MRV's are deployed would be much more difficult, since not only missiles would have to be counted, but the number of warheads on each missile would have to be verified; that could at present only be done by on-site inspection. Since both sides still need tests to make their multiple warhead weapons operational, national verification could keep each informed if additional tests in violation of any agreement were being conducted. The fact that verification is possible with present working arrangements, but would not be possible after multiple warhead weapons are deployed is to me the most compelling reason for both an interim halt in deployment now along the lines suggested in Senate Resolution 211 and for a permanent and comprehensive agreement for suspension of testing and deployment to be sought at Vienna.

The folly of the nuclear arms race has continued long enough. We must now truly implement the "era of negotiation" the President has promised both in this field and in others, such as Indochina as I suggested last week. In each instance we should read the phrase to mean an "era of significant negotiations," in which we do all we can to insure that negotiation leads to agreement. The diplomatic initiative proposed in Senate Resolution 211 in my opinion would be an important way to begin to convert the President's February statement from hope to reality.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, first of all, I commend the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS) and the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) for the excellent,

timely, and thoughtful statements they have made this morning on the subject to which I shall address myself briefly at this time.

NO NEW MIRV OR MINUTEMAN MONEY

Mr. President, the measure presently before the Senate, Senate Resolution 211, sponsored chiefly by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE), deserves the speedy approval of the Senate in the same overwhelming fashion that it was approved by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The original version of this proposal, along with the more far reaching resolution offered by Senator CASE, Senate Resolution 210, have been before the President since last June as they considered advice of more than 40 Senators on dealing with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles, or so-called MIRV's, in the context of the strategic arms limitation talks. The Foreign Relations Committee report on this version reaffirms specifically that further development of MIRV's "could most effectively be suspended by stopping further flight tests which are subject to national verification or other measures of observation and inspection."

The President for some reason has not accepted the advice of the 40 Senators speaking out on the issue. MIRV testing has continued, and we offered no mutual moratorium during last year's first round of SALT discussions. Instead the "scope" of the talks was outlined.

The approach was described as a "compromise" between military and disarmament factions. I think that term is inaccurate. The practical effect of continuing the tests may well be to force acceptance of the proposition that any agreement must assume some MIRV's on both sides. Especially in the case of this new technology, it is clear that we cannot pursue serious efforts to limit arms while we are simultaneously feeding military ambitions to build them.

In any case, the pending resolution is another plea that the President comprehend the gravity of his course.

At the same time, we should recognize that this is a cautious and limited step. It has, of course, no binding effect upon the President. It is advice and no more. In light of our technological lead, the Soviet Union might well reject the overtures it asks.

There is another route which, I believe, we should examine, primarily because it is consistent with prudent management of our strategic forces regardless of SALT, but also because it can help to retain MIRV among the weapons which can be avoided through the negotiations that will soon begin in Vienna. It seems appropriate to discuss it briefly today in connection with the pending resolution because of its direct relationship to several of the most important issues facing our negotiators.

Particularly in light of the administration's refusal thus far to propose a mutual moratorium on MIRV tests—which, if accepted, would have halted the Soviet program as well as our own and would have thus avoided the threat to Minuteman—I think we are forced to consider this year whether it would not

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be wise to allow the phasing out of the entire concept of fixed-site ICBM's.

At the very least we should forego expenditures on futile improvements in the Minuteman force pending an investigation of whether land-based missiles can be a viable component of our retaliatory forces in the future. The \$686 million which has been requested in the budget for the Minuteman procurement program in fiscal 1971 should, in my judgment, be deleted from the military procurement authorization bill, and we should also prohibit expenditure of any funds previously appropriated for that purpose. At an appropriate time, Mr. President, I intend to move to delete these funds for expansion of the Minuteman system.

The first and most compelling reason for taking this step is the growing vulnerability of fixed-site missiles. There is certainly no need for me to make this case, which has already been made so forcefully by Secretary Laird and his colleagues throughout the past year. It is their assessment that the Soviet SS-9 missile will be able to destroy most or all of our Minuteman force in the mid-1970's.

For a time that vulnerability was heralded as evidence of the need for the "hard-point" defense to be provided by phase I of the Safeguard antiballistic missile system. But the situation has now changed. In his defense program and budget report of February 20, Secretary Laird made the startling admission that if the Russians deploy MIRV warheads on the SS-9, improve its accuracy, and continue deploying at the present rate—precisely the steps he said last year showed the need for Safeguard—then the threat in the mid-1970s, in the Secretary's words, "will be much too large to be handled by the level of defense envisioned in the Safeguard system."

Most of us would certainly agree that its degree of security against enemy attack must be a primary measurement of the worth of a strategic weapons system. There is very little point in deploying a strategic system if, in the words of the Secretary of Defense, we have no reliable way to defend that system. It is also clear that we cannot significantly increase the reliability of a questionable Minuteman force by protecting it with an even more questionable ABM. We should instead concentrate our resources upon those which can perform the mission more effectively.

A second strong reason for phasing out Minuteman is the fact that the Safeguard ABM is among the direct consequences of keeping it. In other words, under the new rationalization for building the ABM, it is designed to protect the land-based Minuteman system. Any honest evaluation of the costs of Minuteman must now include not only its own costs of acquisition, operation and maintenance, but also the enormous expense of trying to protect it with the ABM. Retention of the fixed-site concept will involve a continuing drain of resources, further increasing the disparity which I believe already exists between the prices of land-based missiles and those stationed aboard submarines.

Third, the MIRV test program is rapidly approaching the point where Minuteman III with multiple warheads will be ready for deployment, probably within the next several months. If we do not prevent deployment we will have a weapons system with the worst imaginable characteristics.

Minuteman III's stationed in fixed sites will be no less vulnerable to attack on the ground than Minuteman I's and II's. So, to whatever extent Secretary Laird's fears about the capacity of Safeguard to defend our existing Minuteman system is true, the same doubts and fears would extend to the Minuteman III after it has been armed with the MIRV system.

There has been an attempt to make the case that adding multiple warheads will improve the deterrence potential of Minuteman by increasing the amount of damage that can be done by those surviving a Soviet first strike. This is not a valid argument, however, since there is a loss in megatonnage per missile involved in MIRV'ing. Against cities, and within the assured destruction levels we have considered necessary for deterrence, a single 1-megaton Minuteman warhead is probably just as potent as three 150 to 200 kiloton independently targetable warheads. This rationale for MIRV is reminiscent of the curious search for missions we have seen in the case of the Safeguard ABM system—its advocates have been forced to find a new reason for MIRV because they can hardly argue, as they did last year, that it is needed to penetrate a virtually nonexistent Russian ABM.

So we can conclude that MIRV'ing will not make Minuteman more valuable as a deterrent force. It is axiomatic that a Soviet weapon that can destroy a single-warhead missile in silo can as easily destroy one with several warheads.

If this is our realistic understanding of MIRV, however, it may very well conflict with the view taken by the Soviet Union. They must assume the maximum accuracy for our MIRV's, and there is little reason for them not to conclude that we are adding this system in the hopes of achieving a first strike potential against them. The multiplication of 500 warheads to 1,500 will very likely unsettle the current relative balance of forces, and it will severely complicate the problems of inspection and verification upon which previous arms control efforts have floundered.

The pending resolution—unless its advice is accepted by the administration and unless the Soviets then agree to an immediate freeze notwithstanding our lead in both MIRV and ABM technology—will not avoid these damaging consequences. We can at least put them off, however, by freezing our land-based missiles in their current status, and by prohibiting any deployment of Minuteman III.

A fourth and final reason for refusing to spend more money on Minuteman relates to future force planning in the event that the SALT talks do not produce early agreement. In addition to the fact that Minuteman will then probably become vulnerable regardless of what

we do, it seems to me that there is a positive benefit to be gained from pursuing nuclear weapons systems which do not require basing on U.S. territory.

The Nixon administration's fears about Soviet intentions to achieve a first strike capability still seem incredible to me. No one is even willing to assert that they are likely to degrade our Polaris force, and no one can argue that they can perform the physically impossible task of attacking bombers and missiles at the same time.

If such a Soviet strike is part of the administration's vision of the future, however, we should recognize that we can no longer take any comfort from the fact that our land-based missiles are located away from population centers. An SS-9 attack from the Soviet Union large enough to eliminate our Minuteman force, which Secretary Laird says is a possibility, would involve a minimum of 5,000 megatons detonating over the Continental United States. That is the equivalent of 5,000 million, or 5 trillion, tons of TNT. The total energy released would be 250,000 times as great as the blasts which leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The cumulative effects of blast, shock wave, radiation, and fallout would bring death and destruction throughout the country, no matter where those enormous explosions took place.

We cannot even imagine the full consequences of this enormous series of explosions. But does anyone believe that it would make any significant difference that the detonations were scattered across the continent instead of concentrated in major cities?

The concept that we gain some safety for our population by basing our nuclear forces in rural areas is, in truth, becoming obsolete at the same rate as is the fixed-site missile. Both are losing their vitality through the steady growth in the size of warheads which can be delivered against them. The safety of our population can be best served by diverting whatever threat exists away from U.S. soil.

In sum, the deployment of Minuteman III can serve only those who see more virtue in arms competition than in arms limitation.

If the aims of the pending resolution are realized or if the SALT sessions succeed by another route in the near term, then there will be no compulsion to make any improvements at all in Minuteman.

If the talks fail, then in the long term there is probably little we can do, regardless of how much we spend, to retain the fixed-site missile as a viable force. The Safeguard ABM will accomplish no more than a chastity belt for a fallen woman, in those situations.

It has been asserted, Mr. President, that actions we might take to freeze our forces while the talks are underway might give the Soviet Union the impression that we are somehow too anxious for an agreement.

Let us reject this preposterous notion. We are anxious for an agreement. Can we not realize that all people represented at SALT, all Americans and all Russians, will be best served by an end to the

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dangerous and futile arms competition which has devoured our resources and imperiled our survival for the past 25 years.

The pending resolution should be approved. Going beyond it, I hope Congress will assert its aspirations for arms control through actions as well as advice, by refusing authority for weapons which can undermine the talks as effectively as if our negotiators turned their backs on the table.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the adoption of this resolution today will be an important step in the long journey toward peace. I am very proud to be a cosponsor of this resolution. This places the U.S. Senate squarely on record for the suspension of the testing of MIRV warheads and for reversing the mad momentum of the arms race. Both the United States and the Soviet Union now have more than enough nuclear firepower, enough overkill, to utterly destroy each other—all the people of the Soviet Union and all the people of the United States—many times over.

The continuing stockpiling of super weapons by both nations must be stopped. If it is not, all mankind could be on the brink of a nuclear doomsday.

More important, Mr. President (Mr. BURDICK), the continued testing of nuclear weapons by the United States has imperiled the hope for success of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—the SALT talks. We cannot tolerate even the thought on the part of anyone that we would be doing that. This insane nuclear arms and missile race between the United States and the Soviet Union has brought all mankind nearer to the possibility of total destruction. Our hope lies in the SALT talks now proceeding. Our hope is based on the fact that we in the Senate today will do our part, by passing this resolution.

Many armament systems are obsolete before they even reach completion. The emphasis may change from bombs to missiles, or from missiles to antimissile missiles, but the armament race continues. Hundreds of billions of dollars and hundreds of billions of rubles are being wasted on the seemingly insatiable demands of the militarists of both nations for more and more weapons.

After years of this dangerous rivalry, neither our Nation nor the Soviet Union is any more secure than it was at the beginning of this decade.

Every effort to develop a stockpile of new super weapons only results in similar action by the other side. After each nation has developed new weapons, the race begins all over again to produce new, and more expensive, and more sophisticated weapons.

Continuing development by the Soviet Union and by the United States, of course, in testing the deployment of MIRV systems, and further deployment of ABM systems, must be halted.

The way to halt it is by mutual agreement.

We must proceed with the SALT talks. We must give impetus to this development, to this movement toward permanent peace, by passing this resolution today.

It is just a small step, but here is an opportunity to show the will and the mood of the Senate.

MIRV is the major factor that could cause a tragic spiraling of the arms race and preclude for many years the opportunity for meaningful arms limitation negotiations.

In our MIRV fight testing, we may reach the point of no return toward being able to halt this mad momentum of the arms race between this country and the Soviet Union.

The negotiations now proceeding first began in Helsinki on November 17, 1969, which was the day set for the preliminary discussions. The SALT talks have been proceeding since that time and are now proceeding in Vienna.

These negotiations are man's best hope for future permanent peace; indeed, for his survival.

Mr. President, President Nixon has rendered a great service to humanity in promoting and encouraging the SALT talks, to limit altogether this horrible race between our two countries.

Our Navy at the present time has nearly 700 missiles with nuclear warheads on Polaris submarines, and with our Poseidon submarines and MIRV warheads, that is more than 4,000. The more mobile of the bases between our two countries are beneath the seas, close to Red China, or close to various areas of the Soviet Union. At the present time, these missiles with new warheads and Polaris submarines can hit on targets at a distance of 2,875 miles. In fact, they can hit with such accuracy that one of our most distinguished and knowledgeable Senators, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), said that if the men's room in the Kremlin were the target—whoosh—and there would be no more men's room.

Perhaps that is somewhat of an exaggeration but it manifests recognition by the Senator from Arizona of the tremendous accuracy of these missiles.

Now, with the Poseidon submarines and the MIRV warheads, the mileage capability has far extended the offensive power of the United States, which is our best defense. It is so tremendous and so accurate that we can, at this time, and certainly within the very near future, eliminate or annihilate the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and millions of Russian citizens.

How much overkill do we need? Do we want to kill every Russian 10 times over?

President Nixon did a great service for the American people in promoting the SALT talks. It is one of the notable achievements of his administration that he has encouraged the SALT talks, which we all hope will proceed to a successful conclusion.

In supporting the SALT talks, and in supporting this motion in the Senate, we are evidencing the fact that we are marking a turning point in history. Since the first atomic bomb was exploded in August of 1945, mankind has lived precariously under what the late great President John F. Kennedy described as a "nuclear sword of Damocles."

In urging Senate ratification of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, President Kennedy quoted an ancient Chi-

nese proverb, "A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step."

Mr. President, we are taking a very short step today in showing the sense and the views and the deep feelings of the Senate, that we must strive with all our might to have the SALT talks in Vienna succeed, in order to bring an end to the strategic arms race between this country and the Soviet Union.

In that connection, following the failure of three Presidents to achieve it, President Kennedy, through the great work of that master diplomat and statesman and truly great American, Ambassador Averell Harriman, achieved a Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that was a great step toward permanent peace.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has in any way, at any time, violated any part of that treaty.

Mr. President, I am hopeful that the Senate this afternoon will unanimously agree to Senate Resolution 211 which is now pending before the Senate. This would be a vital contribution to our children and to our grandchildren and to all generations that we hope will inhabit this planet in peace. We must succeed in ending the menace of MIRV.

Let us all do everything within our power to bring about a firm agreement at Vienna. Let us hope that by the action of our delegates there, as well as those of the Soviet Union, we will take this tremendous step to avoid mutual annihilation.

If we are faced with either mutual annihilation or with permanent peace, let us be recorded today as being in favor of permanent peace.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I thank the very able and very distinguished senior Senator from Ohio for his support of Senate Resolution 211.

The distinguished Senator from Ohio (Mr. Young) has always been in the forefront of the struggle for peace. I think that his statement is certainly a most worthy contribution in support of this resolution which is, as he has pointed out, a very simple resolution. It merely calls upon the President of the United States to propose to the Soviet Union a joint freeze on offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

The Senator very well knows that we are engaged in a very costly and devastating nuclear arms race with the Soviets.

The Senator also well knows that we are probably as close to parity as we have ever been or may ever be and that if either the Soviet Union or the United States of America were to continue its operational flight testing of these devastating technologies known to them at the present time or, even worse, go forward to the deployment of this technology, it would only mean that the other side would follow up with further testing and further deployment and that each of our nations would spend perhaps additional billions of dollars which could be better used for other purposes not only by the United States of America but also by the Soviet Union.

I have never believed that the Soviet Union has inexhaustive funds. I have never been in the Soviet Union. I be-

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I have that my distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from Ohio, has. But I believe that the Soviet people certainly cannot want to continue the spending of billions of dollars on nuclear weapons when they could best put that money to better use, as we in the United States also could.

We have come to a point in history when it is no longer true that superior strength means superior security. It used to be true that the stronger one was, the more secure he was. But that is not true any longer.

If we had more nuclear weapons, it would, in fact, mean that we would be less secure because the Soviet Union might be tempted either to catch up or to fire some of their nuclear missiles in a preempted first strike pattern.

What we have always wanted was mutual deterrents which would bring about mutual security in the world.

I think that by this resolution we are by no means taking away any of the prerogatives of the President, but that we are sharing with the President this political burden and are simply saying to the President, "It is the sense of the Senate that you make this proposal to the Soviet Union."

Some have asked the question, "Suppose the Soviet Union does not accept." If they do not accept, what will we have lost?

No one is suggesting that we unilaterally call a freeze on our flight testing or deployment. We are saying that if the Soviet Union were to accept such an agreement and if they were to stop their flight testing and stop their deployment, the United States would do the same.

I think it is most significant that such a proposal be made by the President of the United States of America. I think it would certainly be reassuring to the world that our Nation wants peace and that we have made this proposal in an effort to obtain that peace.

I want to again say to the very distinguished Senator from Ohio that he has talked eloquently for so many years on the subject of peace on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Unfortunately, at least for this Senator and I think for all of his colleagues, he has announced that he will not be a candidate for reelection.

I am pleased that in the last years of his very able and distinguished service to his Nation and to the Senate, he still raises his voice in behalf of peace. I hope that his voice will be heard by the President and by both the U.S. delegates and the Soviet delegates to the SALT talks and that this agreement might be entered into and that hopefully the SALT talks will be successful in reaching an agreement on nuclear arms control.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I express my gratitude to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) for the very flattering statement he has made about me today.

I feel very unworthy and very undeserving of the magnificent statements made by my fine friend, the Senator from Massachusetts. I hope that just a small fraction of the fine things that the Senator from Massachusetts has said about me is true.

I am very grateful and touched, indeed.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, in the Senator's customary modesty he has made that statement, but I want to assure him that I believe 98 other Senators would have made the same statement I made and I again say how proud I am to have him support Senate Resolution 211. I thank the Senator.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I, too, should like to add my comments to those of the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts and pay tribute to the distinguished Senator from Ohio for his contribution in this field.

I would be very remiss, indeed, if I did not express on behalf of many of us our indebtedness to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts for his initiative and leadership in seeking a mutual suspension of testing of MIRV's by both the Soviet Union and the United States. By the introduction of Senate Resolution 211 he gave focus to the concern of many of us in both parties who hope to reduce the arms race.

Just 1 year ago this week, on April 17, 1969, I gave a speech at Shippensburg State College in Shippensburg, Pa., in which I said that the future peace of the world requires a mutual freeze on the further development of strategic missiles both offensive and defensive. I called for a moratorium on the arms race to be the first topic for discussion at the forthcoming talks with the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons.

That was a year ago, before the narrowly won congressional decision to deploy antiballistic missiles—the ABM—and before the recent announcement that deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles—MIRV—would begin in June.

The U.S. readiness to deploy MIRV and ABM, and the administration estimates of accelerated Soviet ICBM construction, make it even more imperative now that the arms race be stopped and be stopped immediately.

The modification of Senate Resolution 211 by the Committee on Foreign Relations has strengthened and broadened the resolution. The measure now calls on the President to propose to the Soviet Union an immediate and mutual suspension of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, subject to appropriate verification.

I believe deeply that this is the right course, and I hope that the Senate will adopt the resolution.

I have just returned from the spring session of the Interparliamentary Union held in Monaco. During the course of that conference I had occasion to speak to the chairman of the Soviet delegation and other members of the Soviet delegation. We discussed the SALT talks. I told them I felt confident we were going to be exceedingly realistic and also reasonable in trying to find a basis whereby we could come to an agreement that would be verifiable and an agreement, the integrity of which would be maintained, but to try to find a way to halt the nuclear arms race.

I asked them whether with all the armaments they have built, all at the

expense of mankind, they feel any safer for having all those weapons stored and for all the weapons they still have in production. The chairman of the Soviet delegation and other members of that delegation made perfectly clear that so long as one country continued to arm, the other would be required to do so.

He said the hawks in the Kremlin can point to the defense we are building. He pointed to the number of weapons we possess, the number of missiles we possess, and the number of submarines we have, and how the pressure is on the Kremlin to take money and funds from the consumer goods area and to press forward in the area of armament production.

Mr. President, in effect we have an escalation. We build because they build, and they build because we build. Do any of us feel any safer than we did 10 years ago or 15 years ago? The level of terror has simply increased.

We have developed the capacity of some 20,000 tons of TNT for practically every human being on earth, the capacity to exterminate ourselves, not one or two times, but three or four times. What do we have to do? Will we feel safer when we have the capacity to exterminate each other six, seven, eight, or ten times?

It is admitted we cannot unilaterally disarm. No one proposes that. What is proposed here is that we mutually move ahead; that it is sensible that we have to reach agreements in the deployment of new systems, both offensive and defensive, the existence of which can be verified by technology and reconnaissance. They cannot build defensive or offensive systems without our detection, nor can we build defensive or offensive missile systems without their detection. Therefore, if we can agree at a leveling off point, that would seem to be the sensible thing to do. Our defense is adequate.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, would the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. PERCY. I yield.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the Senator has raised a very important point, and I just want to point out that if we do not stop now and if we go forward with the deployment of MIRV, the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, then, of course, the Senator's point, although accurate at the present time, that we have adequate verification means and they have adequate verification means, may not be valid then primarily because once MIRV is out of the bottle, or when the genie is out of the bottle, it may require and, in fact, would require, in my opinion, and I think in the opinion of most of the respected weight of authority in the scientific community, that we have on-site inspection and actually dismantle the missile and look into it to make a determination if there are actual MIRV's in that missile.

The Senator's point is so important because if we do not stop now even the verification means may be lost to us, which is so essential in any arms limitation agreement.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the Senator is absolutely right. We will be over

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the point of no return very soon. Already we have had an announcement that we will be deploying MIRV very soon. The Senator is absolutely right that we can verify the number of missile sites we have, but there could be no verification except on-site inspection, which has not been acceptable to the Soviet Union, if we reach that point. There is no way to verify how many heads are on each missile. If we reach that point, we will have crossed the point at which we could come to a satisfactory agreement, because we should not accept an agreement that cannot be verified.

We must be tough, hardheaded, and realistic—but a part of realism is the recognition that many of the national goals we established for ourselves, such as cleaning up our environment and cleaning up our cities, and other necessary areas of defense, will be impossible to achieve if we continue the arms race and deploy new nuclear weapons systems.

We are at a crucial point. This is why the resolution of the Senator is so urgent and important, and it is why an overwhelmingly favorable reaction from the Senate now is important.

I am very pleased, indeed, with the progress I have learned of in the Helsinki phase of the SALT talks. From everything I have learned the administration went into these talks with a brilliant team, and they went into the talks adequately and fully prepared and realistic about finding a basis for negotiation, compromise, and understanding. We cannot have it all our way if we expect those talks to be successful; but also there seems to be a basis for realism on the other side. It is a crucial time for us to move forward and the progress we make will be important to the future of mankind if we can find a rational and sensible basis to limit the arms race. Hopefully both sides want to find that basis.

I am quite realistic—we must all be—about the fact that if we do not have a common objective, it will be difficult to find a basis for understanding and agreement.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PERCY. I am happy to yield. In fact, I am glad to yield the floor.

Mr. BROOKE. Before the Senator yields the floor, I just want to say, first, that I am most pleased and proud that the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois has supported this resolution. He is one of the early cosponsors of the resolution. He has certainly been in the forefront in this whole area. He is very knowledgeable in the area. He is very knowledgeable about the arms limitation talks, the SALT talks. But I think what he has said this afternoon in support of the resolution has been most worthy and most helpful.

The Senator has made another very valid point, and that is the chances that we have that the Soviet Union might accept such a proposal. Many persons have asked the question, What evidence do we have that the Soviet Union will accept such a proposal? Of course, we do not know whether the Soviet Union will accept this proposal. I do not think anyone

really knows. I am not sure the Soviet Union knows at this time whether it would accept the proposal. But we do know, as the Senator has very ably pointed out, that there perhaps is no better time than now, when the Soviet Union recognizes the problems, as does the United States, of the tremendous cost of the arms race in which we are presently engaged; recognizes, as do we, that this arms race is really availing us little or nothing at all.

I want to point out to the Senator that there have been very encouraging statements, though, of course, we will not depend upon those statements solely, to come out of the Soviet Union by rather high-ranking Soviet officials that they very well might be receptive to such a proposal at this time.

During this debate one of the very able Senators raised the question as to whether we can trust the Soviet Union; that they have not always lived up to their agreements. Of course, we entered into an agreement on a partial nuclear test-ban treaty, as the Senator from Illinois well knows. Most recently we entered into a treaty with the Soviet Union and other nations on the nonproliferation treaty, which, so far as we know to date, has been honored by all sides.

The point is, if we do not try, how will we ever know? And what are the options? The only option would be to say, "Well, we distrust the Soviets." The Soviets will say, "We distrust the United States, so we are going to build more nuclear weapons." Then we will say, "Well, the Soviets have constructed more nuclear weapons, so we had better construct new nuclear weapons for our defense."

It will spiral ever upward, and who knows what will come out of the great minds of our scientists and the great minds of the Soviet scientists as well. Then when we add to that the fact that the Chinese Communist nation is a nuclear nation and that there are nations, it is rumored, who are very much concerned with developing a nuclear capability, who knows that we will not get into a situation where there will be multiple nuclear nations in the world with devastating capabilities, and who knows whether, not only through design but through inadvertency, somebody might push the button and send some nuclear weapons over some country? Then we will have such devastation that I, for one, would not want to be living in such a world. I know the Senator from Illinois would not want to be living in such a world.

So we have a very great responsibility to those who are living today and to those who are unborn to do all that we can to prevent a nuclear holocaust.

I do not know how many of the American people or how many people of the world are really aware of the nuclear capability of the United States or of the Soviet Union, but we are not talking here of the capability of killing thousands of people. We are talking about the capability of an immediate kill of millions of people, to say nothing about contamination and the fallout and the disease and all of the problems that could result from a nuclear explosion.

We know something about what happened in World War II, when literally thousands of people were killed from a bomb which has nowhere near the capable-nuclear nations in the world with

So it would seem to me that this is a resolution which could be very helpful to our President and to our delegation as it goes to Vienna. I agree with the able Senator from Illinois that there was some reason for optimism out of the Helsinki talks. There is some reason for optimism as we enter the Vienna talks. Those talks are to begin on April 16, next week, and certainly time is of the essence. We want our President and our delegation to go to that conference knowing where the Senate of the United States stands, how it feels, how it thinks.

We have a responsibility to, and we have respect for, the President of the United States, but as well as respect him, we have the responsibility to give him our counsel, and our best counsel.

So I hope that by passage of this very simple resolution we will indicate both our respect and our advice, consent, and counsel to the President and to the delegation that goes to Vienna. Not perhaps, but without question, the fate of the world rests on their decisions and on their important deliberations.

So once again I thank the distinguished Senator from Illinois.

Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Massachusetts has raised some very important points. One of the important points is that of timing. It is crucial to any bilateral negotiations. You must have the proper climate. The time is right sometimes, and it is not right some other times. Sometimes a period of years goes by before it returns again.

The distinguished Senator has pointed out the importance of timing now because we are on the threshold of a vast movement, the development of MIRV's and the deployment of a whole new series of weapons which cannot be certified or inspected or assured.

There is another question involved here. We have at this stage a balance, a sufficiency on both sides. No one in the military in this country would presume to say that the Soviet Union does not have a sufficiency of powers of destruction to rain devastation upon this country. No one in the Soviet Union or in Red China itself would presume that we do not have a sufficiency of power to strike them if we should ever be struck. In fact, I would want to reiterate again what I have said on the floor several times: Our defense depends upon an adequacy of retaliatory weapons if ever struck, and the will to use them if we are ever struck, or if any of our vital allies are ever struck.

I for one have seen no sense of inadequacy of capability, and never for a moment a lack of will to use those weapons if we are ever struck by an opposing force.

But now the question is, When we both have an adequacy in balance, is not that, then, a good time? Because when one gets too far ahead, is not the other less likely to negotiate?

I say there is a real self-interest, also, both for our side and for their side, at this particular stage. We are both on the

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threshold of major deployments of ABM systems. I wonder whether they have learned, in the deployment of their system around Moscow, that their costs have escalated considerably. And as they build that system, are they not worried that they are constructing a system that is already obsolete? I have seen no hesitation on the part of our attack forces to say, "We can penetrate it, simply by exhausting it, and it presents no real problem to us."

We see our costs escalating for these systems, estimated to be about \$5 or \$6 billion originally, to a figure now estimated to be at least \$12 billion, and many of us think it could be \$50 or \$75 billion, since the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the distinguished David Packard—with his candor and knowledge of costs on these two systems—has now implied that the \$12 billion figure may not be a figure we can really hold to.

So we have more than doubled our cost estimates in just a year. And we see what has happened to costs on the C-5A, we see what has happened to costs on the F-111, and we see what has happened to costs on so many other sophisticated weapons systems. In undertaking these whole new systems, research on which has not even been finished, the software for which has not been made, and the system never tested or evaluated, I do not know whether the end of cost escalation would ever be in sight.

There are other needs in this country. We have to look realistically at the health of our people, for example. If we had \$12 billion, we could build 100 medical schools. We could run them and operate them, at \$25 million apiece, with a \$20 million initial investment, for 20 years with that \$12 billion. A real human need exists here. The Soviet Union has the same need.

And what will we have when we finish the ABM system? We are protecting other missiles, maybe; but they can penetrate our system just as we can penetrate theirs. Neither of us is any better off.

This is the crucial time. This is the time when we must move ahead. If we could take this next step, to at least freeze the present systems, we might find we had other areas of mutual interests as well.

I do not imagine they like to see 310,000 American soldiers stationed in Europe today, 25 years after the end of the war. And we do not like to see it cost \$15 billion a year to American taxpayers each and every year to maintain those forces, the NATO forces and our contribution to them.

The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany has recently made a proposal that possibly there ought to be a mutual deescalation of forces in both Western and Eastern Europe. We should seize that opportunity as a possibility for reducing the mutual level of terror and the mutual level of costs.

There are possibilities of space exploration together, if we can take these other steps. It is senseless for one country, in behalf of mankind, to spend billions of dollars to send a rocket to Venus and billions of dollars to send a rocket to

Mars, and have another country send one to Venus and one to Mars. I do not see any particular military advantage, and I really doubt that competition now between the two countries for the conquest of space, is going to be advantageous in any way for either country. We are at the point of diminishing returns now in the race for space. Would it not be much better for us now to work out a practical means, as we did in the International Geophysical Year, to have each country take a separate part in some of these programs, and share the knowledge gained with the rest of mankind?

These are the kinds of sensible programs that will give us the kind of country we need and want for future generations. We must be strong, and we must be secure, but we should be realistic about the way we look ahead. We can go the route of hope and promise, or we can go the other route that we have been going—a route of terror, mutual distress, and certainly anguish on both sides, and without a sufficient degree of security on either side to give us any comfort or protection.

I thank the Senator for the opportunity he has provided for all of us in the Senate to deal specifically with one more step we can take as a step of progress for our Nation and for all mankind.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, everything that the distinguished Senator from Illinois has said makes much sense. I think that he has spoken with his customary eloquence, but, even more than eloquence, he has spoken with profound and deep feeling, and with sure knowledge of the facts. He has pointed out the urgency of such a move on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Our Nation has just recently announced through the Defense Department, as the Senator very well knows, that we will be ready to deploy MIRV in June of 1970. That is just 2 months away. If we deploy MIRV, we will then be deploying a technology which will enable us to field a missile with multiple warheads that will not fall in one cluster around a target, but that will go toward many targets at different ranges.

It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the Soviet Union, with its present defenses, to intercept such warheads by using its existing arsenal.

What does that mean? It means that the Soviet Union, in order to be secure, will have to improve its technology, and probably move toward MIRV'ing its SS-9's, which have superior megatonnage to our Minuteman III and our land-based missiles, our ICBM's.

We would then be called upon, in turn, to improve our MIRV system, probably putting more warheads in the missile, and probably increasing our payload and our megatonnage. As the Senator has so well pointed out, the cost of any of these moves is in the billions of dollars—money, as he has so well pointed out, that is so desperately needed for the hospitals of our cities and urban centers, for education, and as the Senator stated in his very simple but most illustrative example, for building and supporting medical schools around

the country, to say nothing of the hospitals, which are crying out for salvation—and literally for salvation—today; for rapid transit systems that will free us from these clogged cities in which we live; for clean air and clean water; and for attacks upon cancer and other diseases.

Just think of what we could do, both in the United States and in the Soviet Union, if we could use just a fraction of the money that would be spent for the deployment of these sophisticated weapons systems for such purposes.

Time is of the essence. I fear that, once we deploy MIRV, the Soviets probably will have no recourse other than to move ahead as rapidly as possible in order to MIRV their SS-9's.

As the Senator has pointed out, we are as near parity, perhaps, as we can be. It is no secret that we have more ICBM's in our arsenal than does the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is building more ICBM's. They are building more SS-9's, and more SS-11's. We know that. And it does not come as any shock or surprise to me. They know how many ICBM's we have. They are trying to catch up. Perhaps they are trying to pass us. If I knew and if the Senator knew that the Soviet Union had more ICBM's than we, we would perhaps be arguing on this floor right now that we should catch up to them so that we could have parity.

It is no secret that we have a superior submarine force, our Polaris force, which we are in the process of converting into a Poseidon force. We also know that the Soviets are beginning to move in this direction, and they are trying to catch up with us and, again, perhaps pass us. It comes as no shock to me that they are doing this. If the situation were reversed, I am sure we would do it.

We also know that the United States is ahead in the B-52 bomber force and the Soviets are doing something in this direction. Perhaps they are trying to catch up with us again, and perhaps trying to pass us. We also know that we have nuclear weapons in Europe at the present time. They do not have long ranges, to be sure, but they certainly can be used if there should be an exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States—and God forbid that there is ever any nuclear exchange.

So we cannot continue this insanity. That is all it is—it is insanity.

Before the very able Senator from Illinois entered the Chamber, I said that we have been criticized for perhaps giving too much credence to the Soviet Union; that the Soviet Union is just trying to buy time. The Senator has heard that argument, I am sure—that the Soviet Union is trying to buy time; that if we did bring about a freeze on our offensive and defensive weapons, that would give the Soviet Union time, and they would use that time to step up their efforts in this general direction.

Let us examine that in the light of this resolution. We are not suggesting that we give them any more time than we have. We are suggesting, as the Senator has very well pointed out, that this is a mutual freeze; that nothing will happen unless the Soviets join with us in this

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freeze; that we do not want in any way to diminish our national security. We want always to have national security. But all we are saying is that if the Soviets can in very sane moments and we can in very sane moments realize that nothing really is being gained by the nuclear arms race in which we find ourselves, we just stop, that is all, and do no more—just stop.

Let me just point out to the Senator that he knows as well as I that these agreements generally take time. Men cannot sit down and come to an agreement on an important issue overnight, and certainly nations cannot be expected to do so. They have their delegations. I think the Senator pointed out that they have their hawks, so to speak, and they have their doves; and we have our hawks, and we have our doves. They have their interests at heart, and we have our interests at heart, which is acceptable and understandable.

So it is conceivable that these talks could go on for months and years. There is nothing unusual about it. I do not know how long the partial test ban treaty took, but it took a long time to come to an agreement. The same is true with respect to the nonproliferation treaty and other treaties.

If this negotiation between the Soviet Union and the United States should go on for, say, a year or 2 years, or perhaps even more what we are really talking about now as being the most devastating technology known to man conceivably could be obsolete, conceivably could be of very little importance, compared to what the technology may be in 1971 or 1972. If this is true, then we are in a worse position, far worse position, to try to negotiate than we are now, in June of 1970.

So if we could have this freeze during the time that the negotiations are going on, if both parties just stop and stand still and there is no further testing and no further deployment during this time, both will have performed a great service; and they will be more apt, in that climate, to be able to enter into a mutual arms limitation agreement than if they sat down in June and began to talk—but at the same time both parties were increasing their arsenal, both parties were continuing to test, and both parties were moving ahead with far more devastating technology.

Mr. PERCY. The points raised by the distinguished Senator are valid. He has mentioned particularly the timing and the length of these negotiations.

I think we should point out very realistically that there is a great sense of impatience in the country with negotiations of the type that are being carried on in Paris—literally no progress, no realism on the part of the opposition. Talks must be fruitful if they are to have any credibility with the American public.

The encouraging thing about Helsinki and the planning for Vienna is that neither side is using it for propaganda purposes. Neither side is trying to use that forum as just a means to spew forth venom and hatred and accusations and charges. They are businesslike; they are straightforward. In the sense of realism

in which we are dealing between the two great powers, it is essential that we make continued and steady progress as we go along day by day in these negotiations.

I think we should take this further point into account: If we continue to move forward, making progress, then we can realistically say that what production of existing weapons is being carried on now should take into account the sufficiency on both sides. However, I, who have never been called a hawk, would look with deep suspicion if the talks were prolonged and if during the course of those talks the level of production of weapons continues to escalate on the Soviet side, as is now the case. I, for one—not known as a hawk—would favor keeping the balance; and it might mean that we would have to go back into production of ICBM's and more Polaris submarines. We might have to move forward.

So there is a sense of balance and a sense of timing here which are exceedingly important. They should never underestimate us nor feel that they can prolong the negotiations and have us stand still while they move ahead in construction of their offensive and defensive weapons systems.

It is for this reason that the proposition is important that we have a mutual freeze at this stage, so that in good faith we can realistically have balance. I can well understand that anyone could feel, in a situation of nuclear monopoly, that it was in their self-interest to move ahead and develop nuclear capability. As a major power, they had to do that. We did not look on that as warlike when they were trying to match the technology and capabilities we had achieved. It is a different picture than if they continue to move massively ahead, giving evidence and credence to the fact that they may be building a first-strike capability.

Should that be the case, I, for one, would be among the first to say that we must move ahead with our own production of both offensive and defensive weapons. I would say that if they want an arms race, our Government would receive the approval of the Senate to move ahead with all the productive power it required to keep a sufficiency of defensive and offensive weapons.

Mr. President (Mr. CRANSTON), let no one underestimate the productive capacity and the economic ability of the American system to move ahead, if that is what they want, to a level of sufficiency on both sides. There must be assured negotiation. Talks should not be prolonged past the point when we can realistically negotiate the cessation of the arms race.

Mr. BROOKE. I am sure that the Senator from Illinois knows that the original purpose of MIRV was the penetration of an expected and sophisticated Soviet ABM system.

I am sure the Senator also knows that a sophisticated ABM system has not yet materialized.

Now the purpose of MIRV originally has been thwarted, so to speak; we now have a different purpose for MIRV.

My point is, simply, is it not likely to be the same case on our side, and the Soviet side, in each instance, that, if we

wish to deploy a new technology, we can find a justification for it—maybe sometimes based upon fact but also possibly sometimes just based upon suspicion?

If that is true, then we are dangerously flirting with a nuclear holocaust on earth and, therefore, it is most important that we do everything we can to avoid such an eventuality.

Again I want to thank the very able Senator from Illinois. He has made a rich contribution to this debate. I am very much pleased that he has entered into a colloquy which I think has highlighted some of the most important elements of Resolution 211.

He has pinpointed some of the most important issues concerning the resolution. I am very much pleased and proud that he saw fit in the early stages to lend his valuable support as a cosponsor of the measure which I hope the Senate, in its wisdom, will adopt today and that the President and the American delegation and the Soviet Government and its delegation will accede to, when they meet in Vienna.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOLE). The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I yield the floor to the distinguished Senator from California.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.

Mr. GRAVEL. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would inquire from the Senator from Massachusetts, did he not yield to the Senator from Alaska, or the Senator from California? I recognized the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I am happy to yield to the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I want to pay tribute to the great leadership that the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) has provided for so many months in pushing this vitally important resolution that can have such tremendous impact on the cause of peace.

Both in his leadership in the Senate and in the country, he has been joined by another great leader on that side of the aisle, the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER), in broadening the impact of the resolution. I am delighted that I have been able to work with both Senators on this very important issue over a period of many months.

Mr. President, I want to express my total support for the resolution in its new form. This is, indeed, a vital and necessary measure which I was pleased to cosponsor. Seven days before the

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United States and the Soviet Union begin their discussions in Vienna on strategic arms limitations, it is vital for the Senate to speak clearly on this issue.

I was pleased to learn on April 5 of a report issued by a distinguished panel of experts from the American Assembly in connection with Columbia University. After a series of meetings, these men urged that President Nixon propose to the Soviet Union a 2-year interim halt in deployment of strategic weapons while an agreement is negotiated to stop the nuclear arms race. The panel was composed of such men as Herbert Scoville, Jr., a former Assistant Director of the Arms Control Agency, John G. Palfrey, a former member of the AEC and many academic specialists who have been intimately involved with national security matters.

Upon entering office, the Nixon administration was pledged to the doctrine of "nuclear sufficiency" instead of superiority.

The testing and deployment of MIRV vitiates the sufficiency doctrine and only prepares the ground for a response from the Soviet Union and a spiraling arms race.

Any MIRV deployment on Minuteman III missiles creates a situation which needlessly complicates arms limitations negotiations. A central issue in Vienna will be the verification and inspection procedures to be utilized once some form of agreement might be reached. Both the United States and the Soviet Union now possess sophisticated satellite surveillance systems which can detect missiles in underground sites. However, no system can detect an ICBM that has been MIRV'ed in its underground silo. MIRVing of American missiles and of Soviet missiles creates an uncontrollable and unverifiable escalation in the strategic arms race once they are deployed.

The only way to prevent this intolerable situation is for both the Soviet Union and the United States to agree not to deploy these weapons in the first place, and to back up that agreement with reliable inspection and verification procedures.

This resolution does just that in its language:

Resolved further, That the President of the United States of America should propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an immediate suspension by the United States and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, subject to national verification or such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate.

On the eve of the Vienna talks, it is incumbent upon the Senate to clarify its position on MIRV. We must do all we can to insure the success of these negotiations. For success would mean a significant step has been taken away from the abyss of mutual annihilation.

The passage of Senate Resolution 211 would go far toward preparing an effective climate for the arms limitations talks. It is in our interest as well as the Soviet Union's interest to suspend the testing of this destructive, costly, and unnecessary weapon.

President Nixon made comments in a press conference recently to the effect that our Nation is already trying to do what Senate Resolution 211 calls for, and then he called the resolution "irrelevant."

Those of us sponsoring and supporting the resolution should be very pleased that the President thus, in effect, supports the policy objectives set forth in the resolution.

I do not quite see how the President can consider the resolution "irrelevant."

Richard Nixon has often made evident his great admiration for one of his predecessors in the White House—Woodrow Wilson.

It so happens that in 1945 I wrote a book about the struggle between Woodrow Wilson and the Senate over the League of Nations. We all know what happened. The League of Nations was rejected. Woodrow Wilson was broken. The League of Nations was broken. And that led to the killing of the peace.

I am sure that Woodrow Wilson would not have considered Senate support of the League of Nations "irrelevant."

Had the Senate supported the President's efforts toward peace, I believe it is quite possible that World War II would have been avoided and that we would not now find ourselves in the desperate arms race which this resolution seeks to end.

It seems to me that our hopes for an end to the arms race now and our opportunities for peace would be greatly enhanced by Senate agreement to this resolution embodying a policy that our President has said, in effect, is his policy.

Certainly it would strengthen our President in his negotiations with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union were to know that our Senate, responsible for ratifying treaties, had indicated in advance its support for these negotiations and for the American position in those negotiations along the lines of this resolution and the President's statement that it embodies the policies we are presently pursuing.

Uncertainty exists concerning the Senate's responsibility for treaties negotiated by the President, by the State Department, and by our negotiators, and it often leads to weakness and uncertainty in those negotiations—a weakness and uncertainty that we do not face when dealing with the Soviet Union.

We know that if the representatives of the Soviet Union approve in these negotiations a resolution, it will not be rejected by any parliament within that land.

It seems to me this is a compelling reason for total support of the resolution and that in pushing for the adoption of this resolution we are supporting and strengthening the hands of the President of the United States.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I especially thank the distinguished junior Senator from California for all that he has done—and it has been much. In the very early stages of this resolution, the distinguished and able Senator from California discussed this resolution with most of his colleagues on the Democratic side of the aisle. And he was very helpful in getting a great number of his Democratic colleagues to join as co-

sponsors of the resolution. Those efforts have now culminated in the unanimous endorsement by the Democratic policy committee of this resolution.

I thank the Senator for making that contribution and more especially for the substantive contribution he has made both in the drafting of the resolution and also for what he has said on the floor this afternoon.

The Senator raised a question about a statement that was made by our President in respect of this resolution. As a result of that statement, I wrote a letter to the President. I think it is important that I read that letter at this time so that the Senator and all our colleagues may know of the exchange.

The letter reads:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am prompted to write by your press conference remarks concerning the Foreign Relations Committee's report of S. Res. 211, an amended version of the proposal I made last summer. The Resolution expresses the sense of the Senate that the President should propose to the Soviet Union a mutual suspension of further deployments of strategic weapons both offensive and defensive.

Our purpose in urging adoption of this Resolution is to facilitate progress in the vital SALT negotiations which you are about to undertake. The Resolution is in the tradition of past Senate actions, including most notably the resolutions which anticipated the partial nuclear test ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty. It is a device for sharing the political burdens between the Executive and Legislative branches by making clear that the Senate, which will ultimately, be called on to endorse any SALT treaty, will support you in presenting a far-reaching arms control proposal. I hope that, on further reflection, you will agree that the Resolution is quite relevant and that affirmative action by the Senate would assist your efforts to obtain mutual arms limitations. Since you indicated last Saturday that your goal in SALT is the same as that endorsed by the Resolution, I presume that the Resolution will have your support.

Of greater importance to those of us working for the Resolution is the apparent implication of your remarks that the United States is willing to consider either a comprehensive or a system-by-system limitation when we and the Soviets meet in Vienna. It would be immensely reassuring to the Resolution's supporters to know that the United States will actually propose "an immediate suspension by the United States and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, subject to national verification or such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate."

If the Soviets refused to accept such a proposal, the opportunity for more limited agreements would still remain. However, if they accepted this more general freeze, the problems of verification would be greatly simplified, since there would be many different means by which to confirm Soviet compliance.

A freeze on Soviet weapons would relieve us from immediate pressure to expand our own arsenals. Credible deterrence could be maintained at the present force levels. Under such a general freeze, a suspension of MIRV tests would be a principal means of verifying that such potentially destabilizing technology was not entering the inventory of either side. Since we do not now require MIRV to guarantee effective retaliation, a halt to the Soviet ABM effort would permit us to maintain a confident deterrent with existing systems. And surely the best safeguard of our land-based missile force would

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be for the Soviets to stop additional SS-9 deployments and to cease work on multiple-warhead technology for that booster.

A freeze of this type might well be proposed for an interim period, perhaps two years, during which details of verification arrangements could be negotiated. If arrangements satisfactory to both parties could not be devised, one or another element of the freeze might be altered later. However, if the freeze is not proposed quickly, it will be exceedingly difficult to reverse certain imminent deployments, especially MIRV. As I have said before, the prospect of MIRV deployment may well encourage diplomacy. The fact of MIRV deployment might well defeat it.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I trust that you will welcome Senate approval of S. Res. 211 as a constructive affirmation of the goal you have set forth for the SALT negotiations. Your explicit support will certainly speed final action on this important attempt to bolster your diplomatic initiatives by providing an advance indication of the Senate's sympathies. Furthermore, as an assurance to the Senate and as a clear signal to the Soviet Union, I hope that you will confirm that the United States will propose a comprehensive, mutual freeze on strategic weapons. No initiative would be so promising in your historic effort to assure the national security through strategic arms controls.

With warm personal regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD W. BROOKE.

Mr. President, the letter is dated March 23, 1970. I will say to the Senator I have received an acknowledgment of the receipt of this letter to the President. The Senator knows, as do our colleagues, that in the interim period the President's Advisory Council made a recommendation which certainly is in keeping with the intent of this resolution; and I am very hopeful that the President will accept the sense of the Senate and that he will go with this successfully to the SALT talks in Vienna on April 16.

I thank the distinguished Senator from California.

Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator very much for his generous comments about my efforts on behalf of the resolution. I commend the Senator for his brilliance in preparing the letter which summarizes so succinctly what we are seeking to do through the resolution. I am glad we concur across the aisle that we are seeking to strengthen the hand of the President in his pursuit of peace through the resolution.

I thank the Senator for the opportunity he has given me to work in connection with a cause that is so important. I believe there is nothing I have been able to do in the time I have been in the Senate which is more important than what I have attempted to do on behalf of the resolution.

(At this point, Mr. CRANSTON assumed the chair.)

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the remarks of praise of the Senator from Massachusetts. They are entirely warranted. I also express my strong personal support for Senate Resolution 211 proposed by my friend and respected colleague from my native State of Massachusetts, in which I have the honor to join as a co-sponsor.

Scarcely more than a week from today, our U.S. negotiators will sit down

in Vienna with their Soviet counterparts to open talks on the limitation of strategic weapons. We all hope and pray that these negotiations will mark the end of the senseless and dangerous arms race in which we have been trapped for over two decades.

I feel that now is the time for the Senate to speak. Now is the time for the elected representatives of the people to make crystal clear to the President and his advisers what we want. Now is the time to tell the world that we believe we can—indeed, in the name of humanity, we must—firmly say "Stop."

Our debates on nuclear policy and strategic weapons systems too often founder on the rocks and shoals of technology. The problems are intensely complex, and the jargon has been refined by the strategic experts until the layman can only shake his head in bewilderment.

But we cannot—we must not—abandon this field to the technocrats and the military analysts.

You do not have to be a doctor of physics, or an Air Force general, or a Defense Department bureaucrat, to understand the essential political and human problems involved. You do not have to be totally conversant with the flight characteristics of the Poseidon missile, or to be able to talk glibly of the footprint of the Soviet SS-9 rocket, or to argue knowledgeably about throw-weight or early acquisition radar, to know that we are spending ourselves into an economic crisis on stockpiles of ever more sophisticated weapons that are ever less subject to rational political control. And the Soviets are doing the same.

Some may even find the language of Senate Resolution 211 rather imposing, although we all have been forced in recent years to learn to roll out phrases like multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle trippingly on the tongue.

I for one find it useful to put the meaning of the resolution in the simplest possible terms. As I mentioned in my speech of January 20 on the Senate floor regarding the forthcoming strategic arms talks, what I feel the Senate should tell the President is that we want our men in Vienna to propose an as is, where is, in-place halt in the arms race.

What would an as is, where is, in-place halt be like? As I put it in my earlier speech, it would simply prevent any change in the numbers and kinds, and modes of deployment, of land-launched missiles, sub-launched missiles, intercontinental bombers, and anti-missile missiles. In particular, steps would be taken to ban further flight tests of MIRV's and their deployment on existing missiles.

I personally regret very much that President Nixon chose to characterize the Brooke resolution at a recent press conference as "irrelevant." At this time and place, what in the name of human sense could be more relevant than for the elected representatives of the people in this Chamber to stand up and tell the administration precisely what we want, what we expect—indeed, what we demand—of our negotiators in Vienna?

Surely, in any question that inevitably involves the expenditure of billions upon

billions of our tax dollars, the sense of the Senate is relevant. Surely, any proposal that offers some hope—even a very slim hope—of reducing the danger of a nuclear holocaust with which we are condemned to live is deeply relevant. Has not the Senate the right and the duty to speak out on an issue that ultimately affects the lives of every citizen of our Nation?

By what curious measure, therefore, can Senate Resolution 211 be "irrelevant" in the President's eyes? I find that description not only somewhat frightening, but unworthy of the relationship of mutual respect that I have always presumed to exist between our branches of Government.

Besides, even by the President's own definition, the resolution under consideration is deeply germane. In the same press conference, the President remarked that there were only two basic possibilities for agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in our talks in Vienna. He explained these as, first, a "comprehensive agreement," and, second, a "system by system agreement."

If the language of Senate Resolution 211 means anything at all, it means that the Senate is saying, loud and clear:

Mr. President, what we want is a comprehensive agreement.

And we want it sooner rather than later, because the hour is late and this may be our only chance.

And we want our U.S. negotiating team to take the initiative in proposing this course to the Russians, rather than merely sitting back and waiting to hear what the other side has to say.

The President went on to comment that we will be prepared to discuss either basic alternative in Vienna. But that passive approach suggests to me a possible scene at the negotiating table in Vienna that would be ludicrous if it were not so tragic. After all the vast expenditure of time and diplomatic skill required to bring the representatives of the two greatest sovereign powers of the nuclear era together—and all the efforts to prepare positions for what promises to be the most momentous negotiation since the end of the Second World War—is it possible that the American team will merely sit down and say "if you've got anything of interest to say, we're prepared to consider it?"

According to the newspapers, the National Security Council will establish the U.S. negotiating position for SALT with the President during this week. I might add that these meetings are coming none too soon. I find it difficult to understand how we can have meaningful consultations with our NATO allies prior to the opening of SALT—as the President has promised—if the administration has not yet established our own position just 1 week before the April 16 opening in Vienna. Faulty communications with our allies have gotten us into deep trouble before, and could well do so again.

I sincerely hope that in its deliberations the National Security Council will not be overwhelmed by charts and graphs and complex technical briefings by the missile experts. These are all vitally important, and of course they should be heard to provide a foundation

for informed discussion. But what I pray the members of the National Security Council, and the President, will keep in mind, is this.

We are now almost 25 years into a galloping arms race with the Soviet Union. Our resources are not unlimited, and neither are those of the Soviets. We have an abundance of problems within our own society that might be solved or at least alleviated by investment of some of the money and expertise that we now devote to weapons of war. I am sure the leaders in the Kremlin could say the same thing. Both sides have acknowledged that we have reached a critical plateau in nuclear weapons and missile development at which there is rough strategic parity between us. After 25 years of pouring out our national treasure on arms and more arms, the question is now whether we have the guts to say simply "We'll stop, if you'll stop."

I do not expect miracles on the first day in Vienna, and I do not anticipate that the arms race will come to a screeching halt at our first proposal to the Soviets. But the time is ripe for the kind of "risk for peace" that President Nixon has promised the Nation he is ready to take.

We must make this effort. We owe it not only to ourselves but to our children to make this the time when the United States clearly and unequivocally called for an as is, where is, in-place halt in the absurd multiplication of weapons of mass destruction.

I am not proposing that we dismantle our defenses or lay down our arms. Nor do I expect that the Russians would accept any agreement that would endanger their national security. But a temporary freeze—an in-place halt—in the arms race give both the American and Soviet negotiators in Vienna the breathing space they so vitally need to work out a more durable agreement, that hopefully would include permanent measures to stabilize and reduce numbers of strategic weapons.

If the Soviets do not want an as is, where is, in-place halt, or if they fail to live up to its conditions, I would be deeply discouraged. But there would be no permanent harm done to our national security posture.

It is no secret that we have tested MIRV warheads extensively. Indeed, an administration spokesman has informed the world—in an announcement I consider very damaging to prospects for success in SALT—that we are prepared to deploy MIRV warheads on operational missiles by June 1. If we have reached that stage of advanced readiness, there would be no significant delay in proceeding with deployment, should an interim in-place halt of 6 months or more fail to improve the climate for agreement with the Soviets, or be broken by either side.

At times, I think the Pentagon is on the wrong side of this issue. Secretary Laird and his subordinates have waged a persistent public campaign raising the specter of possible Soviet aspirations for a strategic first-strike capability. The Pentagon has published reports indicating that the Russians have been proceed-

ing with accelerated testing of multiple warheads even since the preliminary SALT meeting in Helsinki, and are rapidly deploying more and more of their powerful SS-9 rockets. If someone can devise a plan that would stop the Russians from deploying more SS-9's and from further MIRV testing for 6 months to a year, why should not the generals in the Pentagon leap at the idea?

If we already have a sufficiency of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles today to insure our national security, why should not the Defense Department support any proposal that would maintain that uneasy equilibrium even temporarily?

But I confess that I am not sanguine about the prospects of Secretary Laird's endorsement of Senate Resolution 211, although I would welcome it.

I feel that each Senator, in reaching a judgment on this resolution, also should consider some recent direct signs that the Soviets might be prepared to talk in Vienna about something very like an as is, where is, in-place halt. In this regard, it is well worth a few moments to look carefully at an article that appeared in the March 7 edition of the authoritative Communist party newspaper Pravda.

This was a long and detailed discussion of prospects for SALT, signed "observer," a nom de plume often attached to the most significant of statements in the opaque world of Soviet affairs. The article deserves far more expert analysis than I, as a non-Kremlinologist, can give it. But several aspects clearly are of great importance.

The "observer" statement made clear that the Soviets, rather than insisting on "general and complete disarmament," are prepared to accept more limited agreements if they are in the mutual national interests of the contracting parties. The article stated that the Soviet Union is by no means—and I quote—"guided by the principle of all or nothing" in its approach to SALT. And the Pravda piece is replete with evidence of Soviet apprehension that this is a critical opportunity in the history of the arms race that, if lost, may never be regained.

Pravda of March 7 also left no doubt that Soviet military planners agree that our two nations are locked in a position of rough strategic parity at present. The article acknowledged that the Soviet Union now possesses the modern armaments necessary to guarantee the security of the U.S.S.R. and its allies "to the necessary degree." Let me underline that phrase: "To the necessary degree." If that is not a capsule definition of what we have termed "sufficiency," I do not know what is.

In addition, the Pravda article emphasized the fact that the Soviets are keenly aware that a new escalation of the arms race would make difficult if not impossible the attainment of the domestic goals the Politburo has set for the Soviet Union. The article stated:

The solution of the disarmament problem would help to release from the sphere of military production colossal means which are expended on armaments throughout the world, and whose utilization on economic development need: could assist the scientific, technical, and economic progress of all mankind . . .

I want to underline that that quotation is from Pravda, and not from the New York Times.

Finally, the anonymous "observer" extended an unmistakable warning that neither side can be permitted to use the strategic arms talks as a cover or screen behind which to seek military advantage. I think that our military experts in the Pentagon would be quick to endorse that statement. What better way to insure that there is no improper use of SALT by either side than through an interim agreement on an as is, where is, in-place halt? At least this would give the negotiators in SALT time to test each other's sincerity and willingness to reach a more permanent accord.

Mr. President, I am convinced that we must seize the opportunity presented by the opening of the strategic arms talks in Vienna to take the arms control initiative in our own national interest. I believe that there is at least a reasonable expectation that the Soviet response will be positive.

I feel that a U.S. proposal for a temporary freeze on MIRV testing and the further deployment of both offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons will not adversely affect our national security. I submit that we already have the technical capacity to monitor such a temporary agreement or in-place halt—a capacity that we will lose, probably irrevocably, once each side begins large-scale deployment of MIRV warheads.

I, therefore, intend to vote in favor of Senate Resolution 211, and I urge each of my colleagues to lend his support to this deeply significant—and relevant—proposal.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I thank the very able and distinguished Senator from Alaska for his contribution, and especially for his tone of optimism with regard to the possibility that the Soviet Union may accept this agreement.

I assure the distinguished Senator that I have put into the Record the Pravda statement—which, incidentally, is the Central Committee statement of the Soviet Union. I also wish to say to the Senator that when we had hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, we had before us Prof. Marshall Shulman of Columbia University, who is an authority on the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, and he pointed out to the committee that there were many statements which could give us some cause for hope and optimism, though, of course, no one really knows whether the Soviet Union will or will not accept the proposal if made by our President and by our delegation at Vienna.

But at any rate, I am very grateful that the Senator has so directed his remarks as to give us all a hope and some optimism as to the chances of the Soviet Union accepting the proposal that the Senator is suggesting to our President.

I thank the distinguished Senator.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

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Mr. BAKER. Who has the floor at this moment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has the floor.

Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. BROOKE. I yield.

Mr. BAKER. First, of all, I commend the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts for his contribution in this field and in this respect. I have a longtime, high admiration, not only for his parliamentary skill and ability, but for the astuteness of his judgment on matters of peace and security for this Republic.

I think he has great potential for an additional contribution in that respect in the resolution before the Senate at this time. But to make sure that there is no misunderstanding—and we must face the fact that this forum, more often than not, records colloquy that is at least as significant as the wording of a resolution itself—I think it is important to clarify one or two points before I make up my mind on how to vote on the resolution.

First, I agree that the resolution, if adopted by a significant part of this body, would in effect be a signal not only to our own negotiators at SALT, but to the Soviet Union as well, that we want this particular item negotiated successfully.

But may I ask my colleague, is it a signal that we want it so badly that we single it out, to suggest that we will retreat or give in on almost any other item in order to accomplish it? Is that a fair statement of the intent?

Mr. BROOKE. My answer to the very able and distinguished Senator from Tennessee is that it is not the intent of the resolution.

This resolution carries with it no instructions to our delegation that will go to Vienna. It obviously carries with it no instructions to the President at all. It is only a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, and what it purports to say to the President is that it is the sense of the Senate that he make this proposal to the Soviet Union, and nothing more. If the President sees fit not to make the proposal to the Soviet Union, then we have, certainly, no recourse in that regard at all, and the same thing applies to the delegation, which is not an arm of the U.S. Senate.

I assure the distinguished Senator from Tennessee that we certainly are not suggesting in any fashion that we propose to give away anything at all. I further assure him that all we are suggesting in this very simple resolution is that the proposal be made. If the Soviet Union does not accept the proposal, or if the Soviet Union does not stop operational testing and does not stop deployment, then, of course, the United States would not stop operational testing and would not stop deployment of its weapons systems.

In that event, I think that nothing would happen at all. They would probably go on with their testing and their deployment, and the United States would continue with its testing and deployment.

I certainly want to reassure the Senator that we are giving up nothing in the resolution, and that it is not the intent

that the United States give up anything, or that it weaken its position at the bargaining table.

Mr. BAKER. I am pleased to know that, and I thank my colleague. I would have assumed as much.

I think it is important that we make it abundantly clear that we are not saying to the world and to the Soviet Union that we want this single item so badly that we will relinquish our claim to other controls in other categories in order to obtain it?

I cite this as an example: I hope that, even without a resolution such as the Brooke resolution, the President would instruct and our negotiators would attempt to obtain an agreement with the Soviet Union to attempt to prevent further deployment of any antiballistic missile system anywhere, but I would hope that the resolution does not diminish our fervor for an effort to stabilize our ABM deployment with that of Russia. By the same token, I would hope there might be some sort of mutuality of limitation on naval vessels, especially deep-running nuclear submarines. I would hope that the adoption of the Brooke resolution, without reference to that item, would not seem to diminish the intensity of our desire for that item as well.

Would the Senator from Massachusetts agree with me that it would be appropriate, through our colloquy, to signal specifically that that is not our intent?

Mr. BROOKE. I most certainly would, and I give the Senator from Tennessee every assurance that that is the fact, and that what we are doing here is merely sharing the political burden with the President of the United States. This is our responsibility. We did it in connection with the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by a Senate resolution; we also did it in connection with the Nonproliferation Treaty into which we entered with the Soviet Union; and we are merely giving this advice to the President in similar fashion here.

As I said earlier in the debate, we respect the President, but in addition to our respect, we owe him our counsel, and we are merely here giving him our counsel. He may or may not take it, though I am very pleased that his Advisory Council has practically made the identical recommendations that this resolution makes, and that the Senate would be making by its adoption, and I am very hopeful that the President is going to accept it.

I know that the distinguished Senator from Tennessee was somewhat concerned about a statement which was made, I think, by the distinguished Senator from Alaska and the distinguished Senator from California, when they referred to words that the President had used as "superfluous" or "irrelevant." If I may correct the RECORD, the President did not use the word "superfluous" at any time. The President did use the word "irrelevant," but I think he meant that only in the sense that, as the distinguished Senator from Tennessee has said, that he hoped to do this anyway at Vienna.

Mr. BAKER. And may I say that I

cannot, for my part, even visualize a situation where the President of the United States would not ask that our negotiators attempt to accomplish the objectives of this resolution.

So I think, if I may be facetious for a moment, the irrelevancy is in the irrelevance, because it is clear that the position of the United States is to try to stabilize the arms situation between the superpowers of the world.

Mr. BROOKE. And it is equally clear that the Senate of the United States has not only the authority but the responsibility to give to the President of the United States its counsel in matters which would affect a treaty which we ultimately would be called upon to ratify. And I might also add, for the satisfaction of the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, that the President, at a press conference when this resolution was originally introduced, said that he thought this resolution was most constructive, and I think I quote him correctly at that time. That resolution has been broadened. It was broadened by an amendment offered by the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER), and the Committee on Foreign Relations, under its distinguished chairman, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), held hearings on this matter. I think the resolution has been strengthened as well as broadened, and certainly it carries with it more than we had asked in the first instance, though it was implicit in that resolution. Nevertheless, it is spelled out, and I think it is of more value to the President in its form now than it was in its original form at the time he referred to it and characterized it as constructive.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts for yielding for this purpose, so that there might be, in my view, a significant clarification of the intent and the import of this resolution.

I had not yet made up my mind as to how I will vote on this resolution. With this clarification, I intend to support it.

Mr. BROOKE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Tennessee and say to him that I am very grateful for the question, and even more grateful for his support of this resolution.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BROOKE. I yield.

Mr. DOLE. Let me commend the Senator from Massachusetts. As a cosponsor of the amended resolution, it is my understanding that President Nixon has indicated this would be a constructive step.

I also understand that it is the intention and purpose of the Senator from Massachusetts to strengthen the hand of the President and strengthen the hand of the negotiators. This is the primary purpose, as I read the resolution and the report and as I listen to the debate on the resolution. I believe it will strengthen their hand. There is no effort, as I read the resolution—and I will ask the Senator from Massachusetts to comment—to take away any power or right the President has or might

have or a negotiator might have. Do I interpret that correctly?

Mr. BROOKE. The distinguished Senator from Kansas is absolutely correct. He is a very able and skillful lawyer, as I certainly well know, and I think he has read the resolution correctly.

Mr. DOLE. With reference to the amended version, which refers to an immediate proposal by the President that the Russians suspend deployment, does that have any effect, or what effect does it have, on testing now underway by Russia and by our country—if any?

Mr. BROOKE. If the Russians do not cease their testing and their deployment, the United States does not cease its testing and its deployment. Until such agreement is entered into by the Soviet Union and the United States, I presume it would be full steam ahead for both nations.

Mr. DOLE. I share the view expressed by the Senator from Tennessee that the President and the negotiators are pursuing this effort now. But in the interim period, as I understand, there will be no effort to reduce testing on our part. In other words, we are not going to relax and wait for Russia to respond. I understand we will continue to test, hoping every day and every hour that there will be some agreement. Is that correct?

Mr. BROOKE. That is correct. A resolution was proposed to the Senate which called for unilateral cessation, which meant that we would cease our testing and our deployment, and make the proposal, and then wait for the Soviet Union to accept or reject that proposal. But this resolution is not a unilateral proposal. It is a mutual proposal. It is a bilateral proposal. By this resolution, we are saying that nothing will be done in the interim period, as the Senator has pointed out, until such time as the Soviets accept the proposal.

Mr. DOLE. Again let me commend the Senator from Massachusetts. I certainly share his aspirations and hopes, and the hopes of the cosponsors, this will have some impact. It will be a signal. It will offer some hope not only for our country and Russia but also for all people of the world, and I support the resolution on that basis.

Mr. BROOKE. I am pleased to have the Senator as a cosponsor, and I thank him for his very important and pertinent questions.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BROOKE. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I want to make a few observations about the resolution.

With regard to the recent exchange, it is my understanding that the proposal of the Senator from Massachusetts is that the President following the advice of the Senate, should propose to the Government of the Soviet Union an immediate suspension of the further deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. This is not proposed as the necessary ultimate goal. The point is to suspend all deployment now in order to enhance the probability of getting some agreement, some permanent agreement, at the talks in Vienna. This is not proposed as the ultimate goal

of the talks at Vienna, but as a first measure that would insure, insofar as we can, the success of those talks. That is the way I interpret the resolution, and I believe the Senator from Massachusetts interprets it that way.

We have had great difficulty in making progress in negotiations, whether in Paris with regard to Southeast Asia, or with regard to the Middle East, or with the Russians. The preliminary talks at Helsinki were reasonably satisfactory. Everybody seemed to be pleased with their seriousness and with the way they were conducted. Both sides seemed to be pleased.

If I understand correctly, we are not saying that the ultimate goal of the talks at Vienna is necessarily to achieve a freeze. We are saying that now, at the beginning of the talks, the President should take the initiative by proposing that we freeze everything so that we will not have a destabilized situation or a shifting base on which to try to negotiate a final agreement.

I believe this is the meaning the Senator from Kentucky intended when he offered his amendment; and I thought the Senator from Massachusetts, if I understood the situation correctly, agreed with this interpretation of the objective of the resolution.

In a sense, the purpose of the resolution is to try to break the stalemate. We will not break it if we negotiate one little point and then another. In the meantime some other circumstances will have changed, and that would mean that you would have to renegotiate everything. I believe that is the purpose of the resolution, and I think it would be a useful purpose.

Action on the resolution was precipitated by the announcement by the Secretary of the Air Force—it was not the only reason, but it was one development that I think was important to the sponsors—that we are going to deploy MIRV warheads in June. It was believed—and I think correctly—that if MIRV deployment takes place in the midst of talks, everything else might be affected. At least, MIRV deployment gives some reason for doubt as to the sincerity of the negotiators. There is plenty of that already.

I quote from page 5 of the committee report on the resolutions:

It would seem, therefore, both feasible and desirable to provide the strategic arms limitation talks with an opportunity to reach agreements without the additional problem of having to take into account a constantly shifting and asymmetrical situation with respect to strategic weapons. The committee believes that an immediate mutual suspension of further deployment of all strategic weapons systems would provide such an opportunity.

We stress that the suspension is "mutual." We are not expected to do anything they do not do, other than to take the initiative of making the proposal. We believe that the justification for our taking the initiative in making the proposal is that we have more weapons. We are the more powerful, in a general way, although there is rough parity between us in strategic nuclear weapons. We have a greater diversity of weapons and a

greater number of the such secure weapons as the Polaris missiles which are launched from submarines. We get bogged down in all kinds of classifications in the numbers game. At any rate, we certainly are not inferior. I would say that we each have a sufficiency. The weight of the testimony, I think, would suggest that because of the larger number of Polaris-type submarines we have—and they are considered, generally speaking, to be the most secure of all weapons, the least subject to being destroyed—we have some responsibility, perhaps a little greater than their responsibility, to take the initiative in making the proposal. That is all that is contemplated that is not completely mutual.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, is this a convenient place for the Senator to yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am always delighted to yield to the Senator from Mississippi, and honored that he would see fit to ask me a question.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator will yield to me?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Certainly.

Mr. STENNIS. Here is the proposition. Basically, I believe it is the prerogative and the responsibility of the President to conduct these talks as he sees fit and in the best way he can, without any interference—I am sure that this resolution is not designed to interfere—without any distracting entanglements that might come from some other branch of the Government.

I know the high purpose here and the desire, as it has been said, to help the President, even though, I say, I think we could help him more by giving him counsel.

But I want to know this: The Senator has already said, as I understand it, that he proposes in the resolution only a mutual undertaking—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Correct.

Mr. STENNIS. And nothing unilateral—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Correct.

Mr. STENNIS. Nothing unilateral that we should do. We are not saying we will do anything on a unilateral basis.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. An immediate suspension by the United States and by the Soviet Union. That is mutuality, it seems to me.

Mr. STENNIS. It seems to me it is clear there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Very clear.

Mr. STENNIS. Here is my question further: I personally think that the negotiations will have to go on a long time, that the basic, fundamental, major point to be decided is the matter of inspections, or some kind of surveillance satisfactory to both sides. In the meantime, we will have appropriation bills coming up here on the military program. Suppose the Senate passes this resolution as the sense of the Senate, which it is, and they are not able to work out any mutuality on the points within the next several months that we will be passing on these appropriation bills. I am sure that the Senator does not mean for the Senate to be precluded, by passage of this resolution, from supporting—each Senator being free to support—

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Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is quite right.

Mr. STENNIS. Appropriations for the necessary carrying out of military programs, does he?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is absolutely correct. This resolution does not have any direct relation to those appropriations. Each proposal must stand on its own merits—

Mr. STENNIS. Correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Regardless of this resolution. If we bring forward a weapons system that would do violence to a mutual moratorium, but if the moratorium has not been approved, the weapons system stands on its own. But if a mutual moratorium is approved and accepted by the Russian Government, and our own, of course the appropriations would not do violence to the ban on deployment. We could still appropriate the money.

Mr. STENNIS. I am sure the Senator understands what I am getting at, that is, if there is a lack of mutuality in the SALT talks on deployment, a Senator or the Senate would not be precluded from passing on appropriation bills on the merits. I think that would be a grave situation we could get into.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that it would be, but I do not believe the Senator should be worried that anyone who votes for this resolution would feel morally or legally bound not to support an ABM, for example. The ABM will have to stand on its own feet. We will have to defend it on its own merits without prejudice to the vote. I would not feel bound at all.

Mr. STENNIS. I was thinking of MIRV.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think this resolution—unless the mutual suspension has been agreed to. If that happens, then I would assume that deployment would be suspended; but again, as far as appropriations are concerned, if for any reason we want to hold the money there and consider changing the system. But hard up as we are, I do not think we would want to do that.

Mr. STENNIS. If there has been an actual finality on a mutual agreement, I think it would be held as a suspension and we should not proceed in a positive way.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Mississippi made one remark earlier in his statement that, to me, was not clear. There was a slight intimation that he thought the resolution might be presumptuous on the part of the Senate, that it was not called for, and we were seeking to interfere with the President's legitimate constitutional authority. I do not accept that at all. I think the Senate clearly has a constitutional responsibility, whenever it sees fit to give its advice on matters of this consequence, because we are faced with a continuation of the arms race which threatens to break the country. It is a very important matter. So, in this resolution we are doing it, we are giving our advice. The Constitution does not say the President will be left alone without any advice. It says the opposite.

I am a strict constructionist, if I may use that word to the Senator from Missis-

siippi. I believe in following the Constitution. This resolution follows the Constitution. It is in performance of the responsibility of the Senate to give advice to the President on matters of the greatest importance. I do not know of anything much more important than the arms race which is what is involved in this resolution. It is costing the country enormous sums of money, and is diverting money from the development of the country and the solution of so many of our domestic problems.

Thus, I do not think anyone should be deterred from voting for this resolution on the ground that it is presumptuous to offer advice to the President. The President is getting advice almost every day, and he should get it.

I hope he has an open mind, not only as to our resolution, but as to what other people think.

Mr. STENNIS. I just have one sentence on that subject I should like to state, if the Senator will yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Then I will be through. I was not meaning to be critical of the committee for having the resolution, or critical of anyone for introducing it. But I do think that, right here, on the very eve of the opening of these talks, when it is an Executive responsibility to plan and carry out the best he can the most difficult task, perhaps, that a President has, I think that, right on the eve of those settings, we should defer to the President. That is my idea of the constitutional prerogatives and the responsibility that he has. But, of course, that is a matter of interpretation and an idea that I have.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Do I understand the question clearly, then, that the Senator thinks we should refrain from giving advice such as this?

Mr. STENNIS. Well, not under all circumstances.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Under present circumstances?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Yes, I really do.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President (Mr. SAXBE), under present circumstances, we should refrain? That is what I was not clear about. I regret that. I very much disagree with the Senator from Mississippi.

As a matter of fact, on yesterday—and I say this without respect to the merits of the question—I thought in acting as we did in rejecting the idea that this body, the Senate, does not have a constitutional responsibility to give advice, whether it be regarding foreign relations as in this matter, or on nominations to the Supreme Court of the United States, I think that what the Senate did yesterday made the Senate a significant body again.

I am bound to say that in the last administration, because of very unusual circumstances, I think the Senate was largely subverted, that we became subservient to the Executive to a degree far beyond what I think the Constitution contemplated. Yesterday was a very fine demonstration, I think, of senatorial independence of mind, regardless of the rightness of the decision. At least, the Senate exercised the power given to it

by the Constitution, the power which had almost been subverted; at least we had not exercised it at all. I complained myself, in the previous administration, on the way Members of this body and the other body were taken to the White House, briefed on a subject of the highest importance, and then polled as to whether we agreed or did not agree, before we had any hearings. We were more or less made to commit ourselves on the spot. I call that a serious blow to the senatorial process. I think it was a bad thing for the country. I think that was one of the reason, we fell on hard times. The Senate, in passing the commitments resolution, in attempting to reassert its part in making commitments that involved commitments of manpower and great amounts of money, is now asserting its right to pass upon the fitness of nominees, and is again a respectable body. Every Member of the Senate should be proud to be a Senator. I was very proud to be a Member of this body, much more than before because I now think that the Senate is in a position to assert its rightful constitutional position in our Government.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not accept the idea that we have no business giving advice. If the President comes back from Vienna with an agreement, we will have to approve it. I think we have a right to do this.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield at that point, the illustration he stated, with all due deference, is on such a different subject matter and with such a different purpose in mind that it does not seem to be analogous.

Mr. President, I think that if negotiators go over there now, the President would be bound by this resolution. They would have in their minds the fact that the Senate passed this resolution and it is the only thing available or that we have more interest in this than in anything else.

I think we ought to stay out of it, particularly at this time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the Senator thinks it is a wise thing to promote these talks, does he not?

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I may say that the administration has not asked us to refrain from acting on this resolution at this time. The administration considers that this is a matter for the Senate itself to decide. It neither undertakes to raise objections or to promote it.

There may be individuals who feel that we should not act upon it at this time. But it is simply an expression of the sense of the Senate. As I understand it, and an offer to support the administration on these proposals.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. AIKEN. And I am sure that the administration does not object to our acting upon it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I think the Senator is quite right. Of course,

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the Senator told me that before, and that is the reason I believe it.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I certainly would have liked to see the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee support the resolution. I think it is a resolution that he might very well be able to support.

I jotted down three points which I think might be helpful to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee in addition to the point so very clearly made by the very distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Point No. 1 is that MIRV is defined in the legislative history as including any system able to strike more than one target. The SS-9 technology is specifically covered by the resolution.

Second, the President does have clear authority to define the duration of any such mutual suspension and to determine verification requirements for maintaining it.

Third, the resolution does not require reliance only on national intelligence for verification since it makes clear that the President can specify "such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate."

I further point out that the President has referred to the resolution in its original form as a very constructive resolution.

I should hope that the distinguished Senator from Mississippi might find it possible to support the resolution.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I join in saying that I regret that the Senator from Mississippi does not support the resolution.

The report of the committee states:

The committee recognizes that Senate Resolution 211 is in the nature of advice to the President which he is free to accept or reject. The committee believes, however, that the resolution expresses a growing recognition by the American people that no effort must be spared to bring to an end the escalating cycle of the deployment of nuclear weapons systems.

That is all it is. I think that is a lot. And I think that the President would be very ill-advised, assuming the resolution is agreed to by the Senate, not to follow it. Of course, he would be within his rights if he were not to follow it. But it would be very unwise because, if passed, the resolution would express the collective judgment of the Senate which is entitled to respect when one views the events of the last several years.

I would hope the Senator from Mississippi would reconsider.

I realize that there are perfectly honest and honorable men who do not believe that any kind of agreement with the Russians or with any Communist is worthwhile. Such people make speeches. And there are quite a number of them. They have concluded that as a result of disappointments in the past, the Russians are unreliable and that we should not make any agreement with them.

There are people who express this view.

This resolution is a means for the Senate, in which there are representa-

tives of all 50 States, to express its views—and on this not unimportant matter—in a way that reflects the views of a great majority of the people of the country who are paying the bill for the arms race.

The cost is so enormous that it is hard to calculate not only the immediate cost, but also the costs resulting from escalation of the arms race.

In connection with our consideration of Senate Resolution 211, I would like to call attention to a pamphlet published earlier this year. The pamphlet will not be mentioned in book reviews, sold on newsstands, handed out in supermarkets, or mailed to lists of subscribers. In fact, it will probably not be read by more than a few thousand people at most. That is a pity, for it deals with a subject of the utmost importance, and its message is grave and alarming. The pamphlet is entitled "World Military Expenditures 1969." It is published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

In his introduction to the pamphlet, the Director of the Agency states that the rise in military spending is continuing, although it is less sharp. He then comments: "The world remains the poorer for it."

The world is indeed the poorer because of the continued rise in military spending. The pamphlet tells us that in 1969 world military spending reached a record \$200 billion, an increase of 34 percent since 1964, and that in the last 6 years more than \$1 trillion has been spent for arms and armed forces. This sum exceeds the value of all the goods and services produced in the United States in the past year. It represents more than 2 years' income for the world's 93 developing countries in which over 2½ billion people live. The world's military budget for the past 6 years has taken as much public money as was spent by all governments on all forms of public education and health care. And more of this money for military purposes was spent by the United States than by any other country. Specifically, of the \$200 billion estimated to have been spent for arms and armed forces in 1969, expenditures by the United States were estimated at \$82 billion, and expenditures by the Soviet Union, with the second largest military budget, at \$56 billion.

These are the figures of our own Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The enormous amounts of money which the United States and the Soviet Union have spent reflect the high cost of defense in an age of nuclear weapons. The Poseidon missile, for example, will cost a total of \$5.5 billion according to the Department of Defense, but Senator PROXMIER believes that the eventual cost may be double that estimate. Minuteman II will cost about \$4.25 billion and Minuteman III another \$4.25 billion. The Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft will cost \$3.8 billion according to the Defense Department, but other estimates have ranged from \$11 to \$23 billion. Estimates of the cost of the Safeguard system go as high as \$50 billion.

While on the subject of costs, may I point out that in fiscal year 1971, the total Federal budget will be \$154.9 billion. Of this amount, 47.5 percent, or an

estimated \$73.6 billion, will go for national defense. And of that \$73.6 billion, an estimated \$7.9 billion will go for strategic forces.

Mr. President, we are dealing here with an area of the greatest importance. Yesterday we heard an extremely important statement by McGeorge Bundy, who formerly was Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the predecessor of Dr. Kissinger in the White House. I ask unanimous consent to have his statement printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT OF MCGEORGE BUNDY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am happy to accept your invitation to testify on the arms race, and I am particularly happy to appear in company with Dr. York. I would like to associate myself strongly with his basic argument.

My broad view of the arms race was stated last October in an article in Foreign Affairs, and to save the time of the Committee I would like, with your permission, to offer that article for the record instead of repeating it. Its principal conclusion was simply that the strategic arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union has gone too far, threatens to go further, and should be stopped by an early agreement between these two great powers. Since then SALT has begun in a businesslike way, and our Government is now considering what its position will be as the talks resume in Vienna next week.

My own strong belief is that the best next step for the United States in this field is to follow the course proposed in Senate Resolution 211. That Resolution first states the sense of the Senate that prompt negotiations be urgently pursued between the two great powers, and on this point I think there is little or no disagreement among Americans. The second part of the Resolution expresses the sense of the Senate that we should now propose an immediate suspension by both sides "of further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems." An excellent basic argument in favor of this Resolution is developed in the report submitted by Senator Fulbright, and I will not waste your time by repeating it. Let me rather offer ten brief comments on the significance of your Committee's position.

1. I assume that in passing Senate Resolution 211, the Senate will be urging the President to propose to the Soviet Union the mutual suspension of these deployments for some reasonable term during which further progress could be made toward a definite agreement. There are some who suppose that the word "moratorium" implies a form of permanent self-entanglement, but as I understand it no such self-entanglement is either necessary or intended.

2. I strongly support the statement in the Committee Report that an agreed suspension of deployment of strategic systems will necessarily imply a suspension also of tests—as well as deployment—of such emerging systems as MIRV. The Committee Report makes the correct connection between the Soviet SS-9 and the American MIRV. This connection goes both ways. Just as the Soviets must limit SS-9 if they wish to stop MIRV, so I believe that if we are to get any early limit on SS-9 deployment, we ourselves must place MIRV on the bargaining table.

3. I believe that there will not be much progress in SALT until the United States Government is prepared to make a specific proposal. I think the odds are heavy that it will prove wise and right for us to move first. The Committee has heard the sensitive and perceptive testimony of Professor Marshall Shulman on Soviet attitudes towards arms negotiation. I share his view that Soviet wariness is at least equal to our own. Our ex-

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perience, understanding and present strength make it right for us to take the initiative.

4. Specifically, I believe that as a part of any proposal for an agreed moratorium the United States should take a first step by announcing a suspension of its own deployment of ABM and MIRV for a limited time. Such a time could and should be relatively brief, and its extension could and should depend upon the promptness and seriousness of Soviet response. There might be some marginal inconvenience for our defense organization in such a suspension, and our already overwhelming strategic war plans might need marginal revision if specific planned deployments are delayed—but there is no real or present danger in such a limited suspension, and if we want results in SALT, we should try it. How long such a trial should be, and precisely what it should include, are matters I do not attempt to cover, since it would be unwise for a private citizen to try to define the exact length and direction of any first step. My point is simply that we should begin by an action as well as a proposal.

5. This belief rests not on any sentimental notion that we must be more virtuous than the Russians, but rather upon the deep conviction that effective limitation and reduction of the strategic arms race is an objective deeply in our own national interest as well as the interest of all mankind. It is wholly false to suppose that the national security is always served by adding strategic weapons and never by their limitation. In the world of the 1970s the truth is more nearly the opposite. We have more than enough strategic weapons today. The addition of new systems which will inevitably produce further Soviet systems is not the road to safety for anyone in any country.

6. In particular we should be on guard against the notion that it is useful to press the development or deployment of any given weapons system because of its value as a bargaining-counter for SALT. It is quite true that if we get nowhere in SALT and if Soviet strategic expansion continues, we shall have to take careful stock of our own needs. But there is no evidence at all that pressing the deployment of systems we do not yet need is likely to have a constructive effect on Soviet behavior in SALT. There are times and topics for toughness with Moscow, but SALT in April is not one of them, and many of those who urge this tactic are men who do not want SALT to succeed. It will be very hard to get a good agreement even if we do only what we have to do. It will probably be impossible if we provide unnecessary ammunition to Soviet weapon-lovers by pressing our own deployments relentlessly throughout the talks.

7. In moving toward effective limitation of the arms race, we shall need to be alert and skeptical against distractions and diversions from those whose special interests may be threatened. The history of arms negotiation includes many examples of efforts by the partisans of particular weapons systems to prevent any agreement at all. During the negotiations before the Limited Test Ban Treaty, for example, it was suggested that the Soviets might obtain some decisive advantage by secret nuclear tests conducted behind the sun or by the construction of underground holes so big that the very existence of a test could not be detected. These arguments now rest properly in the dustbin of dead fantasy. But now new dangers are depicted in the effort to justify a refusal to limit or delay our own new weapons systems. Such arguments should be subjected to most meticulous and skeptical analysis, and in such study the role of the Congress is of high importance.

8. There is a particular danger in the uncritical acceptance of doctrines of strategic superiority—or even sufficiency—which may be used by zealous men in support of their

own preferred weapons. This is as true of the Eisenhower Administration's belief in "prevailing" in a general war as it is of later doctrines of "assured destruction" and "damage limitation." All of these forms of words can be used to justify excessive expenditure on unnecessary strategic systems. At present there are four new criteria of strategic sufficiency, but the Administration has not told us what they are. According to press reports, these criteria include "assured destruction," "hostage equality," "crisis stability" and "third country protection." If the Administration and the Congress are not alert and watchful, criteria like these can be protective umbrellas for unchecked strategic expansionism. They can also be roadblocks in the way of arms limitation. They deserve public discussion. My own conviction is that the realities of strategic nuclear weapons are not subject to control by such verbal formulae. In the language of Justice Holmes, I believe that criteria like these tend to be spiders' webs inadequate to control the dominant facts.

9. The main proposition which we need to understand in order to limit the dangers of the nuclear age is that enough is enough. The Soviet Union and the United States have long since reached and passed that point. Each is now able to do totally unacceptable damage to the other, no matter how a nuclear catastrophe begins. Sane political leaders on both sides know this reality for what it is. It is of course possible that some still unknown technological development might genuinely disrupt this fundamental parity, but there is no evidence whatever that any such development is likely in the present decade. So we have enough, and more than enough, and we are on the edge of a most unbalancing and dangerous escalation. Now is the time to stop.

10. The Committee Report recognizes what I would like to emphasize in closing: that while citizens can comment and the Senate can advise, only the President can decide. It will take negotiation to reach agreement, and the official position of the Government of the United States can be stated to the Soviet Union only by our President and his authorized agents. The President must choose the timing and the shape of any initiative he takes; in the end his leadership is what will decide. As he considers the possible choices and deliberates on decisions which have not yet been made, the President is entitled to the thoughtful advice of the Senate, and in this field, where the weight of bureaucratic influence has historically been heavily on the side of arms as against arms control, such advice can be of particular value to him. The easy course is always to avoid decisions; politically the argument of weapons is easy, and the argument for acts of restraint is hard. A President who wants to take the lead needs all the help he can get. The Senate can give such help, and in this situation it is obviously the duty of citizens to respond to the Senate's request for their honest views. I have stated mine, and I will be glad to try to answer your questions.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to read a sentence which appears on the first page of the statement by Mr. Bundy:

My strong belief is that the best next step for the United States in this field is to follow the course proposed in Senate resolution 211.

On page 2 of the statement, he states:

There are some who suppose that the word "moratorium" implies a form of permanent self-entanglement, but as I understand it no such self-entanglement is either necessary or intended. . . .

Just as the Soviets must limit SS-9 if they wish to stop MIRV, so I believe that if we are to get any early limit on SS-9 de-

ployment, we ourselves must place MIRV on the bargaining table.

3. I believe that there will not be much progress in SALT until the United States Government is prepared to make a specific proposal. I think the odds are heavy that it will prove wise and right for us to move first. The Committee has heard the sensitive and perceptive testimony of Professor Marshall Shulman on Soviet attitudes towards arms negotiation. I share his view that Soviet wariness is at least equal to our own. Our experience, understanding and present strength make it right for us to take the initiative.

I wish to stress that last sentence. I think that is the heart of the justification for this resolution. It is our responsibility to take this initiative. The statement continues:

Effective limitation and reduction of the strategic arms race is an objective deeply in our own national interest as well as the interest of all mankind. It is wholly false to suppose that the national security is always served by adding strategic weapons and never by their limitation. In the world of the 1970s the truth is more nearly the opposite. We have more than enough strategic weapons today. The addition of new systems which will inevitably produce further Soviet systems is not the road to safety for anyone in any country.

6. In particular we should be on guard against the notion that it is useful to press the development or deployment of any given weapons system because of its value as a bargaining-counter for SALT. It is quite true that if we get nowhere in SALT and if Soviet strategic expansion continues, we shall have to take careful stock of our own needs. But there is no evidence at all that pressing the deployment of systems we do not yet need is likely to have a constructive effect on Soviet behavior in SALT. There are times and topics for toughness with Moscow, but SALT in April is not one of them, and many of those who urge this tactic are men who do not want SALT to succeed. It will be very hard to get a good agreement even if we do only what we have to do. It will probably be impossible if we provide unnecessary ammunition to Soviet weapon-lovers by pressing our own deployments relentlessly throughout the talks.

7. In moving toward effective limitation of the arms race, we shall need to be alert and skeptical against distractions and diversions from those whose special interests may be threatened.

I submit that is a very perceptive statement.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement by Marshall D. Shulman, director, Russian Institute, Columbia University, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY MARSHALL D. SHULMAN

The Soviet Union and the United States have a common enemy—the strategic arms race. Can anyone doubt the proposition that both countries would be better off, and more secure, if the strategic balance could be maintained at lower levels? And yet, the upward spiral continues, independent of will or reason. The problem is: where and how to initiate the process of checking and then reversing this upward spiral?

The answer is full of technical complexities, but it is fundamentally a political problem. If the will exists to reverse the present senseless trend, ways can be found to solve the technical obstacles. If the will does not

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exist, or is not strong enough, any technical rationalization will suffice as an epitaph.

It is not a question of trust: the level of mistrust is too high in both directions for that. The real question is whether enough reasonable men on each side can be brought to recognize and act upon their own rational self-interest.

The present moment offers a singular opportunity. Usually in the past, when one country has been ready to be serious about arms limitations, the other has been building up its arsenal; the moment passes, and the roles are reversed. Now, however, there is an unusual combination of circumstances: previous disparities have been greatly reduced; each side has more than enough weapons to deter the other; each side is under pressure to use its resources in more constructive ways; and we stand poised fleetingly before the entrance to a new era in military technology—an era whose costs, tensions and instabilities would reduce the security of both sides. In the course of the next thirty days, decisions will be made in Washington and Moscow that will determine whether the present opportunity will be explored to its utmost by men of common sense.

It is necessary to bring as much insight as we can into the circumstances in which these issues are being decided in the Soviet Union. Although there is much that we do not know about the process of decision-making in the Soviet system, we have been learning to appreciate the complex interplay of interests and pressures at work in the Soviet Union today. Like many industrialized countries, including our own, the Soviet Union is experiencing an increase in social tension resulting from the paradoxical rise in pressures for change and, at the same time, in strong conservative resistance to change.

As a result, there are contradictory tendencies to be observed in Soviet political life today. There are those who are concerned about the declining growth rate and the lag in advanced industrial technology, who are seeking to clear away archaic and cumbersome impedances to progress and to adapt the system to modern requirements. Among these men are to be found those who most keenly appreciate the incubus of the arms race upon Soviet economic progress. But there is also to be observed a backlash tendency of ultraconservatism, from those who fear that reform and adaptation will threaten the role of the Communist Party bureaucracy. They are responsible for an upsurge of dogmatic ideology reminiscent of the past; they are engaged in a campaign for orthodox conformity, for an extirpation of alien influence. Their answer to economic and social problems is the old tried and true method of exhortation and coercion, and this leads them to form political alliances with the military and with the police.

The top political leadership seeks to preserve its collegial unity at all costs, and to conciliate the contradictory pressures that bear upon it. The cost of this effort to maintain a consensus government has been an incapacity to act decisively to resolve major problems. Decisions are waiting to be made for the XXIV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the new five-year plan for the economy, both involving fundamental economic and political issues. Serious concern about turbulence in Eastern Europe and even more so about relations with Communist China are major complications intertwined with the domestic problems facing Soviet leadership.

It would be vain to try to prophesy the outcome of these decisions, or to guess whether the system will find the vitality and the flexibility necessary to cope with its complex problems. But it is important to appreciate how deeply this interplay of conflicting forces and pressures affects Soviet-American relations, and also how much it is affected by what we do and say. Clearly the conflicting

pressures of modernization and regression toward dogmatic orthodoxy create uncertainties and set limits on what the leadership can do. It is also evident that many of our old stereotypes about "the Russians" have little applicability, whether the wishful stereotype of Western-style liberalization or the simple stereotype of Stalinist total control.

Obviously, the complex currents of Soviet politics affect decisions about SALT above all, since these concern vital questions of security, relations with the Soviet Union's foremost adversary, and the allocation of resources as between military and industrial interests. The decision to enter into SALT was hard-fought over a long period of time, and those who argue for entering into talks with the United States have always at their backs powerful ideologies who voice their suspicious of American intentions, and who fear the operational problems of preserving the muscularity of the Communist movement during periods of reduced tension with the United States. With the Chinese charging "collusion with the imperialists," the military reacting neurally to every word and act of our military, and the Party dogmatists hammering away at the inequities of "American imperialism," it would be surprising if the Soviet leadership did not show reserve and hesitation in their negotiations with the United States.

There are in addition a number of other circumstances which also peculiarly affect Soviet decision-making in regard to SALT. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union does not have people circulating in and out of government who can serve, while they are out of government, as an independent and knowledgeable lobby on arms control questions, nor does it have scientists who circulate in and out of defense responsibilities who can contribute critical technical experience to the public discussion of these issues. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has not had a great contribution to strategic military theory in the nuclear age from civilians; its discussions of these matters are conducted in professional military journals, many of which have limited circulation.

In the compartmentalization of Soviet life, there is not much lateral transfer of information about military technology, particularly because of the extreme secrecy in which all military affairs are held. The consequence is that there has not been in the Soviet Union the kind of broad educational experience, involving the interplay of scientific, military and political factors involved in arms control questions, which this country has had, for example as the result of the ABM debates.

If we consider how long it takes for the ramifications of new weapons systems to sink into our consciousness, we must also allow for the learning time required for these ramifications to be absorbed by the Soviet political leadership and its staff. This process has something to do with the lags in reaction time which have characterized action-reaction cycle between the two governments.

It takes time for such concepts as the stability and instability of various new weapons systems to be diffused back and forth across the ocean, and to enter into personal and bureaucratic habits of thinking. We therefore have to allow for the incubation period of new ideas, if the negotiations are to have some chance of success.

One other factor affecting Soviet attitudes toward SALT and which sometimes gives rise to misinterpretation is the distinctive Soviet approach to negotiations and bargaining. It has often been the case that the Soviet Union will take elaborate pains to conceal its anxieties, for fear that it may confer a bargaining advantage upon its adversary. When, after a long delay, the Soviet Union

reached a decision to enter into the SALT negotiations, its representatives pressed the United States on every occasion for an immediate response. This led to an interpretation abroad that the Soviet Union needed an easing of the burden of armaments more than the United States did, and that the United States could exact a political price for entering into the negotiations. The Soviet representatives thereupon received instructions to "play it cool," which they did with such elaborate casualness that many observers concluded the Soviet Union had lost all interest in the negotiations.

It will be recalled that when Stalin was first publicly informed by President Truman of the successful atomic explosion at Alamogordo, he reacted with such elaborate indifference as to lead many Western observers to conclude that he failed to appreciate the significance of the event.

In retrospect, it became clear that he was anxious not to give an impression of Soviet concern lest the United States be encouraged to take diplomatic advantage of its lead. Many years later, it appeared to many observers that the Soviet Union had become reconciled to its status of strategic inferiority, because so little value was given to it in public. But it is now clear that the Soviet leaders felt a deep concern, and particularly after the rapid American build-up of the 1961-65 period, did everything possible to overcome the American lead, with consequences that we are now witnessing. Because of the time lag, however, the Soviet build-up was not seen as part of a process of interaction.

These general principles can be illustrated specifically in considering some prevailing assumptions about Soviet attitudes toward the MIRV issue. It has been widely argued here that the Soviet Union is indifferent to MIRV because its representatives did not show concern when the matter was raised at Helsinki. But there has been no indication that the question was clearly put by the United States, and it should not be surprising that the Soviet Union was not prepared to raise the issue, perhaps out of fear that its show of concern would confer a bargaining advantage upon the United States.

In unofficial discussions in the Soviet Union last October with Soviet defense scientists and officials, it was clear to the American participants that the complex ramifications of MIRV were beginning to be studied with lively interest in the Soviet Union, and that a learning process was at work. It may be that the incubation period has now passed, for there have been many indications that at least some in the Soviet Union fully appreciate what the consequences of MIRV deployments will be for both sides, and are as concerned about MIRV as they are about the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles. It would be a mistake for us to conclude that a proposal for a ban on the testing and deploy of MIRV would be automatically rejected by the Soviet Union. It might be, if those in the Soviet Union who want to push ahead until they have reached our level of experience with MIRV testing prevail. But if the learning process has reached the point at which the Soviet leadership recognizes how costly this delay would be for them as well as for us, it is possible that the mutual advantages of heading off MIRV deployments will be seriously considered.

One conclusion affecting our own policy which follows from these observations of the Soviet situation is that a clear signal of United States' intentions regarding SALT is needed. A question often asked of Americans in Moscow is whether the U.S. Administration is serious about the negotiations. There have been a number of articles in the Soviet press in recent days—in *Pravda* on March 7th, *Izvestia* on the 13th and *Red Star* on the 14th—which are at least in part intended to influence the American discussion of these

matters, but which, also reflect the extent to which the uncertainty regarding American intentions toward SALT are involved in the intramural debates in Moscow. More specifically, the articles pose two questions: Whether the U.S. is now prepared to accept as a basis for negotiations a condition of approximate parity in strategic capabilities? Or whether those spokesmen who urge an intensified effort to gain a relative strategic advantage over the Soviet Union before and during the talks represent the Administration position?

Meanwhile, of course, the Soviet Union has continued to enlarge its strategic arsenal at an impressive pace. Perhaps it should not be surprising that as the two nations approach negotiations, they should each try to improve their bargaining position by improving their strategic capabilities. But wise men should recognize that unless this is stopped, there will be nothing significant left to negotiate.

This brings us directly to Senate Resolution 211. The essential question we must ask ourselves is this: Would our security be better served if both countries had MIRV capabilities, or if neither country did? It is not likely that we could preserve a unilateral advantage with this weapon for very long. The answer seems clear that if we both move into the MIRV era, we shall both be obliged, certainly by the time the second generation of MIRVs makes its appearance, to enter upon a huge restructuring of our strategic forces to protect ourselves from the vulnerabilities to which MIRV will subject us. In time, several years and many billions of dollars later, we would doubtless reach a new equilibrium, but neither country will be more secure than it is now, and the costs, tensions and instability may be very great.

It would therefore seem urgently desirable, in our own security interests, to try as strongly and as sincerely as we can to stop the present movement toward MIRV deployments. This points toward the wisdom of a proposal from the President of the United States to the Soviet Union at the earliest possible moment for a 24-month agreed moratorium including the following elements:

1. a ban on flight testing and deployment of MIRVs;
2. a hold at presently projected levels of ABM deployments, including and most importantly supporting radar installations;
3. a hold at present levels of land-based fixed-site ICBMs—which includes no new digging of silo emplacements for SS 9s;
4. an agreed limitation on flight tests of all delivery vehicles to some moderate number, with the understanding that all tests would be conducted only in preannounced areas where they can be observed by national means of monitoring.

If this proposal were to have any chance of acceptance, it would be essential that the United States exercise restraint in the immediate future in regard to the early deployment of Minuteman 3 or a MIRV Poseidon. The recently announced plan to deploy the first Minuteman 3 by June, with a rather slow rate of deployment for the balance of the year, would not improve our capabilities significantly, and would only serve to forestall any possible negotiations about MIRV. The plan also suffers from the logical defect that if we fail to hold the line on MIRV, Minuteman seems destined for obsolescence in the foreseeable future.

A number of objections have been raised to a moratorium proposal along these lines: It is too late to stop MIRV. It is too difficult to agree what should be included in the prohibition. We need MIRV capabilities for our strategic arsenal. We would be losing a bargaining advantage if we did not proceed with MIRV and Safeguard Phase II. It would be

difficult to resume our programs at the end of the moratorium period even if the conditions were not fulfilled. These are serious objections, and they deserve to be examined carefully.

Perhaps the most difficult objection is the feeling that it is too late. It is more difficult to reverse our course of thinking than it is to give in to the inertial force of ongoing events. But unless it is more important to fulfill our presently programmed weapons plans than it is to get an agreement to forestall MIRV deployments, this fatalistic argument is no more persuasive now than it was when it was first advanced in Washington a year and a half ago.

The difficulty of defining what is to be included and excluded in the agreement is a real one; should the prohibition include MIRV components tested singly, and if so would we be able to verify compliance with the prohibition? Should the prohibition extend to MRVs as well as MIRVs? The best judgments seem to be that these are real but disproportionate objections. Whichever way these problems of definition are worked out in the negotiations, it is not reasonable to fear that our security would be seriously compromised within the 24-month period of the moratorium, even under the worst assumptions that can be made.

The argument that we need MIRV has at various times rested upon three rationales. The first is that we need more warheads to cover our present target obligations. This would be a persuasive argument only if we decided to depart from a deterrent posture; it is clear that retaliatory damage to the adversary does not greatly increase if numbers of delivered warheads are increased much beyond 1,000—or, indeed, above 500. There is no limit to what we could include in our target requirements if this is allowed to run free. A second rationale is that we need MIRV as a penetration aid, particularly if Soviet ABMs should be increased, and if the Soviet Union should upgrade its present surface-to-air missile air defense to ABM-level capabilities. This argument neglects the disparity in time required between ABMs and MIRVs. We know from our own Safeguard plans that at least seven to eight years are required to install an ABM system, whereas a MIRV capability can be created in three or four years. The critical point about the upgrading of SAMs would be the supporting radars rather than the interceptors, which might indeed be done under concealment. But if phased-array radars made their appearance, these could not be as easily concealed, and the disparity in lead times would still leave us a reasonable margin of safety. The third rationale has been the need for MIRVs as hard target killers, and here it is most evident that the development of MIRVs capable of destroying adversary missiles would be destabilizing and therefore undesirable, since it would create understandable apprehensions on the Soviet side about our intentions, particularly if it were accompanied by an expansion of our ABM capabilities.

The argument that we should proceed with MIRV, and also with Safeguard Phase II, in order to have a bargaining counter in our hand is short-sighted. To enter upon these programs in order to have something to bargain with, or in order to apply pressure upon the Russians, is likely to have an effect opposite to what is intended. The logical Soviet reaction to such actions would be to question our real intentions, and to redouble their own military efforts. If SALT proceeds over a long period, as it may do, and if both sides argue the need for continuing their build-up to improve their bargaining advantage, the effect of the SALT negotiations will be to leave us both worse off than if they had never been

begun. Negotiating about strategic weapons is not entirely like a poker game—both sides can lose.

Finally, it is true that it may be politically difficult to resume our strategic programs at the end of a 24-month moratorium period, even if we have not been able to negotiate in the meantime a larger and more lasting arms control agreement, but the risk is by no means equal to the risk we run in letting present events take their course, and it must be left to our best judgment at the end of the moratorium period whether our security interests do or do not require a resumption of efforts to build MIRV and additional ABM systems under the conditions that then prevail.

Hopefully, it might be possible during the 24-months to work out the complex requirements for a freeze on strategic capabilities, and perhaps even to move toward some reductions. Without the moratorium, however, time would work against the possibility of any such agreements.

The moratorium proposal, and the SALT negotiations generally, have an important place in the framework of a larger conception of our long-term relations with the Soviet Union. Given the present internal political conditions in the Soviet Union described earlier, it does not seem likely that an easing of political rivalry between the two countries can be expected in the near future. But progress in SALT, or toward a moratorium on MIRV testing does not require a detente, since the mutual interest in damping down the strategic arms race exists whether tensions in other fields are high or low. There is a tendency current now in the Soviet Union to link progress in SALT with our policy toward China; and a tendency in this country to tie SALT to Soviet restraint in the Middle East or some other problem.

This would represent a serious error of judgment in either direction, for our security interest in the success of SALT is not and should not be made dependent upon other problems, and this is equally true for the Soviet Union. However, if the SALT negotiations prove to be successful over a period of time, it is possible that the level of tension may be reduced sufficiently to open the way to an improvement in our relations with the Soviet Union. This is best viewed as a series of stages over a fairly long timespan. SALT is the major business of the present stage. If it is successful, it may open the way to an intermediate stage whose main business would be to introduce some restraints into our deepseated political rivalry. This would in turn open up possibilities for more substantial cooperation, involving trade and technology, and hopefully common action through the United Nations in peace-keeping arrangements, economic development, and environmental problems.

This longer-term perspective would, however, be extremely remote if we have not succeeded in the months immediately before us in leveling off the strategic arms race, beginning with MIRV. And this will not be possible without vigorous action on the part of those who perceive that at this moment and on this subject the rational self-interest of the United States and the Soviet Union meet.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, last I want to comment on the apparent diversity about the treatment of a subject in an article in the New York Times yesterday. The article was about the report of the General Advisory Committee on Disarmament appointed by the President. In the first paragraph, the article states:

A prestigious administration advisory committee has recommended that the United States propose to the Soviet Union an immediate moratorium on further development of strategic weapons when the talks on control of arms resume in Vienna next week.

That, I think, is an overstatement—at least according to Mr. Chalmers Roberts who writes in today's Washington Post that an immediate moratorium was not recommended. But I think even, under the interpretation by Mr. Chalmers Roberts, the idea of a moratorium is implicit in the report of the committee which has not yet been made available, at least to me or to my committee. The idea is to have an ultimate agreement of this kind, rather than putting it into effect now as a condition for fruitful talks. This is the significance of the report, and I think the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Kentucky were conscious of it. I only call it to the attention of the Senator.

I do not think the report of the General Advisory Committee is inconsistent, as it is described in the Washington Post. It simply does not go the same route of proposing a moratorium as a preliminary agreement, at the commencement of the talks or the initiation of the talks, to be in effect during the talks.

That is the significant difference. The proposal that the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from Massachusetts have made is extremely innovative and very important. If the Senate adopts it, as I hope it will, I think it will be a great incentive to the President and others who are involved in the negotiations to move in this direction and thereby make it possible to reach an agreement. If something like this is not done, I think the chances of reaching a really important agreement are much less propitious. We are much less likely to get an agreement if, continuously throughout the negotiations, changes are made, such as the deployment of MIRV's or increasing the number of ABM's.

So I could not let this occasion pass without pointing out the significance of agreeing to the resolution.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I am confident that all Senators share a deep concern that the SALT talks come to a successful conclusion and want to encourage a promising environment in which to negotiate an arms control agreement. As I understand it, Senate Resolution 211 is intended to express that sentiment.

While we can hope that the effect of the resolution will be to impress upon the Soviets our sincere desire to facilitate agreement, we should be aware that its generality is reminiscent of earlier rhetoric on arms control and could strike them as disingenuous.

I share with my colleagues the hope that we and the Soviets might find the

basis for an agreement that will stabilize the strategic balance.

I believe I am expressing the view of an overwhelming number of Senators in identifying the maintenance of an invulnerable retaliatory capability as the principal instrument of such stability.

It is my understanding that the sentiment expressed in the resolution is intended by its sponsors as a declaration of serious purpose—a declaration to support the President in his search for an agreement. No one has argued that the resolution should be seen as an instruction to the U.S. delegation to the talks. This is right and proper. The resolution is generalized; instructions are specific. The resolution is painted with a broad brush while negotiations themselves and the instructions on which they are based are, like an Indian miniature or a Flemish painting, painstakingly crafted line by line with a single-bristle brush.

Mr. President, the general language in which the resolution is phrased admits of widely varying interpretations, and the extraordinarily thin record of testimony on the resolution as presently before us does little to clarify some important considerations.

As I understand the intent of the resolution, particularly as it emerged in discussion on the floor last Friday—April 3, 1970—it is unequivocal on a central point: the proposal for an interim freeze is mutual; it will be proposed by the United States if, and only if, the Soviet Union will agree; and if, and only if, appropriate verification is available to assure compliance.

Moreover, the sponsors, by respecting the principle of stable deterrence and by failing to specify details, have properly left to the President the determination of a detailed negotiating position consistent with the strategic posture of mutual deterrence.

For example, I understand that the sponsors of the resolution do not mean to imply an open ended suspension—that, on the contrary, it is their intent to facilitate an arms control agreement and that the nature of an interim proposal and its duration should be considered instruments toward this end. This suggests that any resulting mutual suspension would be directly related to the nature, pace, and extent of progress toward the conclusion of a negotiated agreement.

I believe that support for the sentiment expressed in the resolution can be made without prejudice to the difficult task of negotiating with the Soviets the shape and content of a formal arms control agreement. We must be careful to distinguish here between an instrument that some hope will facilitate an agreement and the formal, safeguarded agreement itself.

Mr. President, I would point out that among the many problems—deriving from the generality of the resolution—is the failure to distinguish between stabilizing and destabilizing strategic deployments. A resolution such as this, had it been brought to the floor after careful and deliberate hearings reflecting testi-

mony from divergent points of view, would certainly have included consideration of this fundamental issue.

It is because the only construction that I am able to put on the resolution is the expression of support for the policy of the United States to negotiate with the Soviets on all offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems, that I am able to add my vote for affirmation.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for one brief question?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I have listened carefully to the Senator's speech. I think it is clear, but on the question of funds that we may have in an authorization bill to develop MIRV further, for instance, leading to its deployment, the Senator would not think, would he, that in adopting this resolution the Senate would in any way go on record as opposing or being committed against the authorization of such funds?

Mr. JACKSON. No. We are not passing on any strategic items, as I interpret the resolution.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, earlier in the debate the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) presented us with some very cogent remarks with regard to the nature and scope of the pending resolution. He highlighted the fact that the intent of Senate Resolution 211 is absolutely unequivocal on one central point. As Senator JACKSON observed:

The proposal for an interim freeze is mutual; it will be proposed by the United States if and only if the Soviet Union will agree; and if and only if appropriate verification is available to assure compliance.

I want to associate myself with this observation and to make it very clear that it is only upon this basis that I intend to vote for Senate Resolution 211.

Mr. President, I recognize the fact that the legislative situation has been rather disruptive during the last few weeks because of other important matters before the Senate which have been the subject of unanimous consent agreements. But I am compelled to observe that the substance of this resolution, in my judgment, is more in the area of the national defense of this country than it is in the area of foreign relations. I am sorry that the resolution was not considered by the Armed Services Committee for their considered judgment on the merits and scope of the language contained in the operative features of the resolution itself. I must observe that some of the statements that I have heard here on the floor during the debate are in my opinion and to my best knowledge of the situation not in accordance with the facts as they relate to the relative defense posture of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Once again, I must indicate my full accord with Senator JACKSON's earlier statement that "the general language in which the resolution is phrased admits of widely varying interpretations, and the extraordinarily thin record of

testimony on the resolution as presently before us does little to clarify some important considerations." I am certain that if the Armed Services Committee had the opportunity to conduct hearings on Senate Resolution 211 that the record on which Senators might have based their judgment with regard to the wisdom of the resolution might indeed have been more complete and more satisfactory.

Because of the fact that the resolution only pertains to mutual action between the United States and the U.S.S.R. with regard to offensive and defensive strategic weapon system deployment, I do not believe that it will jeopardize the position of American negotiators at the SALT talks. Each of us here recognizes the incredible responsibility these people bear in these negotiations, and the fact that the very future of mankind may rest with them in achieving meaningful success in the SALT negotiations with the Soviet. Likewise, none of us would do anything to make their task more difficult. I believe that favorable action on the pending resolution may provide a clear indication that a mutual, rather than unilateral, freeze of offensive and defensive strategic weapon system deployment is the path leading all of us to a more stable and a more hopeful future.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, the Senate Resolution No. 211 is, of course, offered with the best of motives and for an objective in which we all concur and the attainment of which we ardently hope and pray for.

But I believe the Senate should have in mind certain questions about this procedure and what a precedent of this kind could cause or help to cause in the future conduct of our foreign relations.

Because of an episode that occurred on the floor of the Senate back in 1925, when I was sitting on one of those divans as an aide to a Senator, and because of speeches that lingered long in my memory by Senator William E. Borah, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, one of the great legal minds and one of the great parliamentarians of our time in service in this body, this resolution gave me some concern.

In order to verify my own recollection, I spent some time consulting the second volume of Haynes on "The Senate of the United States" with respect to the situation of the Senate advising the President in advance on treaties or the negotiating of treaties. There are two or three precedents I would like to mention at this time.

In the first place, of course, Haynes states flatly in interpreting article II of the Constitution, section 2, paragraph 2, as follows:

There is no question that the Senate has a right so far to initiate a treaty or propose one for consideration of the President.

But he goes on to say:

It is within the President's discretion, to determine how much consideration they shall receive. On rare cases the Senate has offered to advise (1) that the negotiation be entered upon, or (2) that they not be undertaken.

Then, there are a couple of incidents I think should go into the Record at this

time. On March 3, 1888, the Senate passed a resolution that the President "be requested to negotiate a treaty with the Emperor of China containing a provision that no Chinese laborer shall enter the United States."

This was a more urgent and specific request than the one which had been addressed to President Jackson. Five days later, President Cleveland replied that—

The importance of the subject referred to in this resolution by no means has been overlooked by the executive branch of the Government, charged under the Constitution with the formulation of treaties with foreign countries.

He added that—

Negotiation with the Emperor of China for a treaty such as is mentioned in said resolution was commenced many months ago, and has been since continued.

He intimated that information as to the progress of such negotiations would have been available to any Senator who sought it, and expressed the hope that such a treaty would soon be concluded as would "meet the wants of our people and the approbation of the body to which it will be submitted for confirmation." While neither Jackson nor Cleveland questioned that the Senate's action was within its rights, the tone of the latter's message seems to indicate that he considered the Senate's resolution an impertinence.

More important than this, in 1816, the question was again thrust upon the Senate's attention by the action of Rufus King who had himself been an influential member of the Federal Convention and who later served in various diplomatic capacities.

Dissatisfied with the treaty of commerce and navigation, to which the Senate had just given its consent, he introduced a resolution that the Senate "recommend to and advise the President of the United States to pursue further and friendly negotiations with His Britannic Majesty" for six purposes which he enumerated. This resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, from which a significant report was made, February 15, 1816, by its chairman, Senator Bibb, to the effect that the proposed advice was uncalled for, since in the opinion of the committee the Executive had already made every effort to accomplish the objects mentioned in the resolution. It continued:

The President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiations may be urged with greatest prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to the Constitution. The committee consider this responsibility the surest pledge for the faithful discharge of his duty. They think the interference of the Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations calculated to diminish that responsibility and thereby to impair the best security for the national safety. The nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch. A division of opinion between the members of the Senate in debate on propositions to advise the Executive, or between the Senate and Exec-

utive, could not fail to give the nation with whom we might be disposed to treat the most decided advantages. . . . The committee are therefore of the opinion that the resolution ought not to be adopted.

This report seems to have made a strong impression on the Senate. Action upon King's resolution was postponed once and again, and finally, on his own motion, was put over to a date sure to fall after Congress had adjourned.

Thirty years later, in 1846, when the Oregon controversy was at its height, President Polk headed off a project for the Senate's intervention. When Calhoun and another Senator laid before him a proposal to bring forward a resolution in executive session of the Senate, advising the President to reopen negotiations on the Oregon question and settle it by compromise, he told them that he thought it inadvisable. He asked them if they were sure such a resolution could command a two-thirds majority, and pointed out the fatal consequences if it should receive a smaller vote, since the result would be known in the streets and to the British Minister in 24 hours. He also warned them that some Senators might vote against the resolution on the ground that it was inexpedient, since the negotiation was in the hands of the Executive.

Mr. President, I am sorry to tax the patience of the Senate but those precedents indicate that while the Senate has every right under the Constitution to advise the President regarding treaties and negotiations leading to treaties, there is an element of danger in exercising that right publicly and with open debate on the floor of the Senate.

The incident I refer to that lingered in my memory for so many years and came to my mind so quickly when my attention was first directed to this pending resolution; was at the time Calvin Coolidge was President and negotiations were underway for the Kellogg pact, on arms limitation. A resolution was offered in the Senate advising the President as to certain aspects of negotiations on this disarmament agreement, and in a sense warning against certain dangers to the national defense and national security of this country.

Immediately, Senator Borah of Idaho, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, took the floor. He was followed by Senator Reed. They did not question the right of such a resolution to be introduced, but they insisted that if it were to be considered, it must be considered behind closed doors, in executive session of the Senate, with no one allowed in the galleries and no one allowed on the floor of the Senate other than Senators and officers of the Senate. Their suggestion or position prevailed. I did not hear the rest, because I was one of the attachés who left the floor. But the consideration was behind closed doors in executive session, and was never given to the newspapers.

It was more possible in those days to have an executive session without it being leaked to the press.

Mind you, Mr. President, I am not saying that there is anything inherently dangerous in the present resolution as revised by the committee, but I do want

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to call attention to the general statements assuming that it is fine, any time, to exercise this right and do it in open session. To start advising the President of the United States, whoever he may be, about what the Senate's idea is on what he should seek in negotiating with a foreign power is an approach that should be used most sparingly.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COTTON. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Since I made such a statement, which I think was proper, perhaps I should say first that I would have had no objection to an executive session of the Senate. I would have welcomed it, because there is always better attention and more attendance when we have an executive session than when we have an open session. I did not think of that. Second, I think there is much difference between the circumstances in 1926, under Mr. Coolidge, and those at present.

One reason the Senate and the Foreign Relations Committee feel it is their duty to make suggestions is the deplorable condition in which the country finds itself. We have been at war or in a crisis situation for 25 years. We have spent so much money that we are almost bankrupt. Yesterday afternoon we debated a bill, as a result of inflation taking its toll, which we had to pass under very stringent conditions and with very little consideration. I refer to the pay bill.

I think under the conditions in which the country is now operating many Senators feel that they owe a duty to give their advice, because, goodness knows, during the last few years, under Executive leadership, particularly since 1965, we have been in a very difficult situation.

I must say I do not think the Senate is impertinent in offering it. If there were no problems in the country, and we were just out making trouble, I think the Senator would have a good point. I have a good deal of respect for the good sense of the Senate.

I agree that an executive session is advisable. I would have welcomed it on this on any other resolution of this character, because I think we get more attention and because the Senate will act more sensibly in an executive session than in an open session. In nearly every executive session I have attended, there has been much more attention paid and the attendance has been much better than any open session. So I agree with that statement of the Senator.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, may I say to the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, first, that I was not referring to any particular statement by him. I would not presume to try to admonish the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and my senior in the Senate, for whom I have the greatest respect. That is not my purpose. I clearly and distinctly stated that in the case of this particular resolution in its present form it is innocuous enough so I would not suggest that it was necessary to debate it in great secrecy. In fact, if we had done so, some damage could have occurred because it might

have been thought that since we went into executive session there must have been something grave and sinister involved in the resolution.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. COTTON. Please, let me finish this thought. The Senator from New Hampshire did not refer to this or any other resolution as being impertinent. That was Haynes quoting President Cleveland and President Jackson, who were known to be men of rather blunt methods in stating their views. That was their suggestion, and certainly not the suggestion of the Senator from New Hampshire.

So I can assure the distinguished chairman that, as far as the resolution in its present form, I was not concerned; but there were several statements—not just from the Senator from Arkansas—that just seemed to assume that, at will, we could advise the President on these matters in public session.

As for the collective wisdom of the Senate, I entirely concur with the distinguished Senator from Arkansas. I, too, have great confidence in the collective wisdom of the Senate. I have great confidence in the wisdom of my wife, but from time to time we have had some little conversations or discussions that might be called disagreements that I would not care to have the neighbors hear.

When the Senate is arriving at its collective wisdom, I am not sure that the things we say, as they are reflected in the foreign press, behind the Iron Curtain and in the other powers of the world, although they demonstrate our democracy, are always helpful in accomplishing the purpose that we all desire.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Why did not the Senator suggest an executive session, then? I would have been pleased to have it.

Mr. COTTON. I have said that on this occasion there was no reason for it. What I am trying to do is to get into the Record that I hope this action will not be taken as a precedent, so that any Senator who feels we ought to advise the President about the conduct of some negotiations or some treaty will not feel that it is all right to plunge in and introduce a resolution, proceeding to debate it in public.

That is all I am seeking.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think the Senator from Kentucky, who, of course, was one of the fathers of this resolution, did an innocuous thing. To say it is innocuous and irrelevant, I think, is quite inappropriate. This resolution is neither irrelevant nor innocuous.

Mr. COTTON. The Senator knows very well I have not said it was irrelevant.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator said it was innocuous, I think.

Mr. COTTON. What I have said was not intended and could not possibly have constituted any reflection on the great Committee on Foreign Relations, and certainly not on my friend from Kentucky, to whom I now gladly yield.

Mr. COOPER. May I say, first, that I am glad I stayed in the Chamber and heard the Senator, because he has made

a very interesting and, I might say, scholarly discussion of this problem.

I can see that there are certain resolutions which could be adopted by the Senate, which could be very objectionable to an Executive, and could cause difficulties in his negotiations with other countries. But, on the other hand, if there is some course of action which the Senate believes in very seriously, and with concern, which leads them to pass such a resolution, I would think that concern of the Senate would outweigh the problem about which the Senator from New Hampshire has spoken.

I do object, with all deference, to my friend's designation of the resolution as being "innocuous." I may say we intended it to be very broad and very strong—so strong that it would cover and, if agreed to by the Soviet Union, result in suspending the deployment of, all offensive and defensive nuclear systems.

I do not think that would be very innocuous. I think if agreed to, it would be a very far reaching, forward step, one that would help the security of our country and perhaps limit the danger of a nuclear war. So I think it is a very important resolution.

Mr. COTTON. I apologize to my friend from Kentucky. I withdraw the word "innocuous." In fact, if I understand correctly, he greatly improved this resolution. I could not possibly have voted for it in its original form, but I am certainly willing to vote for it in its present form.

When I used the word "innocuous," let us say I meant that under no circumstances could it be harmful, rather than to say that it was unimportant. I shall come to that in a moment, after discussing very briefly the resolution itself.

Mr. COOPER. To be very fair about it, I think it is broader in its coverage, and stronger, and better for the security of our country, because it covers the Soviet systems as well as the systems of the United States, if agreement can be reached.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, it had been my intention to suggest—and I hope the President will regard this as support for his undertaking the first step needed to stop the arms race—or to point out, that it would cost nothing for us to find out if the Soviet Union would respond affirmatively to our suggestion that we would stop if the other fellows would stop; and that if, on the other hand, we go ahead with deployments on both sides, the dollar cost is frightening and the hazards to survival even more frightening.

Then I was going to suggest that if, notwithstanding what I expect will be the overwhelming vote of the Senate recommending this course, the President nonetheless concluded he was not going to follow it, I thought we could respectfully suggest that an explanation would be in order.

I make this explanation to the Senator from New Hampshire thinking that it bears, in part at least, on the troubled

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area to which he had addressed himself, and he might want to find, either in Haynes or in his own memory, some reasons that might indicate that it would be inappropriate to suggest that the President might explain to us why, if he thinks the overwhelming number of us supporting this resolution are wrong, why we are wrong.

Does this give the Senator any hangup, in the light of the sensitivity that he is reminding us attachés, always, when the Senate seeks to participate, in executive session or open session, in the formulation of treaties?

Mr. COTTON. What does the Senator mean by "hangup"?

Mr. HART. Is the Senator bothered? Is he nervous? Does he need his tensions eased? Does it cause him to feel upset? I am calm and placid as a millpond.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, let me explain to my friend from Michigan that when I used the word "innocuous" which was somewhat offensive to my friend from Kentucky, I meant that to me, this resolution was only asking the President to do exactly what he is intending to do, and is devoted to. That is my understanding.

The reason I began to give the subject some attention was this: I started to receive letters from constituents who were exceedingly alarmed and disturbed—as we all are about the arms race—asking me to add my name as a sponsor to various resolutions.

I read the Brooke-Cooper resolution as it came from committee, and the title still seemed to indicate—the title has now been corrected by amendment—that it might be a resolution in favor of unilateral cessation as far as MIRV and various other weapons are concerned.

The resolution itself, as drafted in the committee—I understand at the suggestion of the Senator from Kentucky—said no such thing. It simply asked the President to seek immediately an agreement with the Soviet Union that there be a mutual cessation of the testing and the deployment of these weapons.

I do not object to that. I am sure it is the hope and prayer of every one of us, and it is my information that this is exactly what the President wants to accomplish. Those close to him have indicated that it is his ardent hope and he welcomes this resolution.

However, I did decline the suggestion that I become a sponsor. I said in my reply that I would undoubtedly vote for this resolution but that I did not care to be a sponsor because the resolution in its present form seemed to me—while I do not say this is the purpose of it—to enable every Senator who sponsored it and every Senator who voted for it to assure his constituents that he struck a great blow for peace and has done something to promote disarmament; and that it actually is nothing but a pious wish expressed to the President that he succeed in doing something which he is very anxious to do. To me, that is the situation.

I simply intended to vote for the resolution and say nothing. But whatever happens here today with this resolution, I want the Record to show that it is the

hope of this Senator that it will not be taken as an established precedent for resolutions advising the President in advance on negotiations and treaties and foreign affairs in the open Senate.

Mr. HART. As I understand the Senator from New Hampshire, he senses, he believes, that the two points made in the resolution represent the President's intention—or "desire" perhaps is the better word.

Let us assume, however, that we go to Vienna and we do not make the first offer; we do not say, in effect, "Look, let's stop now. What to you fellows say?" Let us assume this does not occur. If that does not occur, then, as I interpret it, the President does not agree with this resolution.

Under those circumstances, does the Senator think it disrespectful or out of order or damaging to the interests of this country for the Senate as we approve the resolution to suggest that an explanation would be in order?

Mr. COTTON. After the negotiations?

Mr. HART. Yes. If the majority of us are wrong, let us be told by the President why we are wrong.

Mr. COTTON. There has been no suggestion on the part of the Senator from New Hampshire that anybody is wrong in supporting this resolution. There has been a suggestion that the resolution is asking the President to do what he is most anxious to do, anyway.

The President of the United States in his obvious anxiety—and I underline "obvious"—to have the negotiations in Vienna be successful, and to stop the arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States, has been willing to go a long way to achieve a limitation of nuclear arms.

With respect to the ABM, I stood by the President; I voted for the initial ABM's last year. We were told that it was necessary to assemble a couple of them and this was the only way to test their effectiveness. I supported them. But the President very plainly stated last year that one reason why he was pushing the ABM's was that he wanted to put the emphasis on purely defensive weapons. He did not want to antagonize or alarm the Soviets by speeding up offensive systems.

This Senator happens to think that we should not allow the Soviets to go ahead of us in nuclear submarines. This Senator does not happen to agree with the rosy picture presented by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts—I am sorry he is not in the Chamber at this moment—about how we are ahead of the Soviets in all these fields and that we might be wise to let them catch up so that there would be an even balance and then there would be a better chance at arriving at an agreement—a properly policed agreement, I think he said—in the matter of limitation of nuclear weapons.

This Senator does not serve on the Committee on Armed Services; he is not on the subcommittee that deals initially with our national defense on the appropriations. He does serve on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. He has heard classified information from the

CIA and from others as to the situation in comparing the Soviet power and our own, and this Senator does not agree that we are in a position of complete safety at this moment.

But the fact that the President is so anxious that he is willing to postpone, for example, adding more submarines to our fleet, that he is shying away from offensive weapons and again trying to place most of his reliance on one more ABM, indicates to this Senator that he is so anxious that he leans over backward in the matter of placing his eggs in the basket of the conference at Vienna. This Senator respects his intentions, although he does not go all the way with him.

I do not see how any Senator could say that this resolution is really necessary to spur the President on when the President is, in the opinion of some of us—neglecting national defense while seeking an arms agreement.

Mr. HART. Mr. President (Mr. SPONG), I would hope the President would recognize that the Senate's voting and supporting this resolution is a first step towards stopping the arms race.

We do not know if Moscow will respond to that first step, but it will cost nothing to find out. If Moscow says "Yes," it could bring benefits beyond dollar computation.

On the other hand, the costs of going ahead with deployment of MIRV's and ABM's on a stepped-up arms race, diminished chances for successful disarmament talks, and billions of dollars wasted on weapons which, if they happen to work, will soon be outdated and ineffective.

Neither our Nation nor the world can afford that cost—nor the frightful hazard to the survival of life that such a race represents.

We do not know if Moscow will respond to that first step, but it will cost nothing to find out. If Moscow says, "Yes," it could bring benefits beyond dollar computation.

On the other hand, the costs of going ahead with deployment of MIRV's and ABM's are a stepped-up arms race, diminished chances for successful disarmament talks, and billions of dollars wasted on weapons which, if they happen to work, will soon be outdated and ineffective.

Now I come to the point that I indicated to the Senator from New Hampshire I had contemplated reaching. If, nonetheless, the President concludes that he shall not follow the course, I believe, the Senate is about to recommend, I would hope that an explanation would be made, not that I am suggesting our judgment today necessarily would stand the test of the President's informed explanation of why our position is wrong, but I think that all the people of this country, certainly those of us in the Senate, should have the benefit of an explanation, if, in fact, the President concludes that this initiative should not be taken in Vienna.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Michigan. I am sure that the President does. I am not quite sure in my mind whether it

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strengthens or weakens the President's position, when the Senate says to him, "Please, Mr. President, please, please, beg the Soviet Union to join us in an immediate limitation of armaments."

I do not think he needs that. However, that is a matter of opinion.

Mr. COOPER obtained the floor.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I would like to suggest to the Senate that the Brooke resolution should be adopted, and adopted by an overwhelming vote of the Senate. In my judgment, it will elevate the sights of the whole world, including the SALT negotiators who might not now think so. It goes to the real issue which is before us, which is to stop before we are over the edge of the abyss. That is the whole purpose of the resolution as drafted by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Brooke) originally, with the most gifted addition made to it by the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER), which represents his thinking and, in my judgment, the thinking of the whole committee.

I do not know of any single thing that has more potential to bring about a success in the SALT talks than the adoption by the Senate of the resolution by a resounding vote.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, on next Thursday, April 16, the SALT talks will begin at Vienna. The preparations made by the U.S. Government for these negotiations have been long and extensive. They have been underway for well over 3 years. Events such as the transfer of office from one administration to another in our country, the tensions that arose from the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and other issues of disagreement, have held back the opening of these negotiations. But for the first time in the 25 years of the nuclear age, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have agreed to meet and consider ways of halting the costly and dangerous mad momentum of the nuclear arms race.

The confidence of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have in their respective strategic nuclear strength must be reflected in the willingness of both nations to consider seriously a halt to the arms race. The national confidence and strength of both leaderships is bound up in these talks. The way we approach these negotiations will tell a great deal about the possibilities of their successful outcome.

The military strength of both the Soviet Union and the United States to destroy each other and civilization as we now know it is undoubted. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have the certain means of destroying each other many times over.

There are those who claim we have fallen behind the Soviet Union in nuclear destructive ability. It is true that in some categories the Soviets are ahead in numbers. But in no category do we have less than the assured ability to destroy the Soviet Union many times over and kill hundreds of millions of their people.

The United States possesses 1,054 ICBM's, many of which are armed with MRV warheads. It has about 550 long-range bombers which can reach any part of the Soviet Union. We have 41 nuclear submarines armed with 656 Polaris launchers, many of which are armed with MRV nuclear warheads. We have thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and elsewhere that can be delivered upon the enemy by a variety of means and kill scores of millions of the Russian people.

The Soviet Union possesses a nuclear arsenal of greater total megatonnage but less overall delivery capability. But the delivery capability they possess is enough—more than enough to kill scores of millions of people in the United States many times over. They have about 1,200 ICBM's, 150 long-range bombers, and about 10 nuclear missile submarines. They have IRBM's and MRBM's and many tactical nuclear weapons that can be used upon the countries that border the Soviet Union.

Our Government's ability to verify with reasonable certainty what the Soviet nuclear system can do to destroy the United States is of a nature and quality we can have confidence in. The Secretary of Defense regularly reports on those capabilities of the Soviet Union. The destructive arsenal of the United States is known to the world.

While our ability to destroy is assured, our ability to prevent catastrophic war is in grave doubt. This is the great weakness in the security of both nations. For as our development and deployment of strategic weapons increases our security diminishes. This is what the talks at Vienna ought to achieve—a lessening of that danger. Both the United States and the Soviet Union can race one another, matching technological advance with technological advance. Science has given us the ability to kill more people with greater reliability, accuracy and ingenuity than ever before. The prospects for continuing this grim ingenuity for overkill are contained in the next round of the arms race—a round which will begin unless SALT succeeds. Unless we agree at SALT, ABM, MRV's, FOB's, ULM's will be deployed in the sea, on land and in the air with increased lethal capability.

If we are confident of our ability to destroy, we should be firm in our determination to achieve, if at all possible, success at the talks. The United States should at the outset of talks at Vienna next week propose a mutual halt to the further deployment of strategic nuclear weapons so that a comprehensive arms limitation agreement can be worked out in certainty and with care. The United States should not with fearful caution enmesh itself in complexities and doubts by being tentative in its proposals. The issue is clear; our strength is certain; the action called for, is, I believe, apparent to all.

I urge the President to examine with grave weight the sense of the Senate contained in Senate Resolution 211, and propose the mutual suspension of all further deployment of nuclear weapons. To make such a proposal at the outset of

talks will test Soviet intentions and, just as important, make clear to the Soviet Union our own purposes. It is the course of reason, it is the course of security.

I wish to address two or three points, particularly in view of the questions asked by the Senator from Mississippi. I would like to make it clear, as has been made clear by all the speakers, that the resolution calls for mutual action by the United States and the Soviet Union. It is not a resolution which provides for unilateral action by the United States.

We who support this resolution have felt that this is the best time to make such a proposal, of mutual action by the United States and the Soviet Union. We urge this mutual pact for the same reasons that the SALT talks are possible. At the present time, the Soviet Union and the United States have confidence in their strength and have the knowledge that further development of nuclear systems make it only more difficult for agreement. So they have decided to talk.

The President of the United States, in commenting in a press conference on this resolution, termed it "irrelevant," but I would like to say that I have talked with the President of the United States. He does not consider that it is irrelevant. He said the purpose of the United States at the SALT talks was the same purpose contained in the resolution. There is an important distinction to be made, however, between making the proposal at the beginning of the negotiations, and going through a difficult process of verification over a long period of time in which many changes in the situation are possible.

We feel that this is a time when our present means of verification can be most confidently relied upon. This is a time when the United States and the Soviet Union both have reliable means of verification, but if the deployment of strategic nuclear systems continues while the talks are going on, we may reach a point where reliable verification will not be possible and, therefore, agreement will be difficult if not impossible.

Mr. President, I simply stress the fact—and the true fact—which has been developed so many times in this Chamber, that both the United States and the Soviet Union have the power to destroy each other, even if one is the subject of a first strike. We have certain knowledge of our ability to kill, to destroy each other, and to destroy civilization as we know it. But our ability to prevent a catastrophic nuclear war is in grave doubt. Unless agreement can be reached in these talks we will continue on, with all our grim ingenuity for overkill, to the next round of the arms race, a round which will begin unless the SALT talks succeed.

Unless we agree at SALT to halt the arms race, ABM, MRV, FOB's, and others will be deployed on sea, on land, and in the air, with increasing lethal capability.

Mr. President, I have urged, as all of us who favor the passage of this resolution have urged, that the President take note of and heed the sense of the Senate, and propose the mutual suspension of all further deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons.

To make such a proposal at the outset

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of the talks will test Soviet intentions and, what is just as important, make clear to the Soviet Union our own purposes. I think it is the course of reason and the course of security for this Nation. I hope that the reasons I have stated may have some bearing upon the judgment of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi and others, and that they will support the resolution, because it is one which imposes action mutually upon both countries, and which, if successful, would provide security for our country and, I believe, hope for the world.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, after these hours of debate, virtually all has been said that need be said. I hope that this body, very soon, will agree to the Brooke-Cooper resolution, and that it will serve as a guide for all Americans, and most particularly for the President, who occupies the most troubled post of all in attempting to evaluate what prudence and history will expect of us at Vienna.

Senate Resolution 211 expresses the sense of the Senate that prompt negotiations be urgently pursued between the United States and the Soviet Union to seek agreed, negotiated limitations on strategic offensive and defensive arms. The President has stated frequently that he has no quarrel with that portion of the resolution. But he has been silent on the second resolving paragraph, which makes all the difference. It calls on the President to propose to the Soviet Government an immediate suspension by both parties of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive weapons systems, not as the result of long and deliberate negotiations, but as an interim measure, in order to insure that an atmosphere conducive to successful negotiations be created.

If such a freeze is not put into effect immediately, it is hard to see how the talks can get anywhere. In the absence of a suspension of further weapons deployment on both sides, neither will have much interest in negotiating itself into a position where it might find itself disadvantaged by some new development on the other side.

Mr. President, this is the phenomenon that Dr. Herbert York last year graphically described as "the fallacy of the last move." Absent a moratorium, such as we call for in this resolution, each side will continually feel compelled to take "one last step" to place itself in a "superior" position by some new weapon deployment. It is, therefore, imperative that we now take the initiative and say, "Let us stop now. What do you say?" Until that step is taken there appears to be no way of blocking the continued arms spiral. Today, both sides view themselves in a position of general parity, and for that reason, an immediate freeze is possible as are later negotiations.

We hear reports that the Soviet Union might respond in kind to any constructive U.S. initiative at SALT. Yet, the administration declares itself unwilling to go to Vienna with a constructive proposal, preferring instead to sit back and await a Soviet offer. Thus, both sides are apparently caught in an Alphonse-Gaston Act. That act was amusing when

I was a kid reading the funnies. But it can incinerate mankind, if in fact it is played at Vienna.

The two new weapons developments proposed by this Government are not needed now. That they are being pressed on the eve of the resumption of SALT is very disturbing.

Mr. President, we think we are confronted with urgent issues every week in the Senate. Yesterday we dealt with what is thought to have been an urgent issue. I believe it was. I think it had a significant bearing on the future of life here at home. I think the Senate acted responsibly. What confronts us today is an opportunity to give guidance to the President with respect to something that will affect us, as did the nomination of yesterday, intimately here at home, but which likewise involves intimately the lives of men and women who do not even know of the existence of the Senate of the United States; and there are plenty of them, whether we are conscious of it or not. There are men and women who will never know this resolution was debated here today, but their lives and the future of their children may hinge very importantly on the wisdom with which we approach this vote.

As far as the plan to deploy Minuteman III with its MIRV's is concerned, it makes no sense at all: If SALT succeeds, the Soviet Union will not deploy ABM's, and we will not need MIRV's to penetrate them; if SALT fails, the U.S.S.R. will soon attain the capability to destroy our Minutemen; they will be vulnerable and obsolete, and the money will have been wasted.

The same holds true for the Safeguard ABM. I need not recount the many arguments we made against it a year ago. I will only say that the case the administration is now making for continuing phase I—the defense of Minuteman sites in Montana and North Dakota—is weaker than ever. Equally important, the case has certainly not been made for the requested expansion to begin to provide protection against a future Chinese threat. Against either a Chinese or Soviet threat, the proposed system will be effective only if the threat is tailored to the capabilities of the defense, surely an absurd justification for any weapons system.

And, again, if SALT should succeed, we would not need the ABM; and if it should fail, the Safeguard ABM will not do the job.

So I, therefore, am forced to conclude that the continued pressure for these weapons programs on the eve of SALT is both unwise and counterproductive. As Mr. McGeorge Bundy stated yesterday in testifying before the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee:

There is no evidence at all that pressing the deployment of systems we do not yet need is likely to have a constructive effect on Soviet behavior in SALT... many of those who urge this tactic are men who do not want SALT to succeed.

Mr. President, I want SALT to succeed. The Brooke-Cooper resolution points the way.

Mr. President, I congratulate the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the names of the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK) and the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) be added as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 211.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SAXBE). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have conferred with the Senator from Massachusetts, and I want to make clear to him and to others that I have no complaint at all about the committee jurisdiction on this resolution. Unquestionably, I think, the primary jurisdiction is with the Committee on Foreign Relations. I think the Committee on Armed Services also, on this question of deployment, has a jurisdiction. Frankly, if I had known earlier about what the contents of the resolution were, and when it would come before the Senate, I would have made a motion to transfer it, for a few days' consideration at least, to the Committee on Armed Services.

At any rate, I have this to say about it now, Mr. President: A very laudable thought is behind it, as I have said heretofore. I feel, however, that right at the very edge of these negotiations, the responsibility for which the President has to carry, we ought not to be passing any resolution except to say, "Mr. President, we are behind you. We are behind your motives, and we are behind you."

I shall not stop to argue that further. The language of the resolution is very broad, from my viewpoint, and I regret that I cannot support the resolution under present conditions.

One thing I have in mind is that we are going to have before us within a few weeks bills providing money, or authorizations, at least, for deployment of various kinds of missiles. I think the facts will demonstrate how important they are for our own defense, and I do not want to have any personal entanglements on me in connection with sponsoring the measures that the resolution suggests.

I do not want other Senators to feel, those who see fit to vote for this resolution, that they are in any way committing themselves to be opposed to authorization of funds that may be contained in bills which are considered necessary for our own defense. There are several of them, of the most far-reaching consequences.

So, under those conditions, I shall oppose the resolution. I thank the Senator for yielding me time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not wish to take further time, if other Senators have further comments. I would only reiterate further what has already been stated. If anyone else wishes to speak on the resolution, I do not wish to take up the time.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I want to understand one thing. As I understand this resolution, we are not proposing to do any of this on a unilateral basis.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Absolutely. The language is very explicit that this is mutual. It might be said that it is unilateral in

the sense that we take the initiative. The report states that. It is because we are presumed to be more powerful, richer, and so forth. We spend more money. Somebody has to take the initiative. We make the proposal, but nothing will be done under it unless there is reciprocity.

Nobody is proposing unilateral disarmament, a unilateral freeze, or anything of the sort.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am glad to hear the Senator say that. From my reading of it—and I was in the committee when the discussions were held—I wanted to be sure that was absolutely clear. I have a great deal of sympathy with what the Senator from Mississippi has just said. I would dislike very much if something is not done over there before these other matters come up, to have this brought up as being a declaration that we were opposed to those things.

I am in favor of our continuing our strength until there is a willingness on the part of both sides to let down on it. But I think we have to guard ourselves very carefully in that regard.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I say to the Senator that nobody is suggesting that we disarm. But there is a feeling in many circles, on the part of many people, that you just cannot make any kind of agreement with Communists. There is a feeling of defeatism in other circles, among people who want to make an agreement, that because of the overwhelming power of those who are oriented toward the Military Establishment, you cannot get it. For example on our delegation to the Vienna talks there is Mr. Nitze, who was Deputy Secretary of Defense for a long time, and for a number of years in the recent past his orientation has been primarily in this area. There is Mr. Harold Brown, who was Secretary of the Air Force, I believe. He was also a very important official in the Defense Department. There is General Allison.

So I regret that people who are interested in defense seem to give the impression that they do not want to make any agreement whatever, under any circumstances, with Communists. If this is true, if this is the way it is going to be, it is an utterly hopeless thing to curtail the arms race.

I put in the RECORD a moment ago the figures of the extraordinary expenditures all over the world—over \$1,000 billion since 1964. These figures are from our own Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

If we are going down this road, and the people who are in control of the major part of our Government are unwilling to make an agreement, and if we mouth a few pious hopes now and then but are unwilling to take an initiative, I do not see any hope for an eventual solution of our problems.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. I think the Senator from Arkansas has emphasized this already, but it is my understanding that whatever agreement is reached is not predicated upon good faith.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No.

Mr. PASTORE. It has to be by proper verification.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. By the words of the resolution.

Mr. PASTORE. In order to make sure that there will be no cheating.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

I say again to the Senator that the only reason it is so timely, and the talks are timely, is the development of MIRV. It makes that very point extremely difficult.

As a matter of fact, the original resolution of the Senator from Massachusetts was directed solely at MIRV, and I think one of the principal considerations was the difficulty of verification of MIRV deployment. Until they are at the point of being deployed, I believe they can be verified, due to our highly complex methods of verification.

This question is dealt with quite explicitly in the report. Just to tie that point down, I read from page 5:

But it is also clear, and must be emphasized in this report, that a suspension of testing and deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles could not be sustained for long in the face of the deployment by the Soviet Union of large numbers of missiles, such as the SS-9, or the development and deployment of new strategic defensive systems by the United States or the Soviet Union.

That is why it is so important to make this proposal in the beginning. If the deployment of MIRV's is begun, then the question of verification becomes infinitely more difficult. That was the testimony of some of the best witnesses we had in the scientific field. I think that this is one of the most important considerations.

I yield the floor.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the Senate is once again reasserting its prerogatives with respect to U.S. foreign policy. Last summer we adopted the so-called National Commitments resolution, declaring that U.S. military or financial response to events in other nations shall be subject to action by both the executive and legislative branches of government. I supported that resolution because I felt strongly that the Congress took a back seat to the President for 8 years. Considering the dilemmas in which we soon found ourselves, that was too long a period of acquiescence.

Today we are considering another resolution, this one regarding the suspension of further deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems. Mr. President, I regard this problem as one of paramount importance to world survival. Nations have come much too close to the perilous point of self-extermination.

Senate Resolution 211 urges prompt negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to limit strategic weapons systems. President Nixon is already one step ahead in this regard. Constructive preliminary talks have been held in Helsinki and further talks are scheduled for Vienna. The President regards these negotiations as the most crucial ever undertaken by any nation. I remain cautiously optimistic that the United States and the Soviet Union can reach a mutually agreeable

settlement if these negotiations continue to be held in the serious vein for which they were intended.

Senate Resolution 211 also urges the President to propose to the Soviet Union an immediate suspension, by both nations, of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems. All this, of course, will be subject to national verification or some other method of observation and inspection. I regard this particular directive as one which seems to be the key to the strategic arms limitations talks—SALT.

President Nixon, during his news conference of June 19, 1969, said:

We are considering the possibility of a moratorium on tests as part of any arms control agreement. However, as for any unilateral stopping of tests on our part, I do not think that would be in our interest.

I am in full agreement with the President on this point. I believe that the United States can propose to the Soviet Union a bilateral cessation of the further deployment of strategic weapons systems. This proposal might be made at the next round of SALT meetings as part of an entire package of suggestions to halt the arms race. I believe that remains one of the major goals of the Nixon administration.

My earlier concern with respect to the original wording of Senate Resolution 211 has been alleviated. I do not want to tie the President's hands in his search for peace. I want to provide him with every tool he needs to assure the world's future generations of a peaceful coexistence among all nations. The resolution as presently drafted gives the President the flexibility he needs.

Mr. President, I have read the pending resolution very carefully. I note that with each redrafting, it has attracted additional support, now comprising about one-half of the Senate. I believe that its adoption by the Senate will serve as a useful and unrestrictive guideline for the President in his efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. I have already notified the distinguished author of this resolution, Senator EDWARD BROOKE, of my desire to be added as a cosponsor. I urge the Senate, for the sake of generations yet unborn, to adopt this resolution by an overwhelming margin. Let us all continue to take the offensive in the search for peace.

A NEW ERA OF NATIONAL SECURITY: THE SENATE AND A MUTUAL STRATEGIC FREEZE

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the discussion of Senate Resolution 211 has already developed the essential issues which the proposal raises. Last Friday's important debate covered a broad range of considerations. It made clear the reasons why this resolution has been reported without a dissenting vote in the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senate Resolution 211 is an historic successor to past Senate actions on arms control. During the 1960's the Senate twice passed similar resolutions which paved the way to ultimate adoption of the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty. Such expressions serve the interests of American diplomacy in several ways, but most es-

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pecially by providing an indication that the Senate will support the efforts of the Executive to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on limiting the arms race that threatens both countries. Thus, this resolution can bolster the President's diplomatic posture in the vital Strategic Arms Limitation Talks which begin in Vienna on April 16.

Senate Resolution 211 is a simple statement. It recognizes that the United States and the Soviet Union both possess powerful nuclear deterrents today. It recognizes that this rough strategic balance in fact improves the prospect for mutual agreement to avoid further costly and wasteful spirals of weapons expenditures. It recognizes that the pace of technology is such that this diplomatic opportunity must be seized before new technologies and new deployments alter the strategic balance and undermine the prospects for joint limitation of nuclear forces.

This resolution is a sensible reinforcement of what President Nixon has already declared is the administration's purpose in the SALT negotiations. On March 21, the President stated that the United States is prepared for either a comprehensive or a system by system agreement in SALT. As the President put it so succinctly:

Our goal certainly is to limit both offensive and defensive missiles, and if the Soviet Union has the same goal, we will make a bargain.

The resolution now before the Senate would lend the weight of opinion in this body, which must ultimately ratify any agreement reached in SALT, to this essential goal. It would advance this Nation's commitment, accepted in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to pursue with the Soviet Union mutual efforts to curb the nuclear arms race. It would add a sense of urgency by stressing that the negotiations should seek agreement on a mutual suspension of further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems. Such a general freeze would be subject to national verification or other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate.

In the opinion of informed officials and experts, such a freeze proposal could be verified by so-called national means, which is a term of art referring to both side existing intelligence capabilities. However, the negotiators are left ample latitude to define additional means of verifying compliance and for reducing the uncertainties which might arise in this connection. For example, I have long argued that a suspension of further tests of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles is a critical requirement for impeding deployment of these potentially destabilizing systems. Informed technical testimony favors the conclusion that a MIRV test moratorium could be verified by each side's present intelligence networks.

Dr. Jack Ruina, former director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency and now a ranking consultant to the administration, has made this point emphatically in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee. He has been supported in this view by such distin-

guished authorities as Dr. Gordon MacDonald, now a member of the Council on Environmental Quality, Dr. Herbert York, former Director of Defense Research under President Eisenhower, and Dr. Freeman Dyson, the noted scientist of Princeton University. All are agreed that a ban on MIRV testing and deployment is feasible, verifiable, and important to the national security of both ourselves and the Soviets.

The SALT discussions could usefully explore a variety of means for increasing confidence in the verification system. I have proposed, for instance, that the two sides agree to announce all missile tests, to test over agreed ranges where each could monitor the other's tests in detail to consider exchanging observers or installing suitable instruments at the major test facilities in both countries. These and other ideas for improving verification of a MIRV test ban deserve thorough study in SALT, as do all aspects of verifying a general freeze arrangement. No one can deny that the issues involved in the SALT negotiations require solutions in which both parties have high confidence.

Let me underscore several points which are at the heart of Senate Resolution 211. The eloquent chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee stated its purpose well when he said that it seeks "to provide the negotiators in Vienna—both American and Soviet—with a chance to negotiate on firm ground instead of on shifting sand." The impending deployments of MIRV and ABM systems threaten to complicate the SALT negotiations immeasurably. In the face of this prospect, it would be prudent and safe for both sides to halt further deployments for at least an interim period while the diplomats seek to devise durable barriers against future expansions of the strategic forces. If such a freeze is not agreed to, and it is a truism that it can scarcely be agreed to if it is never proposed, the problem of stabilizing the arms balance will grow more intricate and the probability of eventual agreement will be reduced.

The logic of a mutual freeze as a means of buying time for diplomacy to seek lasting arms controls can be stated in many ways. Perhaps the simplest formulation is the best. As President Nixon indicated last March, both the United States and the Soviet Union now possess credible deterrence. That is, both countries have sufficient nuclear weapons to guarantee that, if attacked, they can deliver devastating retaliation against any adversary. Both countries will do whatever is necessary to see that they retain such an assured capability to retaliate.

Yet both countries now acknowledge that there is no profit in endless increases in their force levels. Former Secretary McNamara's description of the "mad momentum" of the arms race has been echoed by Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement that the arms race has long since become "lunacy". This same conclusion has been voiced by the authoritative comment in Pravda of March 7, 1970, which stressed that the present strategic balance makes quite unrealistic any cal-

culations about "the possibility of victory in a thermonuclear war. Judging by everything, a new spiral in the arms race would not change the essence of this correlation."

This, then, is the context in which the SALT effort begins. That it is beginning at all is, in my judgment, a direct reflection of a common recognition that the arms race is futile and wasteful, that it adds nothing to the security of either side, and that a mutual limitation of strategic weaponry would be advantageous to both countries.

But this unprecedented political consensus between the Soviet and American leadership may be overwhelmed by the pressures of a technology which has brought us to the verge of a new era in military systems. If a general freeze is not established, the United States will continue with plans to deploy its MIRV systems. In response the Soviet Union will no doubt insist on perfecting and deploying its own MIRV weapons. With Soviet MIRV weapons entering the force, the U.S. land-based missile force will become increasingly vulnerable and we shall have to take countermeasures, either by changing the mix of our offensive forces, by expanding ABM defense of the Minuteman, or by other means. These actions in turn are likely to engender Soviet force changes, probably increasing the total number of delivery vehicles as a hedge against the new uncertainties connected with MIRV, ABM, and other systems. In short the chances for a general arms limitation will be in danger of coming unstuck.

To forestall this risky cycle, a mutual freeze proposal is timely and needed. Senate Resolution 211 is a vehicle by which the Senate can share with the President the burdens of advancing this urgent proposal.

If the Soviet Union accepts the proposal, as I believe its own national interests dictate, the security of both our countries will be enhanced. The Soviets would suspend deployment of the SS-9 system which, if deployed in numbers and equipped with accurate MIRV's is considered the prime threat to the U.S. Minuteman force. It would also stop adding to its nuclear submarine fleet, which is viewed as a growing threat to the U.S. strategic bomber bases and command and control facilities. Furthermore, its ABM system would be limited to the insignificant number of weapons which we are now confident we can penetrate with existing U.S. forces. In return the United States would have only to cease plans to deploy MIRV and ABM, which are in fact intended primarily as responses to the prospective Soviet ABM and MIRV systems. If the latter are forestalled by a mutual freeze, it is self-evident that the United States can safely and wisely refrain from deploying weapons which it will not need.

There is, of course, a legitimate question as to the effect of this proposal on the U.S. negotiating position in Vienna. After deliberate study over many months, the Committee on Foreign Relations concluded, as I have, that the suggestion made by the resolution would be highly constructive. It would convey the Sen-

ate's appreciation that the impending deployments of MIRV and ABM may well energize diplomacy at this decisive juncture of history, while actual deployment of such systems could frustrate SALT. We have arrived at a fragile moment which we must either grasp by a bold initiative or see it fall victim to our own hesitation.

Of special significance in tendering the Senate's advice to the President on this matter is the fact that a general freeze on offensive and defensive weapons deployments is actually more easily verified than a plan to limit only one aspect of such weapons. Under a mutual suspension of this kind, there are many indicators to tell whether the parties are complying with the agreement. Thus, we would be able to monitor not only the nature of Soviet missile tests, but whether they are attempting to increase clandestinely the total number of ABM radars or missiles, or the number of land-based offensive missiles, or the number of missile-launching submarines.

Evidence of violation on any one of these aspects of a freeze would be a signal alerting the other party. If there is strong mutual interest in maintaining the freeze, each side would find it in its interest to reassure the other about any questionable activities that might tempt a party to withdraw from the agreement. Thus there could well emerge powerful incentives for building mutual confidence in the agreement, rather than bearing the hazards of seeing the understanding collapse amid charges of attempted evasion. I would consider this a major advantage to the proposal.

Another way of examining the recommended mutual suspension of strategic deployments is to ask what the situation will be in the absence of such an arrangement. If one is prone to be apprehensive about relying on national means to verify Soviet force levels under an agreed freeze, one should be doubly apprehensive about having to do so in the absence of such an agreement. Yet that is precisely the situation today, and it will prevail indefinitely unless SALT is successful. Our own force planning is based heavily on such intelligence estimates, with all the attendant doubts and anxieties about whether we are doing too much or too little.

As I have said, Senate Resolution 211 leaves the President wide authority to seek the verification arrangements he considers necessary, but it is fair to point out that a great deal can be done on the basis of national means of intelligence and that those means can be vastly strengthened by a prudent limitation of the type suggested. For example, today's surveillance systems can provide reliable estimates of the total number of offensive missiles in the Soviet inventory. Yet the capability to provide an accurate count of such weapons will decline in the future if mobile land-based ICBM's or deceptive basing techniques are introduced. It is precisely those kinds of concepts which a freeze could help head off. The mutual suspension of further strategic deployments could do a great deal to reinforce the advantage both sides now possess in being able to determine independently the relative balance of forces.

To the extent that uncertainty about the balance develops, the likelihood of destabilizing changes in the forces grows.

In addition to the extraordinary cosponsorship which Senate Resolution 211 has attracted, its wide support in the Senate is reflected in that fact that the Foreign Relations Committee reported the measure without a dissenting vote. Similarly, it is most significant that the Democratic Policy Committee has made clear by its unanimous endorsement the bipartisan backing Senate Resolution 211 enjoys.

The President now knows that he can seek a mutual suspension of deployments of strategic weapons with the overwhelming support of both Republicans and Democrats. That is a welcome reinforcement of the vital tradition of bipartisan foreign policy which has contributed so much to American security over the years.

I might add my own satisfaction, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, that my colleagues on that body have shown increasing support for this resolution. In addition to a number of members who have indicated their intention to vote for the resolution, several of those who serve on the Armed Services Committee—Senator SYMINGTON, Senator YOUNG of Ohio, Senator INOUYE, Senator MCINTYRE, and Senator SCHWEIKER—have joined as cosponsors. It is clear that many of the most informed and concerned Senate authorities on national security issues recognize the desirability and urgency of seeking the kind of stable strategic arrangements proposed in Senate Resolution 211.

I would like to inject one further thought concerning the kind of proposal suggested by the resolution. It is reported that some members of the administration feel the United States should wait and see what proposals the Soviet Union advances at Vietnam. Apart from the possibility that the Soviets may adopt a parallel reticence and that the SALT talks may then be paralyzed by a useless and tiresome waiting game, there is an obvious absurdity to this suggestion. It is best revealed by the recent acknowledgment by a high administration official that, if the Soviet Union made the proposal outlined in Senate Resolution 211, the United States would certainly be responsive.

Thus, there is precious little logic to risking a complete failure of the effort in SALT by a kind of diplomatic brinkmanship in which each side hesitates even to make a firm proposal, preferring to let the other country bear the imaginary onus of making the first proposal. This is outrageous, especially when one realizes that both nations have a paramount and mutual interest in such a joint arrangement. In adopting this resolution, the Senate will be assisting the President in perceiving the fundamental interests which should govern the United States in making such a proposal.

Let me address explicitly a few concerns which have been raised about the duration of the recommended strategic deployment standstill. Some have been apprehensive that the United States would somehow get locked into an open-ended halt, with public opinion making

it difficult for the United States to disengage even if the Soviets were engaging in certain ambiguous or threatening activities. Nothing of this sort need occur.

First of all, the President has ample authority to define the duration of the mutual suspension at the outset by specifying that it should last, for example, for 18 or 24 months, with an extension dependent on further progress in the SALT negotiations.

Second, even if the proposal is not tied to a specific time period, the resolution in no way limits the President's capacity to determine the exact verification requirements which would permit mutual restraint to continue. As many of us have made clear, we believe much can be done by means of national intelligence systems, but it may well be that, as SALT proceeds, more detailed arrangements for mutual verification will prove possible. Both countries could surely exercise mutual restraint for a limited time while detailed arrangements are perfected in the SALT talks.

Third, should the President at some point judge that the mutual suspension could not be continued without undue dangers to our national security, he would undoubtedly make the necessary decision to resume U.S. deployments. It is reasonable to hope that if confronted with such an immediate prospect of a resumed arms race, the Soviet Union would recognize its larger interest in ceasing any suspicious activities or in so clarifying them as to make it possible for the United States to continue abiding by the mutual restraints. But if the Soviets failed to do so, no one would expect the President to accept unwise risks to our security. If in his judgment, whether or not supported by public opinion, the risks of delaying additional deployments outweighed the risks of a resumed arms competition, every Member of the Senate knows that the President would take appropriate action.

Thus, the supposed hazard of an unreasonable, open-ended freeze being imposed on the President by an unknowing public opinion is nothing more than a bogey-man. The alleged risks of such a development are trivial when compared to the predictable risks of carrying the present strategic competition into the dangerous, shifting terrains populated by MIRV and ABM.

These then, are some of the considerations which have led so many Senators to support Senate Resolution 211. In no sense can it be considered a step toward unilateral disarmament. Indeed the only unilateral proposal being made is by those who urge unilateral changes in the present strategic balance before the SALT negotiations even have a chance to address the issues. Prime examples of this tendency are the plans for the premature and unwise deployment of the U.S. MIRV and the continued, counterproductive increases in the Soviet SS-9 force.

Senate Resolution 211 is a well-founded and reasoned exercise of the Senate's historic responsibilities in the field of foreign policy. The choice of the risks which the United States will bear in international affairs is a task which this body, as well as the President, must

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share. This resolution advances a modest proposal and indicates that the Senate will support the President in seeking a mutual freeze on further deployments of strategic weapons, including particularly MIRV and ABM. As one means of verifying compliance with an agreement not to deploy MIRV, the legislative history of Senate Resolution 211 makes clear that a MIRV test limitation should have high priority in the SALT negotiations. The vital objective is to stabilize matters where they stand so that the SALT negotiators will have a chance to shore up the present strategic balance by erecting durable means of verifying a freeze for the long haul.

Will the Soviets accept such a mutual freeze? No one knows for certain, but I am convinced that they may very well respond affirmatively. I have reviewed the exchanges at Helsinki with some care. I am satisfied that there is no sufficient evidence to conclude that the Soviets would not be interested in such a proposal. Within this larger framework, I think it especially important to note that there is no sound reason to conclude that the Soviets are indifferent to MIRV or ABM, as some commentators once suggested. Indeed, high officials of the administration have privately indicated that the Soviets now appear interested specifically in a possible MIRV limitation, which would be accomplished by the general freeze proposal set forth in this resolution. Since the Soviets fully understand that U.S. restraint on MIRV will require Soviet restraint on ABM, they have no doubt that both offensive and defensive systems must be limited, if there is to be agreement.

The only way to determine whether the Soviet Union is interested in a mutual strategic freeze is to make the proposal. If Moscow rejects the plan, there will still be an opportunity to explore more limited undertakings on a system-by-system basis.

More than most Americans realize, the future security and well-being of our country hinge on the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The Senate has the power and the privilege to serve those great interests by lending its advice to the President on the profound issues of strategic arms control. Senate Resolution 211 is a prudent instrument for that purpose, and I commend it to the Senate.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I rise to support Senate Resolution 211 and to urge the President to offer the Soviet Union a prompt interim halt to offensive and defensive weapons deployment. I think it would be a grave error if we undermined the upcoming SALT talks—perhaps our last best hope of ending the arms race—by an unnecessary deployment of MIRV and Safeguard.

The administration apparently takes the position that we should go ahead with MIRV and Safeguard until the Russians propose a comprehensive arms control agreement. But this position makes no sense at all. Why should we wait until the Russians make an arms control proposal? Are not we the leaders in mankind's struggle for peace? Surely this is not the time for the administration to

participate in an Alphonse-Gaston routine.

Furthermore, the Russians have given some indication that they are interested in a comprehensive freeze on weapons systems. An obviously high-level article in the March 7 edition of Pravda acknowledged the danger of a new spiral in the arms race and the need for arms control. It suggested that "honest talks" would lead to "agreed solutions."

Now, of course, the Pravda article may be completely insincere. The Russians may have no intention of entering into a serious arms control agreement. But why not put the Russians to the test? Why not offer an interim halt in the deployment of offensive and defense weapons systems and take the initiative for peace? If the Russians reject our initiative, they will stand condemned in the eyes of the world. But let us make sure that the United States cannot be condemned for inaction in the quest for peace. Let us call for an end to arms race, and let us call for it today.

The administration has never explained why it is necessary to deploy MIRV's as early as this June. Indeed, the administration has never satisfactorily explained why we need to deploy MIRV's at all. The original purpose of MIRV was to counter a massive Soviet ABM system. But this system was never built. We are, therefore, overreacting to a threat which never materialized, just as we did in the 1950's and 1960's. Instead of acting with a new realism, we are simply repeating old mistakes.

There is no danger that our security will be jeopardized if we fail to deploy MIRV now. As Rathjens and Kistiakowsky have pointed out:

There is little doubt that currently designed U.S. MIRV's could be deployed on a time scale [which is] short compared with that required for deployment of any significant Russian ABM defenses. Accordingly, there is no need for any MIRV deployment pending firm evidence that the USSR is beginning the construction of such defenses.

We will always be able to deploy MIRV if that should prove necessary.

The risks we take if we insist on premature, unnecessary deployment of MIRV and Safeguard, and if we undermine the SALT talks, are staggering. First, there is the risk of spirally arms costs which will make it impossible for us to meet our pressing domestic needs. At the present time, the strategic forces budget of the United States amounts to about \$9 billion per year, excluding some rather large items for warheads, research and development, and communications and intelligence activities; \$9 billion is more than twice what the Nixon administration accepted to spend this year on education. It is over seven times more than the Nixon administration intends to spend next year on crime reduction. But, if we do not limit arms control expenditures in the near future, it is estimated that outlays for strategic systems could double by the mid-1970's. Eighteen billion dollars a year in Federal tax revenues would become unavailable to meet domestic needs.

The second risk we take by unnecessary deployment of MIRV is even more

ominous. The new buildup in the arms race would increase tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. It would reduce even further the possibility of Soviet-American cooperation in the Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, if both super powers continue to develop new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons systems, there is a danger that the present nuclear balance will be upset, or will appear to be upset, and that one of the powers will embark on a reckless military adventure. Harold Brown, former Secretary of the Air Force, has made an important observation in this regard. It is true that if we have an arms control agreement, the Russians might make clandestine improvements in their weapons systems, although the advent of satellite surveillance reduces this possibility. Dr. Brown points out:

But, it seems at least as likely that, in the absence of an agreement, they might make a sudden massive effort to tilt the balance in their favor.

Mr. President, the Nixon administration must do everything in its power to make the SALT talks a success for peace. The proposed deployment of MIRV and Safeguard is a step toward disaster. It substantially increases the risk that the dreaded arms race, with all its costs and all its dangers, will continue to plague mankind for generations.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, the resolution presently pending is certainly laudable in its purpose to limit the escalation of the arms race. I noted with interest that recently the President's Policy Advisory Committee to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has similarly recommended that the United States propose to the Soviet Union an immediate and mutual halt to missile deployment. I am sure that no one in this body would take issue with the objective sought by these recommendations.

However, I have grave reservations as to whether or not the approach will be successful in view of the historical precedents set by the Soviets in this regard. In 1958 when President Eisenhower announced that the United States would discontinue further testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere for so long as the Soviets did likewise, the moratorium was unilaterally broken by the Soviets in less than 3 years. Consistently for the past two decades the Soviets have rejected any suggestions regarding surveillance and onsite inspection.

On the other hand, every time efforts are initiated concerning arms talk, we hear that the United States should immediately suspend all technological development of its weaponry or the Soviets will not meet us at the negotiation table. This assumption has always proved in error. The pending resolution was introduced on June 17, 1969, with the urgency stated that unless it was adopted the pending Strategic Arms Limitation Talks would be in jeopardy. The talks went ahead on schedule and the second round is to convene on April 16 without the benefit of this resolution being passed. During the ABM debates we also heard that unless the requested authori-

zation were defeated we would defer negotiations.

In short, I do not believe that history favors these arguments or encourages optimism as to a meaningful agreement with the Soviets.

Recognizing these points, however, I still share the hope of my colleagues that meaningful progress can be made in the arms talks. The thrust of Senate Resolution 211 contains, in my judgment, sufficient caveats to insure protection of our national interests. Obviously, the concept of simultaneous cessations of the operational testing of MIRV is meaningless without realistic protection. National verification or other methods of observation and inspection as may be appropriate called for in the resolution offers a vehicle to explore the true intention of the Soviets and their willingness to achieve the goals sought. With this point fully in mind I offer my support to the resolution and sincerely hope that my pessimism will be proved unfounded.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I understand that there will be no more speakers, so when I get through I will put in a quorum call, to start voting at 4 p.m.

I want to emphasize that the one thing unilateral about this resolution is that the Senate of the United States, and hopefully the U.S. delegation to the Vienna conference, will be taking the initiative to propose a mutual freeze. Every action contemplated will be taken by both countries—no country will take a risk the other country refuses to take.

We are not advocating disarming unilaterally. Nobody in this body would stand for that. What we are trying to do is to break the deadlock which exists, to try to give encouragement to the President and his delegates at Vienna, and to try to do something constructive in helping to bring about an end to the mad momentum which seems to have gripped the two major powers in the world—the Soviet Union and ourselves—to the end that perhaps there will be salvation at the end of the road, rather than destruction.

We have now begun to walk the correct pathway to that end. The adoption of this resolution will represent a major step along that road.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded and that, with no further speakers, the vote begin.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The first question is on agreeing to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that prompt negotiations between the Governments of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to seek agreed limitations of both offen-

sive and defensive strategic weapons should be urgently pursued; and

Resolved further, That the President should propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an immediate suspension by the United States and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, subject to national verification or such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now is on agreeing to the resolution, as amended.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STENNIS. (after having voted in the negative). On this vote I have voted "nay." I understand that the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Ribicoff), if present, would vote "yea." I have given him a live pair, he being absent. I, therefore, withdraw my vote.

Mr. ERVIN (after having voted in the negative). I voted "nay." I voted "nay" because I think this is a matter for the executive branch rather than for the legislative branch. The distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. Magnuson) is necessarily absent. I am advised that if he were present he would vote "yea." I have agreed to give him a live pair and, therefore, withdraw my negative vote.

Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. Anderson), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Bible), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Eagleton), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Eastland), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Hartke), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Cannon), the Senator from Washington (Mr. Magnuson), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Ribicoff), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Russell), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. Yarborough) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Inouye) and the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. Pell) are absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd) and the Senator from Texas (Mr. Yarborough) would each vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Utah (Mr. Bennett) is absent on official business as observer at the meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Korea.

The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cook), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Dominick), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Hansen), the Senator from California (Mr. Murphy), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. Tower) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Mundt) is absent because of illness.

If present and voting, the Senator from Utah (Mr. Bennett), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Dominick), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Hansen), the

Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Mundt), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. Tower) would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 72, nays 6, as follows:

[No. 128 Leg.]

YEAS—72

Aiken	Harris	Muskie
Allott	Hart	Nelson
Baker	Hatfield	Packwood
Bayh	Holland	Pastore
Boggs	Hollings	Pearson
Brooke	Hruska	Percy
Burdick	Hughes	Prouty
Byrd, Va.	Jackson	Proxmire
Byrd, W. Va.	Javits	Randolph
Case	Jordan, N.C.	Saxbe
Church	Jordan, Idaho	Schweiker
Cooper	Kennedy	Scott
Cotton	Mansfield	Smith, Maine
Cranston	Mathias	Smith, Ill.
Curtis	McCarthy	Sparkman
Dole	McClellan	Spong
Ellender	McGee	Stevens
Fong	McGovern	Symington
Fulbright	McIntyre	Talmadge
Goodell	Metcalf	Tydings
Gore	Miller	Williams, N.J.
Gravel	Mondale	Williams, Del.
Griffin	Montoya	Young, N. Dak.
Gurney	Moss	Young, Ohio

NAYS—6

Allen	Fannin	Long
Bellmon	Goldwater	Thurmond

PRESENT AND GIVING LIVE PAIRS, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—2

Ervin, against.
Stennis, against.

NOT VOTING—20

Anderson	Eagleton	Murphy
Bennett	Eastland	Pell
Bible	Hansen	Ribicoff
Cannon	Hartke	Russell
Cook	Inouye	Tower
Dodd	Magnuson	Yarborough
Dominick	Mundt	

So the resolution (S.J. Res. 211), as amended, was agreed to.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution was agreed to.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment to the preamble was agreed to.

The preamble, as amended, was agreed to as follows:

Whereas the competition to develop and deploy strategic weapons has reached a new and dangerous phase, which threatens to frustrate attempts at negotiating significant arms limitations and to weaken the stability of nuclear deterrence as a barrier to war;

Whereas development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles by both the United States and the Soviet Union represents a fundamental and radical challenge to such stability;

Whereas the possibility of agreed controls over strategic forces appears likely to diminish greatly if testing and deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles proceed;

Whereas a suspension of flight tests of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles promises to forestall deployment of such provocative weapons; and

Whereas a suspension of such tests could contribute substantially to the success of the strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union: Now, therefore, be it

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The title as proposed to be amended will be stated.

The bill clerk read as follows:

April 9, 1970

Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on suspension of further deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I call up my amendment to the amendment to the title.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The BILL CLERK. The Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER) proposes an amendment on page 4, to strike the last two lines and insert in lieu thereof the following:

The sense of the Senate on mutual suspension of further deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons systems by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and by the United States.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, this is a perfecting amendment to accord with the other provisions of the resolution and also with the colloquies conducted on the floor of the Senate.

I have discussed the amendment with the distinguished prime sponsor of the resolution and with others. I understand that it is acceptable to them.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Iowa to the amendment to the title.

The amendment was agreed to.

The title, as amended, was agreed to.

PROGRAM

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I should like to address a question to the distinguished majority leader.

Would the distinguished majority leader be good enough to advise us of the further program for today and thereafter?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in reply, for the information of the Senate, in addition to the Peace Corps Act, as amended, Calendar No. 768, H.R. 15349, the Railroad Adjustment Board, will be taken up tomorrow.

On Monday it is anticipated that we will take up Calendar No. 760 (S. 2846), the mental retardation bill; Calendar No. 747 (S. 3637), the equal-time bill.

On Tuesday we will take up Calendar No. 763 (S. 1814), the public ownership of the D.C. Transit System, and will finish the equal-time bill if it is not completed on Monday.

Following that, on Wednesday, we will consider Calendar No. 773 (S. 721), the credit card bill.

On Thursday, we will consider Calendar No. 764 (S. 3685), the mortgage credit bill; Calendar No. 712 (S. 1148), the Virgin Islands Act.

On Friday we will consider Calendar No. 564, H.R. 9477, the Umatilla Indian Reservation bill.

This is the best I can do in a definitive way as to stating what the schedule will be.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I say to the distinguished majority leader that I am glad I asked the question.

I thank the Senator from New Hampshire.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the bill (S. 3690) to increase the pay of Federal employees, with an amendment, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendment of the Senate to the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 2601) to reorganize the courts of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. McMILLAN, Mr. ABERNETHY, Mr. DOWDY, Mr. CABELL, Mr. NELSEN, Mr. HARSHA, Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia, and Mr. HOGAN were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES SALARY ACT OF 1970

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on S. 3690.

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 3690) to increase the pay of Federal employees which was to strike out all after the enacting clause, and insert:

That this Act may be cited as the "Federal Employees Salary Act of 1970".

Sec. 2. (a) (1) The President shall increase the rates of basic pay, basic compensation, and salaries (as such rates were increased by Executive Order Numbered 11474, dated June 18, 1969) contained in the schedules listed in paragraph (2) of this subsection by amounts equal, as nearly as may be practicable and with regard to maintaining approximately equal increments within any grade, level, or class of any such schedule, to 6 percent.

(2) The schedules referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection are as follows: the General Schedule contained in section 5332 (a) of title 5, United States Code; the Postal Field Service Schedule and the Rural Carrier Schedule contained in sections 3542(a) and 3543(a), respectively, of title 39, United States Code; the schedules relating to certain positions within the Department of Medicine and Surgery of the Veterans' Administration and contained in section 4107 of title 38, United States Code; and the Foreign Service schedules contained in section 412 and 415 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

(b) Rates of basic pay, basic compensation, and salaries of officers and employees paid under the schedules referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall be increased initially under conversion rules prescribed by the President or by such agency as the President may designate.

(c) The increases made by the President under this section shall have the force and effect of law and shall be printed (1) in the Statutes at Large in the same volume as public laws, (2) the Federal Register, and (3) the Code of Federal Regulations.

Sec. 3. (a) The rates of pay of personnel subject to sections 210 and 214 of the Federal Salary Act of 1967 (81 Stat. 633, 635; Public Law 90-206), relating to Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation County Committee employees and to certain employees of the legislative branch of the Government,

respectively, and any minimum or maximum rate, limitation, or allowance applicable to any such personnel, shall be adjusted, effective on the first day of the first pay period which begins on or after December 27, 1969, by amounts which are identical, insofar as practicable, to the amounts of the adjustments under this section for corresponding rates of pay for employees subject to the General Schedule, by the following authorities—

(1) the Secretary of Agriculture, with respect to individuals employed by the county committees established under section 590h (b) of title 16;

(2) the Comptroller of the Senate, with respect to the United States Senate;

(3) the Finance Clerk of the House of Representatives, with respect to the United States House of Representatives; and

(4) the Architect of the Capitol, with respect to the Office of the Architect of the Capitol.

The provisions of this section shall not be construed to allow adjustments in the rates of pay of the following officers of the United States House of Representatives: Parliamentarian, Chaplain, Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, Doorkeeper, Postmaster, and the four Floor Assistants to the Minority whose position titles formerly were Minority Clerk, Minority Sergeant at Arms, Minority Doorkeeper, and Minority Postmaster.

(b) Notwithstanding section 665 of title 31, the rates of pay of employees in and under the judicial branch of the Government, whose rates of pay are fixed by administrative action pursuant to law and are not otherwise adjusted under this section may be adjusted, effective on the first day of the first pay period which begins on or after December 27, 1969, by amounts not to exceed the amounts of the adjustments under section 2(a) of this Act for corresponding rates of pay. The limitations fixed by law with respect to the aggregate salaries payable to secretaries and law clerks of circuit and district judges shall be adjusted, effective on the first day of the first pay period which begins on or after the date on which adjustments become effective under this section, by amounts not to exceed the amounts of the adjustments under this section for corresponding rates of pay.

(c) The rates of pay of United States attorneys and assistant United States attorneys whose annual salaries are fixed pursuant to section 548 of title 28, United States Code, shall be increased, effective on the first day of the first pay period which begins on or after December 27, 1969, by amounts equal, as nearly as may be practicable, to the increases provided pursuant to section 2 of this Act for corresponding rates of pay.

(d) Notwithstanding section 665 of title 31, the rates of pay of employees of the Federal Government and of the government of the District of Columbia whose rates of pay are fixed by administrative action pursuant to law and are not otherwise increased pursuant to this section are hereby authorized to be increased, effective on the first day of the first pay period which begins on or after December 27, 1969, by amounts not to exceed the increases provided pursuant to section 2 of this Act for corresponding rates of pay in the appropriate schedule or scale of pay.

Sec. 4. (a) An increase in pay, compensation, or salary which becomes effective under section 2 of this Act is not an equivalent increase in pay within the meaning of section 5335 of title 5, United States Code, or section 3552 of title 39, United States Code.

(b) Nothing in this Act shall impair any authority pursuant to which rates of pay, compensation, or salary may be fixed by administrative action.

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act—

Two had ignored it. The third accorded it two grudging inches in the third section.

But there was a picture of three hippie students being arrested at San Francisco State. There was a picture of another group of young radicals giving the "Black Power" salute outside the Bel Air, Md., trial of H. Rap Brown. There was a picture of girls involved in the "Women's Liberation Movement."

But there was no picture of a 15-year-old girl kissing her president, no picture of three boys and two girls who shared \$13,500 in VFW college scholarships for their scripts on "Freedom's Challenge." There wasn't even a story.

The veterans were angry at the newspapers in Washington. Perhaps it's time that all of us in the press took another look at "what's news."

SALT

STATEMENT OF McGEORGE BUNDY

HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 9, 1970

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, the SALT talks will be resumed in Vienna next week. The United States must adopt a position of flexibility and compromise if these important talks are to succeed.

The distinguished president of the Ford Foundation, McGeorge Bundy, testified yesterday before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations. I believe his remarks are of great significance and I include them at this point:

STATEMENT OF McGEORGE BUNDY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am happy to accept your invitation to testify on the arms race, and I am particularly happy to appear in company with Dr. York. I would like to associate myself strongly with his basic argument.

My broad view of the arms race was stated last October in an article in Foreign Affairs, and to save the time of the Committee I would like, with your permission, to offer that article for the record instead of repeating it. Its principal conclusion was simply that the strategic arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union has gone too far, threatens to go further, and should be stopped by an early agreement between these two great powers. Since then SALT has begun in a businesslike way, and our Government is now considering what its position will be as the talks resume in Vienna next week.

My own strong belief is that the best next step for the United States in this field is to follow the course proposed in Senate Resolution 211. That Resolution first states the sense of the Senate that prompt negotiations be urgently pursued between the two great powers, and on this point I think there is little or no disagreement among Americans. The second part of the Resolution expresses the sense of the Senate that we should now propose an immediate suspension by both sides "of further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems. An excellent basic argument in favor of this Resolution is developed in the report submitted by Senator Fulbright, and I will not waste your time by repeating it. Let me rather offer ten brief comments on the significance of your Committee's position.

1. I assume that in passing Senate Resolution 211, the Senate will be urging the President to propose to the Soviet Union the mutual suspension of these deployments for

some reasonable term during which further progress could be made toward a definite agreement. There are some who suppose that the word "moratorium" implies a form of permanent self-entanglement, but as I understand it no such self-entanglement is either necessary or intended.

2. I strongly support the statement in the Committee Report that an agreed suspension of deployment of strategic systems will necessarily imply a suspension also of tests—as well as deployment—of such emerging systems as MIRV. The Committee Report makes the correct connection between the Soviet SS-9 and the American MIRV. This connection goes both ways. Just as the Soviets must limit SS-9 if they wish to stop MIRV, so I believe that if we are to get any early limit on SS-9 deployment, we ourselves must place MIRV on the bargaining table.

3. I believe that there will not be much progress in SALT until the United States Government is prepared to make a specific proposal. I think the odds are heavy that it will prove wise and right for us to move first. The Committee has heard the sensitive and perceptive testimony of Professor Marshall Shulman on Soviet attitudes towards arms negotiation. I share his view that Soviet wariness is at least equal to our own. Our experience, understanding and present strength make it right for us to take the initiative.

4. Specifically, I believe that as a part of any proposal for an agreed moratorium the United States should take a first step by announcing a suspension of its own deployment of ABM and MIRV for a limited time. Such a time could and should be relatively brief, and its extension could and should depend upon the promptness and seriousness of Soviet response. There might be some marginal inconvenience for our defense organization in such a suspension, and our already overwhelming strategic war plans might need marginal revision if specific planned deployments are delayed—but there is no real and present danger in such a limited suspension, and if we want results in SALT, we should try it. How long such a trial should be, and precisely what it should include, are matters I do not attempt to cover, since it would be unwise for a private citizen to try to define the exact length and direction of any first step. My point is simply that we should begin by an action as well as a proposal.

5. This belief rests not on any sentimental notion that we must be more virtuous than the Russians, but rather upon the deep conviction that effective limitation and reduction of the strategic arms race is an objective deeply in our own national interest as well as the interest of all mankind. It is wholly false to suppose that the national security is always served by adding strategic weapons and never by their limitation. In the world of the 1970s the truth is more nearly the opposite. We have more than enough strategic weapons today. The addition of new systems which will inevitably produce further Soviet systems is not the road to safety for anyone in any country.

6. In particular we should be on guard against the notion that it is useful to press the development or deployment of any given weapons system because of its value as a bargaining-counter for SALT. It is quite true that if we get nowhere in SALT and if Soviet strategic expansion continues, we shall have to take careful stock of our own needs. But there is no evidence at all that pressing the deployment of systems we do not yet need is likely to have a constructive effect on Soviet behavior in SALT. There are times and topics for toughness with Moscow, but SALT in April is not one of them, and many of those who urge this tactic are men who do not want SALT to succeed. It will be very hard to get a good agreement even if we do only what we have to do. It will probably be

impossible if we provide unnecessary ammunition to Soviet weapon-lovers by pressing our own deployments relentlessly throughout the talks.

7. In moving toward effective limitation of the arms race, we shall need to be alert and skeptical against distractions and diversions from those whose special interests may be threatened. The history of arms negotiation includes many examples of efforts by the partisans of particular weapons systems to prevent any agreement at all. During the negotiations before the Limited Test Ban Treaty, for example, it was suggested that the Soviets might obtain some decisive advantage by secret nuclear tests conducted behind the sun or by the construction of underground holes so big that the very existence of a test could not be detected. These arguments now rest properly in the dustbin of dead fantasy. But now new dangers are depicted in the effort to justify a refusal to limit or delay our own new weapons systems. Such arguments should be subjected to most meticulous and skeptical analysis, and in such study the role of the Congress is of high importance.

8. There is a particular danger in the uncritical acceptance of doctrines of strategic superiority—or even sufficiency—which may be used by zealous men in support of their own preferred weapons. This is as true of the Eisenhower Administration's belief in "prevailing" in a general war as it is of later doctrines of "assured destruction" and "damage limitation." All of these forms of words can be used to justify excessive expenditure on unnecessary strategic systems. At present there are four new criteria of strategic sufficiency, but the Administration has not told us what they are. According to press reports, these criteria include "assured destruction," "hostage equality," "crisis stability" and "third country protection." If the Administration and the Congress are not alert and watchful, criteria like these can be protective umbrellas for unchecked strategic expansionism. They can also be roadblocks in the way of arms limitation. They deserve public discussion. My own conviction is that the realities of strategic nuclear weapons are not subject to control by such verbal formulae. In the language of Justice Holmes, I believe that criteria like these tend to be spiders' webs inadequate to control the dominant facts.

9. The main proposition which we need to understand in order to limit the dangers of the nuclear age is that enough is enough. The Soviet Union and the United States have long since reached and passed that point. Each is now able to do totally unacceptable damage to the other, no matter how a nuclear catastrophe begins. Sane political leaders on both sides know this reality for what it is. It is of course possible that some still unknown technological development might genuinely disrupt this fundamental parity, but there is no evidence whatever that any such development is likely in the present decade. So we have enough, and more than enough, and we are on the edge of a most unstabilizing and dangerous escalation. Now is the time to stop.

10. The Committee Report recognizes what I would like to emphasize in closing: that while citizens can comment and the Senate can advise, only the President can decide. It will take negotiation to reach agreement, and the official position of the Government of the United States can be stated to the Soviet Union only by our President and his authorized agents. The President must choose the timing and the shape of any initiative he takes; in the end his leadership is what will decide. As he considers the possible choices and deliberates on decisions which have not yet been made, the President is entitled to the thoughtful advice of the Senate, and in this field, where the

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weight of bureaucratic influence has historically been heavily on the side of arms as against arms control, such advice can be of particular value to him. The easy course is always to avoid decisions; politically the argument for weapons is easy, and the argument for acts of restraint is hard. A President who wants to take the lead needs all the help he can get. The Senate can give such help, and in this situation it is obviously the duty of citizens to respond to the Senate's request for their honest views. I have stated mine, and I will be glad to try to answer your questions.

HELLS CANYON NATIONAL RECREATION AREA

HON. AL ULLMAN

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 9, 1970

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, in a recent article in the Oregonian's Northwest magazine, Willis Hobart describes the unique beauty of the Hells Canyon portion of the Snake River, which separates Oregon and Idaho. However, as Mr. Hobart explains:

Today only about 120 of the entire 1000 miles, lying in the Middle Snake and Hells Canyon area still characterize the churning, ruggedly beautiful river that Captain William Clark first named the Lewis, for his explorer partner Meriwether.

I fully understand Mr. Hobart's sense of urgency about designating and preserving this natural treasure. For this reason, I have introduced a bill, H.R. 16437, to designate the "Hells Canyon National Recreation Area."

My bill differs from other measures that have been introduced to deal with the future of the Middle Snake region. It provides for intensive recreational development of part of the area while setting aside a large area in its present roadless state. The recreational development will in no way detract from the natural beauty of the canyon. It will extend the enjoyment of the area to those people who would otherwise be prevented from viewing this spectacular creation of nature.

I would like to reprint excerpts from Mr. Hobart's article at this point of the RECORD so that my colleagues will have a better understanding of the country we are trying to protect and designate for future generations.

The excerpts follow:

HELLS CANYON OF THE SNAKE

Hells Canyon of the Snake—merely its name signifies the treachery encountered by the earliest explorers. Most saw it not merely as a wasteland but truly Hells Canyon, a natural barrier of magnificent proportions, challenging safe passage to the Willamette prairies or local gold fields. But the Indians saw it as the "Holy Mother Snake", a bountiful provider of game, salmon, steelhead, sturgeon and more—a twisting, roaring, turbulent oasis in an arid land that normally averages only around 12 inches of rainfall annually.

It is a stream replete with historical events ranging from the encampments of the Lewis and Clark Expedition at the mouth of the Clearwater River to the U.S. Army's tragic persecution of the Nez Perce Indians. Thing

of the white man's maltreatment, Chief Joseph led his men, women and children in 1877 across the swollen waters of the Snake near Dug Bar without loss of tribesman or horse on their historic 1000 mile "strategic retreat" for freedom, a feat that has been likened to the ancient Greek's Retreat of the Ten Thousand. Later the proud Nez Perce (a name derived from the misnomer "Pierced Noses") were finally forced to surrender only a few miles from the Canadian border's safety.

Petroglyphs, early Indian drawings painstakingly etched on scattered rocks, hint of the area's rich archeological history dating back several thousand years to the continent's earliest inhabitants. Of an estimated 200 archeological sites, the number systematically excavated and studied can almost be counted on the fingers of one hand. Hopefully, future investigations in the area will provide greater insight into man's earliest life and movements in North America.

Other early explorers of the river included Wilson Price Hunt, Robert Stuart and Captain B.L.E. Bonneville who wrote in 1833 that "Nothing we had ever gazed upon in any other region could for a moment compare in wild majesty and impressive sternness with the series of scenes which here at every turn astonished our senses and filled us with awe and delight."

Much of the Snake River today would be virtually unrecognizable to pioneers who first fought that pristine stream. While two-thirds of the entire Snake Basin is range and forest, one-fourth is now dominated by agriculture, principally irrigated crops, livestock and dry-farmed grain.

The river has been dammed, polluted, diverted for irrigation, municipal uses, to cool a nuclear plant, paper and pulp production and other industrial purposes. Thus by the time its waters merge with the Columbia, they've seen a lot of use. Yet the remaining wild water, characterized by Hells Canyon's churning rapids, polished boulders, and white sand beaches, are surprisingly clean, attesting to the river's natural ability to cleanse itself, given the chance.

In size, the entire Snake River Basin rivals New England and New York State combined. Among Northwest rivers, the Snake is second only to the Columbia and provides fully one-fifth the Columbia's total flow. Springing from the Yellowstone-Teton area of Northwest Wyoming, the Snake swings to the southwest through Idaho's Burley-Twin Falls regions, circles to our border, heading north to pick up this state's Owyhee, Malheur and Powder rivers and Idaho's Bruneau, Weller and Payette rivers, tripling in size in the last fifth of its course. And it also is here along this last one-fifth of its journey that the Snake enters Hells Canyon, the deepest verdant gorge on this continent, at 6550 feet, more than twice as deep as our average coastal mountains are tall. Mary's Peak, tallest of the Coast Range at slightly over 4,000 feet elevation, would be completely engulfed in Hell's Canyon, it's top only a tiny plateau nearly 2,500 feet below the Canyon's rim.

Too many view Hells Canyon in only one of its many facets, either its spectacular depth its fish or its wildlife or recreational resource, the wild Snake River itself or its power potential. But it is as a whole that it's uniqueness genuinely stands out. Compressed within its scope from river to rim, the canyon progresses through all six North American "life zones" and their characteristic fauna and flora, ranging from the desert-like Sonoran zones at or near the river's edge to the Alpine tundra atop the Seven Devils Mountains.

Many of its slopes below 4,000 feet are carpeted with grass and have been grazed by livestock since the mid-1800's. Timber adds flavor to the scenery over 4,000 feet, unlike the more barren appearing Grand Canyon of the Colorado or the Black canyon of the

Gunnison. Climate too may seem a paradox having snow on the rim at times yet sweltering under 100 degrees F. temperatures at river's edge in mid-summer.

Today only about 120 of its entire 1000 miles, lying in the Middle Snake and Hells Canyon area still characterize the churning, ruggedly beautiful river that Captain William Clark first named the Lewis, for his explorer-partner Meriwether. That this restricted area remains much the same today as before may only be due to its remoteness and comparative inaccessibility—characteristics which still provide much of the Middle Snake's charm.

Native wildlife includes the black bear, mule deer, elk, mink, river otter, raccoon, cougar, bobcat, coyote and farther downstream, the rarer Northwest or Idaho white-tail deer. Eagles, ospreys and peregrine falcons, among our rarer birds, share the winds with vultures, cliff swallows and many more. Here too, the chukar partridge, a bird introduced about 15 years ago, has found a good toehold and prospers. Quail, grouse and many others call the area home. Altogether, more than 150 different species of birds have been counted in the area.

Common to all wildlife and birds however, is the need for living space—nesting areas for birds in summer and wintering range for wildlife. Conservationists estimate that nearly 12,000 acres of irreplaceable wildlife habitat would be lost if the area were to be flooded, an especially severe blow to big game annually crowded down from summer pasture by snow.

Native salmon and steelhead have received their share of concern since plans began for construction of Bonneville Dam in the 1930's. But with only a 60-foot head, that dam was to confuse its critics, little impeding the upstream passage of migratory game fish through its new ladder facilities. On the other hand, the second major Columbia dam, Washington's 316 foot Grand Coulee, did indeed halt upstream passage, effectively blocking 1,140 miles of spawning streams. And at any rate, the general trend for the salmon and steelhead of the Columbia system has been downhill.

Today the Snake (primarily its lower segment) remains the best producer of salmon and steelhead in the entire Columbia River system. Of this, Idaho's Salmon River, immortalized as the "River of No Return," is by far the Snake's most important fish-producing tributary which would be blocked by the proposed China Gardens re-regulating dam, planned in conjunction with the High Mountain Sheep Dam.

Water temperatures can be very critical for salmon and steelhead, since they require relatively cool water for successful migration and spawning. Underscoring this problem was the month-long delay in Chinook salmon migration in 1967. That run remained in the Columbia's cooler waters until the Snake's temperature dropped to an acceptable level. Cause of the abnormally high "thermal pollution" is irrigation and impounding of the stream by such upstream reservoirs as Brownlee and Oxbow.

But for the white sturgeon of the Snake, this wild stretch of river is about the only thing between it and extinction. They too have been in a general decline and this year both Oregon and Idaho moved to give them full protection there by banning their removal from the stream. As early as 1933, Herbert Sheldon Lampman, reporter for The Oregonian and wild life authority, observed that the sturgeon fisheries of the Columbia system were virtually extinct and that "... few of these fish of any great size remain." Truly they are a fish of another age and their physical characteristics have changed little in many thousands of years. Though unrelated to sharks, they possess such general similarities, as a cartilaginous skeleton (rather than bone), a sickle-shaped tail, and

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(Prose Editor-Geographer Sorensen was elected to state our case because of the extensive field research he conducted in the area during recent months.)

As a geographer, this editor has described the Blue Earth River system as, "a typically dendritic basin that drains large areas of Waseca, Faribault, Martin and Watonwan Counties where topography is relatively flat. Along the stream courses, the surface is deeply channeled from 40 to 75 feet at the headwaters to 150 to 200 feet near the Minnesota Valley.

"The Le Sueur and Watonwan Rivers are the largest tributaries of the Blue Earth River. The Maple and Cobb Rivers feed the Le Sueur River and Perch Creek empties into the Watonwan.

"In the lower courses the streams have eroded their steep sided valleys through unconsolidated glacial drift and into the underlying rock formation exposing Onita dolomite and Jordan sandstone."

While the descriptive professional jargon adequately serves the purpose of informing the scholar, it fails to reveal inherent beauty, solitude and source of joy and quiet pleasure that is the Blue Earth River Basin. More tragically, it fails to tell of the God-awful eyesore the Corps of Engineers proposes to create in its transformation of our valley into another of its monstrous projects.

Since childhood I have walked throughout the valleys, sometimes with rod or gun, through woodlands, fields and pastures. I have taken small mouth bass, walleye and channel cat from clear pools of cool waters and picked up agates and fossils from many clean gravel bars. I have tasted sweet and cold spring water flowing from the rock as I drank in the beauty of the wooded slopes and sheer clay banks rising from the water's edge, and here I have found peace.

The Corps proposes to transform these many hundreds of acres of habitat for deer, beaver, fox, mink, muskrat, hare and human into a widely fluctuating pool bounded by ugly drowned timber, mud flats, mud slides, and drowned ski slopes devoid of life.

The clay cliffs will slump and drowned grassland will slide down lubricated clay slopes into a turbid lake out of the ecological balance needed to support game fish in what was and could again be one of the best small mouth bass streams in America, and posterity will never know the joyous awe of standing on a precipice towering one hundred feet above the emerald ribbon that is the Little Cobb as it meanders toward the Blue Earth.

It is for them and us we ask, Please don't do it.

In addition, I also wish to insert two articles concerning the Plaintiff which appeared in the February 21 issue of the Mankato Free Press, Mankato, Minn. These articles attest to the excellence of this college publication:

"PLAINTIFF" WINS ALL AMERICAN MAGAZINE HONORS

"Plaintiff," Mankato State College's student edited literary magazine, has been awarded All American honors by the Associated College Press rating service for the fall 1969 issue.

The high rating is the sixth national honor the magazine has received since being established in 1964.

The 52-page magazine, which contained poetry, fiction, essays, woodcuts and photography, was edited by David Hunter, a senior from Mankato.

Other staff members included associate editor—Ted Anderson, a senior from Mankato; art editor—Mike Griffin, a senior from Minnetonka; poetry editor—Loren Burkel, a senior from Mankato; and prose editor—Ed Sorensen, a graduate student from St. Peter.

Advisers for the current year are Lawrence Holmes, associate professor of English, and Dr. Heino Ambros, associate professor of political science.

MSC PLAINTIFF EDITORIAL STAND AGAINST DAM

The winter edition of the Plaintiff, Mankato State College literary magazine, will carry an editorial opposing the Blue Earth River dam proposed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Prose editor Ed Sorensen, a geographer who has done extensive field research in the valley, predicts the corps' proposal will transform many hundreds of acres of habitat for wildlife and humans into "a widely fluctuating pool bounded by ugly drowned timber, mud flats, mud slides, and drowned ski slopes devoid of life."

"We feel that America has been ravaged for long enough and that projects undertaken in the name of progress are eroding the last remnants of a once lovely continent," says the editorial.

"We further believe that with our resources dwindling, alternative solutions are less expensive in real cost even when the initial cost is higher."

EAST ORANGE COUNCIL SUPPORTS REGISTERING VOTERS IN POST OFFICES

HON. JOSEPH G. MINISH

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 9, 1970

Mr. MINISH. Mr. Speaker, I should like to bring to the attention of my colleagues the resolution adopted by the council of the city of East Orange, N.J., and its mayor, William S. Hart, Sr., on March 10, 1970.

This resolution supports the principle of providing the facilities of the U.S. Post Office for voter registration, thereby making registration as effortless and easily available as possible.

Legislation to provide for this system is pending before the House Elections Subcommittee, which, I hope, will give it swift and favorable attention. The resolution of the East Orange council follows:

RESOLUTION I-116, CITY COUNCIL OF EAST ORANGE

Whereas, all citizens should exercise their right to vote; and

Whereas, many such persons have not taken advantage of their right to vote by reason of their failure to register; and

Whereas, the Congress of the United States of America has before it proposals that legislation be enacted to provide for the registration of voters at the various U.S. Post Offices during regular business hours; and

Whereas, many of our citizens frequent premises of said U.S. Post Offices; and

Whereas, the use of such U.S. Post Office facilities would aid in the registration of voters and provide better representation upon elections of persons to office and the resolution of public questions,

Now, therefore, be it resolved, That the Congress of the United States be and it is hereby urged to pass legislation providing for the use of U.S. Post Office facilities for the registration of voters; and

Be it further resolved, That copies of this resolution be forwarded to the President of

the United States, the President of the U.S. Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Senators Williams and Case of New Jersey, and Congressmen Minish and Rodino of New Jersey.

I hereby certify that the above is a true copy of Resolution I-166 adopted by the City Council of East Orange, March 9, 1970, and approved by the Mayor, March 10, 1970.

In testimony whereof, I have hereto set my hand, and affixed the corporate seal of said City, this 11th day of March A.D. 1970.

City Clerk.

LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 9, 1970

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, February 16, 1970, marked the 52d anniversary of Lithuania's declaration of independence. In commemoration of Lithuania's Independence Day, Mayor Roman S. Gribbs of Detroit, Mich., issued a proclamation saluting Detroit residents of Lithuanian extraction. Similarly, the Detroit Lithuanian Organizations Center adopted a commemorative resolution.

So that my colleagues may have an opportunity to be familiar with these two documents, I insert their texts at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

PROCLAMATION—CITY OF DETROIT, EXECUTIVE OFFICE

LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1970

Whereas, the hearts of all loyal Lithuanians are especially stirred each year at this time because February 16 marks the date 52 years ago, when Lithuania declared its independence from Czarist Russia, and

Whereas, despite three totalitarian regimes, including the present yoke of Communist control, this gallant people's fervent cry for liberty has not been silenced, and

Whereas, the United States government supports the belief of Lithuanians everywhere in the eventual re-establishment of Lithuania as a free and sovereign state by refusing to recognize its incorporation into the Soviet Union, and

Whereas, this year, Lithuanians of the Detroit metropolitan area will commemorate the anniversary of their declaration of independence on Sunday, February 15 at the McAuley Auditorium at Mercy College

Now, therefore, I, Roman S. Gribbs, Mayor of the City of Detroit, do hereby proclaim February 16, 1970 as Lithuanian Independence Day in Detroit and salute all Detroit Lithuanians on this very special day for their shining example of patriotism for their beloved homeland.

Given under my hand and seal this 29th day of January, 1970.

ROMAN S. GRIBBS, Mayor.

LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY RESOLUTION—FEBRUARY 16, 1970

Unanimously adopted at a mass meeting of Americans of Lithuanian descent and their friends, living in the Detroit Metropolitan area, sponsored by the Detroit Lithuanians Organizations Center, held on Sunday, February 15, 1970, at 3:00 P.M. at Mercy College of Detroit, McAuley Auditorium, Detroit Michigan, in commemorating the 52nd anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Lithuania on February 16, 1918.

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Whereas, the Communist regime did not come to power in Lithuania by legal or democratic process; and

Whereas, the Soviet Union took over Lithuania by force of arms in June 1940; and

Whereas, the Lithuanian people are strongly opposed to foreign domination and are determined to restore their freedom and sovereignty which they rightly and deservedly enjoyed for more than seven centuries in the past; and

Whereas, the Government of the United States maintains diplomatic relations with the government of the free Republic of Lithuania and consistently has refused to recognize the seizure of Lithuania and forced incorporation of this freedom-loving country into the Soviet Union; and

Whereas, the House of Representatives and the United States Senate unanimously passed a resolution urging the President of the United States to direct the attention of world opinion at the United Nations and at other appropriate international forums and by such means as he deems appropriate, to the denial of the rights of self-determination for the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and to bring the force of world opinion to bear on behalf of the restoration of these to the Baltic peoples; now, therefore be it

Resolved, that we, Americans of Lithuanian origin or descent, reaffirm our adherence to American democratic principles of government and pledge our support to our President and our Congress to achieve lasting peace, freedom and justice in the world; and be it further

Resolved, that President Nixon continue to carry out the expression of the United States Congress contained in H. Con. Res. 416 by bringing up the Baltic States question in the United Nations and demanding the Soviets to withdraw from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and be it finally

Resolved, that this resolution be submitted into the Congressional Record, and forwarded to the President, United States Senators from Michigan, Members of the U.S. Congress from Michigan and the press.

R. S. SAKIS, *Chairman.*

SALT

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON ARMS LIMITATION

OF WISCONSIN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, April 9, 1970

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, earlier this week the American Assembly on Arms Limitation issued a report on the outlook for arms limitation with reference to the strategic arms limitation talks—SALT—scheduled to resume April 16 in Vienna.

The report represents the view of a group of highly qualified and knowledgeable private citizens who met earlier this month under the auspices of the American Assembly of Columbia University. Their deliberations, which were chaired by the Honorable Adrian S. Fisher, dean of the Georgetown University Law School and former Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, resulted in several recommendations.

The most important of these was a call to the President to propose to the Soviet Union, on a reciprocal basis, an immediate interim halt in the deploy-

ment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons and of tests of multiple warheads. The group further recommended that, to give the proposal a chance of success, that the impending deployment of U.S. MIRV's—multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles—be postponed for 6 months.

I believe it would be wise for the President to heed this proposal as he determines the final decision on what the U.S. negotiating position will be at the SALT talks in Vienna.

Last year the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments held extensive hearings on the diplomatic and strategic impact of MIRV's. After hearing testimony from a number of eminent witnesses, both in and outside the Government, the subcommittee unanimously reached the following conclusions:

(1) By its nature, MIRV may increase the temptation for a preemptive first strike; therefore, MIRVing of existing missile forces will pose a substantial threat to the present nuclear balance.

(2) The deployment of MIRV systems by either the Soviet Union or the United States would increase the difficulties for achieving meaningful arms control and could well touch off a costly escalation of the nuclear arms race.

(3) As both sides continue to test multiple-warhead systems, the opportunity to halt this development is fast slipping away. It may not yet be too late to reach a workable agreement with the Soviet Union on a mutual testing and deployment moratorium.

(4) In order to obtain an adequate, enforceable moratorium, it is essential that certain collateral agreements also be reached by both sides.

(5) Because of the evident complexities involved in achieving a safe, effective, and meaningful agreement halting the testing of MIRV's, that objective can best be accomplished within the framework of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Basing its judgment on those conclusions, the subcommittee further recommended that the executive branch give a high priority to proposing a MIRV freeze at the initial session of SALT. Although this position was acknowledged as a prudent one by some administration officials, including, reportedly, the Secretary of State, the United States did not ultimately make an arms freeze proposal at Helsinki.

Mr. Speaker, time is fast running out on any opportunity to obtain a MIRV freeze and a meaningful halt in the arms race. I am hopeful that the President will demonstrate a sincere dedication to the cause of arms control and long-range national safety, and seek a reciprocal freeze on strategic weapons systems, as recommended by the American assembly group.

At this point, I am pleased to include the report of the American Assembly on Arms Limitation, together with an introduction by Mr. Clifford C. Nelson, president of the American Assembly:

THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON ARMS LIMITATION

(By Clifford C. Nelson)

These pages contain the views of a group of Americans who met March 31-April 2, 1970, at Arden House, Harriman, New York, to consider the outlook for arms limitation. The

meeting was held with immediate and timely reference to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, scheduled to resume in Vienna, April 16. Reference was also made to the broader problem of slowing down the arms race and to the effect of military expenditures on national resources.

The meeting was held under the auspices of The American Assembly of Columbia University, which regularly convenes for the purpose of focusing attention on issues of public importance. The recommendations of this Assembly were adopted in the plenary session of April 2, after two previous days of discussions as a committee of the whole. (Because of the urgency of the topic, standard American Assembly procedures were modified somewhat for the occasion, and the number of participants was reduced accordingly. Many had taken part in earlier American Assembly programs on arms: Arms Control, 1960, and Nuclear Weapons, 1966.)

Adrian S. Fisher, dean of the Georgetown Law School and former deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, prepared a background paper as the basis of discussion.

As a non-partisan educational institution The American Assembly takes no official stand on the opinions herein, which belong to the participants in their private capacities. They represented themselves and not necessarily the institutions or persons with whom they are associated.

FINAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON ARMS LIMITATION—1970

At the close of their discussions the participants in The American Assembly on Arms Limitation—1970 reviewed as a group the following statement. Although it represents general agreement, no one was asked to sign it, and it should not be assumed that every participant necessarily subscribes to every recommendation.

We call upon the President of the United States to propose to the Soviet Union, on a reciprocal basis, an immediate interim halt in the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons and of tests of multiple warheads. To give this proposal a chance of success, we ask the President to defer for six months the impending deployment of Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs).

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are resuming in Vienna at a time when mankind has a unique opportunity to end the nuclear arms race. At present there exists a roughly equal and relatively stable nuclear balance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. A rare coincidence of favorable political and strategic conditions provides a real but fleeting opportunity for agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to halt the arms race in both quantity and quality of weapons, and then to diminish the threat to mankind posed by existing weapons. Whether agreement can be reached we do not know, but wisdom and common sense require every plausible effort to exploit the present promise.

This opportunity will be put in jeopardy if the U.S. soon deploys Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs), or proceeds with plans for a modified Phase II Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM), or if the Soviet Union extensively tests large ICBMs (SS-9) with multiple warheads (which may not themselves be independently targetable but may well be steps in the development of a Soviet multiple independently targetable delivery system).

The introduction of MIRVs into the present nuclear relationship would have the initial effect of substantially increasing the number of deliverable nuclear warheads available to each side. MIRV program will take on new dimensions as missile accuracy increases. When this occurs, it becomes pos-

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sible for one side if it strikes first with missiles armed with MIRVs to take out more than one missile site with a single attacking missile. The obverse of this frightening coin is that each side may fear that, unless it strikes first, the MIRVed missiles of the other side may be able substantially to eliminate its own land-based ICBM force, with the other side still having substantial ICBM force left in reserve.

New and worrisome uncertainties would enter into the strategic calculations. For example, Secretary Laird has testified that 420 Soviet SS-9s with three warheads of five megatons each and an accuracy of one quarter of a mile could eliminate all but 50 of our Minutemen. Similar calculations by the Soviet Union would show that if the U.S. were to MIRV its Minutemen with three warheads, with yields approximating a quarter of a megaton each and having an accuracy of one-tenth of a mile, it could by using 580 Minutemen, eliminate all but 70 or so of the Soviet missile force.

Whatever their validity such calculations make it clear that both sides would feel more secure if neither one had a MIRV. The U.S. plan to deploy MIRVed Minuteman III in June of this year, within two months after the beginning of the talks, may well close the door on this possibility. Although the generation of MIRVs which would be deployed would not be capable of a first strike, this step would cast serious doubts on our seriousness in pursuing SALT. This would present the U.S.S.R. with a *fait accompli*. One of the most important things that the SALT talks could accomplish is to prevent the deployment of MIRVs. This opportunity should not be lost.

We in the American Assembly therefore call on the President to postpone this deployment for six months. Such deployment at this time would not contribute to our security. Far from improving our bargaining strength at SALT proceeding with that deployment would make negotiations more difficult, and would invite the Soviet Union in turn to present us with *faits accomplis*. No harm can result to our strategic posture by such delay, which will involve only a handful of land-based missiles in a MIRV program that is already being widely questioned as unnecessary, wasteful, and certainly premature, since the large Soviet ABM program it was designed to penetrate does not exist.

We also suggest that current U.S. and Soviet testing of multiple warheads complicates the political and strategic climate on which these negotiations depend. We urge mutual restraint in this regard.

We also urge postponement in implementing the proposed modified Phase II of the Safeguard System. The argument that going ahead with this program would strengthen our bargaining position at Vienna is not persuasive; authorizing armaments so that they can be included in a disarmament program soon reaches the point of diminishing returns. If both sides play this game, SALT will result in an increase in the arms race. Going ahead with modified Phase II Safeguards so soon after Phase I had been made a separate program would belie the promise of deliberate consideration upon which that separation was in part based. It would more likely give the Soviets the impression that the U.S. was determined to push the complete Safeguards program to a finish, come what may. This would make success in SALT less rather than more likely.

These measures of restraint will give our negotiators a chance. But the negotiation of a treaty at the SALT talks will be difficult and complex and may take years. To keep the present opportunity from eroding during this period, an interim halt is necessary to prevent any substantial changes in the rough strategic balance which now makes such an agreement possible.

We therefore urge the President of the United States to propose to the Soviet Union on a reciprocal basis, an immediate two-year suspension of the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons and of the tests of multiple warheads. Specifically we propose that during this two-year period interim halt there would be:

1. No testing of any multiple warheads, whether MRV or MIRV;
2. No deployment of multiple warheads;
3. No new deployment of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles;
4. No construction of Anti-Ballistic Missile radars or deployment of anti-ballistic missile interceptors;
5. No new "starts" on constructing submarines for launching ballistic missiles.

In such an interim agreement we see no necessity for limits on air defenses or on new bomber construction because developments in these areas do not carry an immediate potential for upsetting the present strategic balance.

The short term of the agreement and its comprehensive quality would simplify the requirement for inspection. From the standpoint of the U.S. security, compliance with these provisions can be adequately determined by national means of verification. In particular, the halt in Soviet buildup of ICBMs and SLBMs, including the SS-9, could be verified. With regard to the restrictions on multiple warhead testing, however, to enhance confidence during the interim halt, an understanding that missile tests will be pre-announced and restricted to designated areas may be desirable.

The restraints that we propose and an agreed interim halt would create an environment of stability and mutual confidence. In such an improved climate more lasting agreements, taking account of new technological and political developments, could be achieved.

We have not attempted to blueprint the details of a more permanent agreement; planning for it should take account of what is learned during the interim halt. Some of the major issues which would need to be taken into account during the negotiations of a treaty are:

1. *ABM levels.* A key question appears to be whether some level of ABMs is necessary for the U.S. in light of the developing Chinese nuclear capability. We believe that an area ABM is not vital to protecting U.S. interests in Asia and that we should be prepared to accept a mutually agreed zero ABM level if it improves the prospects for obtaining an effective agreement with the Soviet Union. Without an ABM, deterrence is as effective against China as against others; and a Safeguard system designed for area defense against the Chinese may, in the eyes of Soviet planners, pose a threat to their deterrent.

2. *Control on Missile Testing.* A ban on MIRVs would require a prohibition on all multiple warhead tests and limits on a number and location of all missile tests. We believe that such controls would be feasible and desirable.

3. *Reduction.* We believe that the U.S. should seek agreement on reduction in numbers of strategic systems. In particular the U.S. should consider proposing the phasing out of fixed land-based missiles which will become increasingly vulnerable even if MIRVs are banned.

Depending on how these and related issues are resolved, a whole range of agreements is possible. One type of agreement which most of us would favor would seek to freeze the existing situation by banning MIRVs and ABMs. A second type would concentrate on banning ABMs and phasing out fixed land-based missiles if it does not prove possible to ban MIRVs. A third type would focus on

freezing numbers of offensive missiles and limiting ABMs if it is not possible to ban MIRVs and if the judgment is reached that an area ABM against China is needed. On our current understanding of the issues most of us favored the first type of agreement.

We believe that the initiatives and agreements we propose will enhance U.S. security by improving the prospects for peace. These efforts can also lead to the wise and prudent use of our national resources. The expenditures thus avoided would amount to at least several billion dollars a year in the short run and much more in the long run if the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. enter into a new and costlier phase of the arms race. The SALT talks, and the clearer assessment of our real security requirements which may result from those talks, may prevent these expenditures. More of our resources can then be devoted to human needs, both at home and abroad. This is an important aspect of our national security. Unless urgent social needs are met, our national security may be progressively undermined, not by external threats but by failure to meet internal and justifiable social needs.

The negotiation of a treaty to end the arms race will involve many complex technical details. But the overriding considerations are not technical; they are deeply political. They require a fresh and clear reassessment of the fundamentals of U.S. security.

We must recognize that it is at least as dangerous to focus on "worse cases" as it is to overlook significant threats to our deterrent. If one proceeds from the most pessimistic view of U.S. capabilities, and the most generous view of the Soviet capabilities, one arrives at a U.S. second-strike posture that may look to the Soviets so much like a first-strike posture that they will be inclined to increase their own forces, thereby continuing the arms race and increasing the danger of nuclear war. In fact, the proper test for the adequacy of U.S. nuclear retaliatory power is not the U.S. worst estimate of its effectiveness, but the Soviet estimate of the damage it would suffer in a nuclear exchange. That estimate will not be based on assumptions that take the Soviet performance at its best possible level and the U.S. performance at its worst. If we arm against a "parade of imaginary horrors" on the part of an adversary, the adversary will do the same, and we will have devised a sure prescription for a dangerous and wasteful arms race.

We have made this mistake in the past, from a misdirected sense of caution. In the interests of our own security we must not make this mistake again. We must end the nuclear arms race.

PARTICIPANTS IN THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON ARMS LIMITATION—1970

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Alexander, Archibald S., Bernardsville, New Jersey.

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Paffrath, Leslie, President, The Johnson Foundation, Racine.

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Parrent, Rev. Allan, Department of International Affairs, National Council of Churches, Washington, D.C.

Persinger, Mrs. Richard, Chairman, Committee on Public Affairs, National Board of the Y.W.C.A., New York.

Posvar, Wesley W., Chancellor, University of Pittsburgh.

Rathjens, George W., Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Scoville, Herbert, Jr., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.

Shulman, Marshall D., Director, The Russian Institute, Columbia University.

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Yarmolinsky, Adam, Professor of Law, Harvard University.

LAWS AND RULES FOR PUBLICATION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

CODE OF LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES

TITLE 44, SECTION 181. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD; ARRANGEMENT, STYLE, CONTENTS, AND INDEXES.—The Joint Committee on Printing shall have control of the arrangement and style of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and while providing that it shall be substantially a verbatim report of proceedings shall take all needed action for the reduction of unnecessary bulk, and shall provide for the publication of an index of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD semimonthly during the sessions of Congress and at the close thereof. (Jan. 12, 1895, c. 23, § 13, 28 Stat. 603.)

TITLE 44, SECTION 182b. SAME; ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, DIAGRAMS.—No maps, diagrams, or illustrations may be inserted in the RECORD without the approval of the Joint Committee on Printing. (June 20, 1936, c. 630, § 2, 49 Stat. 1546.)

To provide for the prompt publication and delivery of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the Joint Committee on Printing has adopted the following rules, to which the attention of Senators, Representatives, and Delegates is respectfully invited:

1. *Arrangement of the daily Congressional Record.*—The Public Printer shall arrange the contents of the daily CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as follows: the Senate proceedings shall alternate with the House proceedings in order of placement in consecutive issues insofar as such an arrangement is feasible, and Extensions of Remarks and Daily Digest shall follow: *Provided*, That the makeup of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD shall proceed

without regard to alternation whenever the Public Printer deems it necessary in order to meet production and delivery schedules.

2. *Type and style.*—The Public Printer shall print the report of the proceedings and debates of the Senate and House of Representatives, as furnished by the Official Reporters of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, in 7½-point type; and all matter included in the remarks or speeches of Members of Congress, other than their own words, and all reports, documents, and other matter authorized to be inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD shall be printed in 8½-point type; and all rollcalls shall be printed in 6-point type. No italic or black type nor words in capitals or small capitals shall be used for emphasis or prominence; nor will unusual indentions be permitted. These restrictions do not apply to the printing of or quotations from historical, official, or legal documents or papers of which a literal reproduction is necessary.

3. *Return of manuscript.*—When manuscript is submitted to Members for revision it should be returned to the Government Printing Office not later than 9 o'clock p.m. in order to insure publication in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD issued on the following morning; and if all of the manuscript is not furnished at the time specified, the Public Printer is authorized to withhold it from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for 1 day. In no case will a speech be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of the day of its delivery if the manuscript is furnished later than 12 o'clock midnight.

4. *Tabular matter.*—The manuscript of speeches containing tabular statements to be published in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD shall be in the hands of the Public Printer not later than 7 o'clock p.m., to insure publication the following morning. When possible, manuscript copy for tabular matter should be sent to the Government Printing Office two or more days in advance of the date of publication in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Proof will be furnished promptly to the Member of Congress to be submitted by him instead of manuscript copy when he offers it for publication in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

5. *Proof furnished.*—Proofs of "leave to print" and advance speeches will not be furnished the day the manuscript is received but will be submitted the following day, whenever possible to do so without causing delay in the publication of the regular proceedings of Congress. Advance speeches shall be set in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD style of type, and not more than six sets of proofs may be furnished to Members without charge.

6. *Notation of withheld remarks.*—If manuscript or proofs have not been returned in time for publication in the proceedings, the Public Printer will insert the words "Mr. — addressed the Senate (House or Committee). His remarks will appear hereafter in Extensions of Remarks" and proceed with the printing of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

7. *Thirty-day limit.*—The Public Printer shall not publish in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD any speech or extension of remarks which has been withheld for a period exceeding 30 calendar days from the date when its printing was authorized: *Provided*, That at the expiration of each session of Congress the time limit herein fixed shall be 10 days, unless otherwise ordered by the committee.

8. *Corrections.*—The permanent CONGRESSIONAL RECORD is made up for printing and binding 30 days after each daily publication is issued; therefore all corrections must be sent to the Public Printer within that time:

Provided, That upon the final adjournment of each session of Congress the time limit shall be 10 days, unless otherwise ordered by the committee: *Provided further*, That no Member of Congress shall be entitled to make more than one revision. Any revision shall consist only of corrections of the original copy, and shall not include deletions of correct material, substitutions for correct material, or additions of new subject matter.

9. The Public Printer shall not publish in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the full report or print of any committee or subcommittee when the report or print has been previously printed. This rule shall not be construed to apply to conference reports.

10(a). *Extensions of Remarks in the daily Congressional Record.*—When either House has granted leave to print (1) a speech not delivered in either House, (2) a newspaper or magazine article, or (3) any other matter not germane to the proceedings, it shall be published under Extensions of Remarks. This rule shall not apply to quotations which form part of a speech of a Member, or to an authorized extension of his own remarks: *Provided*, That no address, speech, or article delivered or released subsequently to the sine die adjournment of a session of Congress may be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

10(b). *Makeup of the Extensions of Remarks.*—Extensions of Remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD shall be made up by successively taking first an extension from the copy submitted by the Official Reporters of one House and then an extension from the copy of the other House, so that Senate and House extensions appear alternately as far as possible. The sequence for each House shall follow as closely as possible the order or arrangement in which the copy comes from the Official Reporters of the respective Houses.

The Official Reporters of each House shall designate and distinctly mark the lead item among their extensions. When both Houses are in session and submit extensions, the lead item shall be changed from one House to the other in alternate issues, with the indicated lead item of the other House appearing in second place. When only one House is in session, the lead item shall be an extension submitted by a Member of the House in session. This rule shall not apply to CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS printed after the sine die adjournment of the Congress.

The Public Printer shall withhold any Extensions of Remarks which exceed economical press fill or exceed production limitations. Extensions withheld for such reasons shall be printed in the next issue of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD immediately following the lead items as indicated by the official reporters.

11(a). *Remarks under 5-day rule.*—Remarks printed under the 5-day rule shall appear in the proceedings of the daily issue of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, suitably identified as such, following Special Orders for the day.

11(b). *Remarks in tribute to deceased Members.*—Remarks of Members in tribute to deceased Members or former Members of Congress shall appear in the proceedings of the daily issue of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD following Special Orders of the day.

12. *Official Reporter.*—The Official Reporters of each House shall indicate on the manuscript and prepare headings for all matter to be printed in Extensions of Remarks and shall make suitable reference thereto at the proper place in the proceedings.

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country's 57 million bicyclists and tricyclists) have been enthusiastic backers of the bike. John Lindsay remains a strong advocate of bike routes in New York City. In fact, bicycles have traditionally been one of the few points of agreement among New York mayoral candidates. Following the 1965 municipal elections, the New York Post commented that Bill Buckley's proposal for an elevated bikeway along Third Avenue may have been the most reasonable suggestion advanced in the entire campaign. While this may be more of a reflection on New York City than it is on the bicycle, it is indicative of the fawning attention that candidates tend to pay to bicyclists.

On the national level, Stewart Udall has been a strong supporter of bicycling as the only way to offset "the tyranny of the automobile." Lyndon Johnson waxed almost poetic in a message to Congress: "I see an America where our air is sweet to breathe and our rivers are clean to swim in. I see an America where [there are] bicycle paths running through the hearts of our great cities. . . . The forgotten Americans of today are those who like to walk, hike, or ride bicycles. For them we must have trails as well as highways."

With bicycles, as with everything else, talk has been more plentiful than action. There is still nothing like a national plan for commuter bike routes. On the local level, however, much has been done, and there are in fact "bikeways"—especially designated, clearly marked routes—running through the hearts of many of "our great cities."

One of the most ambitious and most successful bikeways runs through downtown Chicago. An extensive system of bike routes leads through several city parks and along the lake shore. As is the case in most other cities, Chicago started its bikeway project strictly for recreation purposes, and then expanded it as shoppers and commuters began to use the routes, too. The city now has 36 regularly traveled bike routes.

And Chicago isn't all. You can commute from Cambridge to downtown Boston on a bicycle path that runs along the Charles. Milwaukee has 64 miles of marked bikeways. Cities all over Florida have responded to the possibilities of bike commuting. Miami is the hub of an extensive system of bicycle routes connecting the central city with outlying suburbs. Bicycles are so common in Florida that the Coconut Grove National Bank has set up pedal-in teller windows at its branches.

The most carefully planned and most instructive program for bicycle commuter routes is a proposal prepared earlier this year by three young staff members in the Division of American Studies of the Smithsonian Institution. The Smithsonian Plan was designed specifically for Washington, D.C., but its approach and general strategy make it a good model for cities everywhere.

The Smithsonian Plan calls for a radial system of routes bringing commuters from various sections and suburbs to a common axis—in this case, the Mall—running through the central business district of the city. It is designed to serve shoppers, tourists, and schoolchildren, as well as thousands of commuters.

The Smithsonian Plan is modular. It can be started on a relatively modest scale and augmented in phases. The initial "pilot" phase of the project, which is under consideration among city officials now, would provide routes from three residential areas—Capitol Hill, Georgetown, and Arlington, Virginia—to the Mall. These first routes can be expanded logically in definite steps into an extensive system serving all major residential areas. The expanded system also includes bike routes leading downtown from pocket areas in the inner city, where few

residents own cars and where bus and taxi service is practically nonexistent.

The Smithsonian Plan combines three different types of bicycle paths into one integrated system. Where traffic is heavy and sidewalks are wide enough, bicyclists will travel on the side walk. In other places, the bicycle will share the street with automobile traffic. Along particularly busy roadways, the proposal suggests that special bike paths—paved areas, about six feet wide, running parallel to the road—be constructed.

The Smithsonian Plan takes extensive precautions for the bicyclists' safety. Wherever possible, the proposed routes run along side streets rather than major trunk lines. Where bikes must share the road with heavy automobile traffic, the streets will be clearly identified and motorists will be reminded to watch out for cyclists. The plan emphasizes marking and identification of routes in order to bridge the visibility gap between bicycles and motorists.

Washington is a city on a river; the river means bridges; and bridges mean special hazards for bicycle commuters. The Smithsonian planners have side-stepped this problem in a delightful way. They propose that a special ferry service be established to bring bicyclists across the Potomac to and from the Virginia suburbs. They have even found a ferry boat—the *S.S. Old Duck*—which was recently taken out of service and docked at a backwater in the Washington Navy Yard. The authors of the Smithsonian Plan have recommended that the District of Columbia put the *Old Duck* back in service as a bicycle ferry.

To date, nobody has taken the suggestion seriously. Everybody knows that ferry boats were pronounced dead by the city planners eons ago. Ferries were a victim of progress; in this era of convenience the river ferry is an obsolete as—well, as the bicycle.

The irony here, of course, is that the onward thrust of "progress" has brought us to the point where the *Old Duck* is a quicker and more convenient form of transport than any of its vaunted successors. No doubt the planners can prove conclusively on paper that the idea would never work. But ask a commuter—the *Old Duck* would make sense to somebody who actually makes the trip twice a day.

And what a wonderful trip it could be. To ride a bike to the river bank, chug across the river on the faithful old ferry, pedal down the gangplank and on to the office—it's the kind of thing you'd pay \$2.50 to do at Disneyland, and you could do it every day, twice a day, in the heart of the city. With a little imagination, the city could make some money in the process. It would be easy to serve a continental breakfast on the trip across the river, and in the afternoon the ferry could become the club car of the cycling set.

In short, the *Old Duck* would be an opportunity to put some fun into the workaday grind. The possibilities—for the city and commuter—are endless. They deserve to be explored not only in Washington but in every city that still puts a premium on such an outmoded commodity as pure pleasure.

This ferry proposal represents all the best features of bicycle commuting in general—it is simple, inexpensive, and rather quaint, perhaps, but at the same time obviously feasible and eminently reasonable. City planners who are racking their brains to find simple, feasible, and reasonable solutions to their traffic problems might do well to study the Smithsonian Plan and to consider the bicycle.

In the light of our collective motormanias, the idea of giving the bicycle serious thought may be hard to accept. But as space to move and to park the automobile in downtown areas runs out, as clean air begins to have

a price tag, with no readily available alternative in sight, the demands for recognition of "Pedal Power" become less and less funny. Bicycles are not a panacea for the traffic problems, but, given the chance, they can help. It is time for commuters and communities to give bikes a chance.

THE SEA, THE SKY, AND THE MOUNTAINS

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, the national campaign to preserve and improve our environment has inspired a leading Hawaii composer, R. Alexander Anderson, to write a song entitled "The Sea, the Sky, and the Mountains." Its theme is that these great natural blessings may be ours for as long as man has the will to preserve and protect them.

"Alex" Anderson's song is his latest in a long list of successful compositions. Among his most popular hits are "Lovely Hula Hands," "Cockeyed Mayor of Kahunakakai," and "Mele Kalikimaka," each of which has sold more than a million records.

I congratulate him on composing a new song with an important, timely message. It is a song which the composer says "will best suit those singers with robust voice who can stand up and really deliver a message."

I ask unanimous consent that the words of "The Sea, the Sky, and the Mountains" be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the words were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE SEA, THE SKY AND THE MOUNTAINS

(By R. Alexander Anderson)

The sea, the sky and the mountains
Must never change, will never change
If man has the will to preserve them,
To keep them always the same.

Golden sunshine, welcome rainfall,
Cooling sea breeze sweeping the land,
Lakes and rivers ever flowing
From the mountains to the shore
Keep them unpolluted, unsullied, undefiled.
Protect all God's creatures,
Birds up in the sky, fishes and wild things
Do not let them die.

And the sea, the sky and the mountains
High,

Let man preserve them,
Learn to conserve them
To have to hold them forevermore.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

WAIVER OF THE GERMANENESS RULE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Pastore rule on germaneness, which I understand began operating some minutes ago without our being aware of it, not be considered to have begun operating until now.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—EN-
ROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION
SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled joint resolution (S.J. Res. 190) to provide for the settlement of the labor dispute between certain carriers by railroad and certain of their employees, and it was signed by the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. ALLEN).

SALT**SUSPENSION OF FURTHER DEPLOY-
MENT OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFEN-
SIVE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC WEAP-
ONS SYSTEMS**

The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution (S. Res. 211) seeking agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on limiting offensive and defensive strategic weapons and the suspension of test flights of reentry vehicles.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the pending business occur not later than 4 o'clock p.m. today. This, I understand, has been cleared on all sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**SALT AND THE FUTURE FOR STRATEGIC
ARMAMENTS**

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, it is now almost 25 years since the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. In that quarter-century we have added enormously to our arsenal of nuclear weapons; we have increased the number and types of delivery systems. The Soviets have entered into nuclear competition until now both the United States and Russia have the capacity to destroy each other and much of the rest of the world.

Because we have lived so long with the threat of nuclear war, and because we have become accustomed to the ingenious and terrible weapons which made such a war possible, we sometimes act as if the threat did not exist, and we behave as if the expansion of our nuclear capacity were essential to our security and national welfare.

The fact is, Mr. President, that more nuclear weapons do not buy more security. The only value in having nuclear weapons is to discourage and deter others from attacking us. We and the Soviets have ample numbers of deliverable weapons to serve that purpose today. Adding a new generation of nuclear weapons adds to the danger of global disaster without increasing national security, and it decreases our capacity to deal

with those social and economic problems which plague our country and many others.

But we and the Soviets are in real danger of launching our countries into a new round of futile, dangerous, and potentially disastrous competition in nuclear weapons. At the same time, we have an almost unique opportunity to reach an agreement with the Soviets on arms control which can reduce the danger of nuclear destruction, without lessening our national security and without diverting \$20 billion a year from the needs of people.

In the years since 1945, our sizable lead in nuclear armaments has meant that proposals to control the strategic arms race had little chance of succeeding. Now, in 1970, there is the first clear opening. There is both a situation of mutual deterrence and an acceptable parity of nuclear strength between the United States and the Soviet Union. This unique and fleeting opportunity must not be allowed to slip away through design or delay. We can act promptly and decisively without committing ourselves hastily to any final solutions.

The choice that presents itself is not that of simply talking to the Russians at length while the arms race continues, or seeking desperately to reach what might be an inadequately thought-out agreement. There is a third choice—taking steps now to preserve the opportunity for effective agreement without locking ourselves into a final position.

Reasonable equality is the all-important new element in 1970. Today the United States and the Soviet Union are roughly equal in technology and in the destructive power of deliverable nuclear warheads. A condition of mutual deterrence has prevailed for many years, because deterrence does not depend on even rough equality. The likelihood of any appreciable nuclear devastation by retaliatory attack is a powerful deterrent to the first use of nuclear weapons. But although relatively little opposing nuclear strength is enough to deter, substantial equality must be reached before both parties will be willing to negotiate. With the balance as it now exists, neither side need fear that an immediate halt to the arms race will mean permanent inferiority.

The present situation of nuclear balance is adequate for our own security needs. We can never hope to do much better and we can do a lot worse. Both sides have learned the costs and the dangers of attempting to win the nuclear race. It is a race with no finish line and the runner in second place always has time to close the gap.

It is therefore in our interest to end the arms race and we should do it now. If it continues, we both at best will continue to squander our resources in a fruitless drive for meaningless superiority. At worst, time will run out for us both—and for mankind.

There have been indications that the Soviets recognize that security is not synonymous with nuclear superiority. A recent Pravda article on the SALT talks dated March 7, 1970 was notable for the

absence of the traditional propaganda theme of "general and complete disarmament." Instead the article extolled the virtues of restraint and limitation, and talked sensibly about parity. It noted that "a new spiral in the arms race could not change the essence of this balance" and that "none of the weapons systems now seemingly within the reach of this or that side can change this fact."

I do not know President Nixon's personal views on the question of seeking nuclear superiority. But to the extent that he recognizes the search for such superiority to be futile and self-defeating, his actions are either inconsistent or incomprehensible.

His vague demands for linking SALT to the settlement of other political issues complicate the negotiability of SALT without making the other issues more negotiable.

His criteria for what he calls nuclear "sufficiency" insofar as they are understandable can undermine stability and create a climate of unfounded fear about mutual deterrence.

His negotiating tactics and tentative approach are allowing the essential condition of mutual security to slip away.

While the actions of the Soviet Union have been equally ambiguous, it is not clear whether this is a cause or a consequence of the Nixon administration's policies. The continuing Soviet missile buildup and most especially their recent SS-9 deployments do not square with their hints of stabilizing the strategic balance as expressed in the Pravda article.

I am not prepared to disregard their missile buildup or the possibilities for mischief in their position. But neither am I willing to dismiss the possibilities for serious negotiations. My point is that we do not have to argue about interpretations of Soviet motives. SALT provides an opportunity to assess their real position and see if we can do business together.

I do not want to assign blame for the past 25 years of the arms race. It is unknowable and unnecessary. I do not want to have to engage in guessing games about President Nixon's goals and strategy. I want to do something about the here and now.

The way to start ending the strategic arms race is to seek agreement with the Soviet Union to an immediate and mutual interim strategic standstill. This would mean freezing the present strategic nuclear balance in all of its dimensions. It would mean time to make sound and lasting decisions later. It would preserve negotiating opportunities.

This standstill would encompass all further deployments of offensive and defensive strategic weapons system and all testing of MRV's and MIRV's. Because of the totality of its scope, because of the necessity of its taking effect immediately, and because of the complexity of the issues involved, I believe that the mutual freeze should first be introduced for a 6-month period. Starting with a 6-month period would not by any stretch of the imagination impair the security of either the United States or the Soviet Union. It would also enable both sides to determine